Works by Bernard Berofsky
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- Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy.Bernard Berofsky -1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.This is a detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A sustained critique of (...) concepts such as moral autonomy, self-realisation, ideal autonomy, and identification is offered. The author replaces these with an alternative model that reveals how spontaneity, vitality and competence enable human beings to act in the real world. (shrink)
- Nature's Challenge to Free Will.Bernard Berofsky -2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press USA.Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
- (1 other version)Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues.Bernard Berofsky -2001 - In Robert Kane,The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Free Will and Determinism.Bernard Berofsky (ed.) -1966 - New York,: Harper & Row.
- Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility.Bernard Berofsky -1987 - New York: Routledge.Introduction No philosophical problem is more deserving of the title 'the free will problem' than that concerning the assessment of the claim that a ...
- Global control and freedom.Bernard Berofsky -2006 -Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, (...) the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities. (shrink)
- Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet.Bernard Berofsky -2003 - In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker,Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 107.
- Determinism.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press.A revision of the author's thesis, Columbia University, 1963.
- Autonomy.Bernard Berofsky -1983 - In L.S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. Parsons & Robert Schwartz,How Many Questions? Hacket.
- (1 other version)Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: Dispositional Analyses of Free Will.Bernard Berofsky -2001 - In Robert Kane,The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Free will and the mind–body problem.Bernard Berofsky -2010 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...) autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described. (shrink)
- The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky -2006 -Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...) agents need to possess and exercise can be secured without metaphysical excess. If there is a free will problem, it is the one G. E. Moore addressed in 1912. He concluded that persons can act otherwise in a deterministic world. We should continue to try to figure out whether he was right or wrong. (shrink)
- The regularity theory.Bernard Berofsky -1968 -Noûs 2 (4):315-340.
- Identification, the self, and autonomy.Bernard Berofsky -2003 -Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):199-220.Autonomy, we suppose, is self-regulation or self-direction. There is a distinct idea that is easily confused with self-direction, namely, self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Although it will turn out paradoxically that autonomy is neither self-regulation nor self-realization, it is reasonable to suppose that the former is a superior candidate. My teacher of Indian religion, Dr. Subodh Roy, blind from birth, chose not to undergo an operation that would have made him sighted because he believed, perhaps rightly, that the ability to see (...) would interfere with his religious quest. He thereby chose not to realize one of his fundamental human capacities, one whose cultivation has produced some of the finest fruits of civilization. Joseph Raz describes a case in which a man places his life in jeopardy by undertaking a trip to deliver medical aid to a group of people in a distant place. Since he will be unable to secure food for several days, he, in effect, subordinates one of his own basic needs or interests to a goal that he deems more important. There is no reason to believe that, in refusing to express or realize a dimension of self, either Dr. Roy or Raz's philanthropist have failed to act autonomously. (shrink)
- Classical Compatibilism.Bernard Berofsky -2016 - In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy, Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge. pp. 4-51.
- Autonomy and Free Will.Bernard Berofsky -2004 - In James Stacey Taylor,Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the world one happened to inhabit even if it is deterministic, (...) one would have the capacity for perfect autonomy. The extreme incompatibilist position that autonomy requires creation of self ex nihilo is incoherent. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - Causality and general laws.Bernard Berofsky -1966 -Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):148-157.
- III. Explanation.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 35-41.
- (2 other versions)Books available for review.Theodor W. Adorno,Bernard Berofsky,Robert H. Blank,Andre L. Bonnicksen,Irene Bloom &Joshua A. Fogel -1996 -Auslegung 21:159.Export citation Bookmark
- Books available.Frederick C. Beiser,Wolfgang Benhabib,John McCole,Bernard Berofsky,Robert H. Blank &Andre L. Bonnicksen -1996 -Auslegung 21.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Acknowledgments.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press.No categories
- Belief and responsibility.Bernard Berofsky -1989 - In Peter Slezak,Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95--122.
- "Review: Responsibility, by Jonathan Glover,".Bernard Berofsky -1973 -Journal of Philosophy 70 (20):766-771.No categories
- Determinism and the concept of a person.Bernard Berofsky -1964 -Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475.
- Foreword.Bernard Berofsky &Isaac Levi -2012 -Journal of Philosophy 109 (8-9):469-469.
- Freedom as Creativity.Bernard Berofsky -2015 -Journal of Philosophy 112 (7):373-395.Determinism poses a prima facie problem about free will only if the latter is understood as counterfactual power, understood categorically, rather than self-determination. A key premise of the defense of incompatibilism provided by the Consequence Argument, namely, that laws are unalterable, presupposes that laws include more than the fundamental laws of physics. This premise is challenged by appeal to actual cases. The necessitarian assumptions embodied in that premise can be successfully challenged by a new and improved version of the regularity (...) theory. Other defenses of the latter, including a defense of Humean Supervenience, are offered. The picture that the compatibilist offers of a decision maker, in part responsible for the laws of psychology, unconcerned about the deterministic or indeterministic nature of the world, is of a more creative individual than the incompatibilist, for whom one’s freedom depends upon the nature of a world about which one has no control. (shrink)
- Free Will in the History of Philosophy.Bernard Berofsky -1970 - In Robert Audi,Dictionary of the History of Ideas.Export citation Bookmark
- Freedom Without Self.Bernard Berofsky -1997 - In Charles Harry Manekin & Menachem Marc Kellner,Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives. University Press of Maryland.Export citation Bookmark
- Introduction.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 1-6.No categories
- Index.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 325-330.No categories
- IV. Causality.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 42-126.No categories
- IX. Determinism Defined.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 268-270.
- In Defense of Mill's Theory of Free Will.Bernard Berofsky -2014 - In Antis Loizides,Mill’s a System of Logic: Critical Appraisals. New York: Routledge.Export citation Bookmark
- I. Foreknowledge.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 9-27.
- In Memoriam: Arthur C. Danto.Bernard Berofsky -2013 -Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):581-582.
- II. Predictability.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 28-34.
- Is Pathological Altruism Altruism?Bernard Berofsky -2011 - In Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Guruprasad Madhavan & David Sloan Wilson,Pathological Altruism. Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Is Pathological Altruism Altruism?Bernard Berofsky -2011 - In Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Guruprasad Madhavan & David Sloan Wilson,Pathological Altruism. Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Keith Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism.Bernard Berofsky -1969 -Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):151.Export citation Bookmark
- Minkus-Benes on incorrigibility.Bernard Berofsky -1958 -Mind 67 (April):264-266.
- On the Absolute Freedom of the Will.Bernard Berofsky -1992 -American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):279 - 289.
- Purposive Action.Bernard Berofsky -1970 -American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):311 - 320.
- Phl 341f Free Will and Determinism.Bernard Berofsky &I. Wilks -1995 - Custom Publishing Service, University of Toronto Bookstores.Export citation Bookmark
- The counterfactual analysis of causation.Bernard Berofsky -1973 -Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):568-569.
- The Irrelevance of Morality to Freedom.Bernard Berofsky -1980 -Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:38-47.
- The Luck Argument Against Libertarianism.Bernard Berofsky -2019 - In Allan McCay & Michael Sevel,Free Will and the Law: New Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 66-84.Export citation Bookmark
- The metaphysics of freedom.Bernard Berofsky -1977 -Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4 (2):161-186.
- (1 other version)Through thick and thin: Mele on autonomy.Bernard Berofsky -1998 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):689-697.
- VIII. Deterministic Accounts.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 253-267.No categories
- VI. The Regularity Theory: Translatability.Bernard Berofsky -1971 - InDeterminism. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. pp. 179-220.No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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