The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes -2007 -Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.detailsThis paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.
Access and what it is like.Bernard W. Kobes -1995 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.detailsBlock's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.
Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. shimamura (eds),Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing.Bernard W. Kobes -1997 -Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.detailsThe field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us (...) with the rudiments of a theory that meets these desiderata and integrates the principal findings reported in this collection. (shrink)
On a model for psycho-neural coevolution.Bernard W. Kobes -1991 -Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):1-17.detailsAccording to a model of inter-theoretic relations advocated by Patricia S. Churchland, psychology will need to revise its theories so as to fit them for "smooth reduction" to the neurosciences, and this will lead to the elimination of reference to intentional contents from psychology. It is argued that this model is ambiguous; on one reading it is empirically implausible, on the other its methodology is confused. The connectionist program NETtalk, far from exemplifying the model as Churchland claims, suggests a theoretical (...) rationale for employing relations to intentional contents in psychology. (shrink)
Review of Michael Tye'sConsciousness and Persons. [REVIEW]Bernard W. Kobes -2005 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.detailsConsciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition may not be wholly facetious, if Michael Tye's latest book is right. Tye's main goal here is to develop a theory of the phenomenal unity of experience at a time, and its diachronic analog, the moment-to-moment continuity of one's experiential stream from the time one wakes up to the time consciousness lapses.
Working Without a Net. [REVIEW]Bernard W. Kobes -1994 -Review of Metaphysics 47 (3):613-614.detailsTo say that S's belief or action is rational is to say, according to Foley, that from a certain belief perspective it appears to satisfy certain of S's goals. This approach is firmly teleological in character, and does not take "rules" or "virtues" of rationality to be fundamental. Precisely which belief perspective, and which of S's goals, are relevant here? We should acknowledge many notions of rationality, says Foley, depending on how we fix these parameters. We might take all of (...) S's goals to be relevant, or perhaps only S's desire to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs. And we might take as relevant the belief perspective of experts in S's community, or that of an objectively knowledgeable observer, or that of S alone were S to be deeply reflective. (shrink)