Mimicking emotions: how 3–12-month-old infants use the facial expressions and eyes of a model.Robert Soussignan,Nicolas Dollion,BenoistSchaal,Karine Durand,Nadja Reissland &Jean-Yves Baudouin -2017 -Cognition and Emotion 32 (4):827-842.detailsWhile there is an extensive literature on the tendency to mimic emotional expressions in adults, it is unclear how this skill emerges and develops over time. Specifically, it is unclear whether infants mimic discrete emotion-related facial actions, whether their facial displays are moderated by contextual cues and whether infants’ emotional mimicry is constrained by developmental changes in the ability to discriminate emotions. We therefore investigate these questions using Baby-FACS to code infants’ facial displays and eye-movement tracking to examine infants’ looking (...) times at facial expressions. Three-, 7-, and 12-month-old participants were exposed to dynamic facial expressions of a virtual model which either looked at the infant or had an averted gaze. Infants did not match emotion-specific facial actions shown by the model, but they produced valence-congruent facial responses to the distinct expressions. Furthermore, only the 7- and 12-month-olds displayed negative responses to the model’s negative expressions and they looked more at areas of the face recruiting facial actions involved in specific expressions. Our results suggest that valence-congruent expressions emerge in infancy during a period where the decoding of facial expressions becomes increasingly sensitive to the social signal value of emotions. (shrink)
Animal Consciousness.Pierre Le Neindre,Emilie Bernard,Alain Boissy,Xavier Boivin,Ludovic Calandreau,Nicolas Delon,Bertrand Deputte,Sonia Desmoulin-Canselier,Muriel Dunier,Nathan Faivre,Martin Giurfa,Jean-Luc Guichet,Léa Lansade,Raphaël Larrère,Pierre Mormède,Patrick Prunet,BenoistSchaal,Jacques Servière &Claudia Terlouw -2017 -EFSA Supporting Publication 14 (4).detailsAfter reviewing the literature on current knowledge about consciousness in humans, we present a state-of-the art discussion on consciousness and related key concepts in animals. Obviously much fewer publications are available on non-human species than on humans, most of them relating to laboratory or wild animal species, and only few to livestock species. Human consciousness is by definition subjective and private. Animal consciousness is usually assessed through behavioural performance. Behaviour involves a wide array of cognitive processes that have to be (...) assessed separately using specific experimental protocols. Accordingly, several processes indicative of the presence of consciousness are discussed: perception and cognition, awareness of the bodily-self, self-related knowledge of the environment (including social environment). When available, specific examples are given in livestock species. Next, we review the existing evidence regarding neuronal correlates of consciousness, and emphasize the difficulty of linking aspects of consciousness to specific neural structures across the phyla because high-level cognitive abilities may have evolved independently along evolution. Several mammalian brain structures (cortex and midbrain) are involved in the manifestations of consciousness, while the equivalent functional structures for birds and fishes would likely be the pallium/tectum and midbrain. Caution is required before excluding consciousness in species not having the same brain structures as the mammalian ones as different neural architectures may mediate comparable processes. Finally, specific neurophysiological mechanisms appear to be strongly linked to the emergence of consciousness, namely neural synchrony and neural feedback. Considering the limited amount of data available and the few animal species studied so far, we conclude that different manifestations of consciousness can be observed in animals but that further refinement is still needed to characterize their level and content in each species. Further research is required to clarify these issues, especially in livestock species. (shrink)
The Body Speaks: Using the Mirror Game to Link Attachment and Non-verbal Behavior.Rinat Feniger-Schaal,Yuval Hart,Nava Lotan,Nina Koren-Karie &Lior Noy -2018 -Frontiers in Psychology 9:388728.detailsThe Mirror Game (MG) is a common exercise in dance/movement therapy and drama therapy. It is used to promote participants’ ability to enter and remain in a state of togetherness. In spite of the wide use of the MG by practitioners, it is only recently that scientists begun to use the MG in research, examining its correlates, validity and reliability. This study joins this effort by reporting on the identification of scale items to describe the nonverbal behaviour expressed during the (...) MG and its correlation to measures of attachment. Thus, we explored the application of the MG as a tool for assessing the embodiment of attachment in adulthood. Forty-eight participants (22 females, mean age = 33.2) played the MG with the same gender-matched expert players. All MG were videotaped. In addition, participants were evaluated on two central measurements of attachment in adulthood: The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) and the Experience in Close Relationship questionnaire (ECR). To analyse the data, we developed the “mirror game scale” that coded the nonverbal behavior during the movement interaction, using 19 parameters. The sub-scales were reduced using factor analysis into two dimensions referred to as “together” and “free”. The free factor was significantly correlated to both measurements of attachment: Participants classified as having secure attachment on the AAI, received higher scores on the MG free factor than participants classified as insecure (t (46) = 7.858, p =.000). Participants who were high on the avoidance dimension on the ECR, were low on the MG free factor (r (48) =-.-285, p =.007). This is the first study to examine the MG as it is used by practitioners and its correlation to highly standardized measures. This exploratory study may be considered as part of the first steps of exploring the MG as a standardized assessment tool. The advantages of the MG as a simple, non-verbal movement interaction demonstrate some of the strengths of dance/movement and drama therapy practice. (shrink)
Using Drama Therapy to Enhance Maternal Insightfulness and Reduce Children’s Behavior Problems.Rinat Feniger-Schaal &Nina Koren-Karie -2021 -Frontiers in Psychology 11.detailsMaternal insightfulness or the capacity to see things from the child’s point of view, is considered to be a crucial construct for therapeutic change. In the present study, we aimed to implement the knowledge gleaned from the studies on attachment theory and maternal insightfulness into clinical practice to create an intervention program for mothers of children-at-risk due to inadequate parental care. We used drama therapy to “practice” maternal insightfulness in more “experiential” ways, because the use of creative expressive means may (...) be accessible and effective for the target population of the study and help improve maternal care. We used a manualized 10-week drama therapy-group intervention, focusing on the core concepts of maternal insightfulness: insightfulness, separateness, complexity, and acceptance. We used various dramatic means to explore and experience these components of maternal insightfulness. Forty mothers of children-at-risk took part in eight groups of parental insightfulness drama therapy. To evaluate the efficacy of the intervention, we used the Insightfulness Assessment interview, which produces 10 scales and a final classification of PI and non-PI. The Child Behavior Check List was used to evaluate a change in children’s behavior problems. The assessment took place at three time points: before the intervention, right after the end of the intervention, and 6 months following the intervention. Results at T2 showed a significant improvement compared to T1 in some of the maternal insightfulness scales, but not in the maternal insightfulness categorical classification. At T3, there was a significant change in the classification of the mothers, from non-insightful to positively insightful. At T3, there was also a significant decline in the children’s externalized and general behavioral problems. The results of this study contribute to an evidence-based practice of using drama therapy in the treatment of mothers and children at risk. (shrink)
Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative.JimSchaal -2011 -American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 32 (1):97-101.detailsIn his 1992 book The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence, philosopher and theologian Jerome A. Stone developed an epistemological stance in which "experience, understanding, and knowledge are seen as transactions between what we call the subject and the object" (3). From this epistemological stance, writes Stone, follows the hermeneutical image that shapes his most recent work, Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative: "This book is like a portrait.… Unlike most portraits, however, the portraitist is clearly stationed within the (...) group being portrayed" (3). In Stone's insightful, generous, and fair-minded portrayal of the figures among whom he stands, readers of the American Journal of .. (shrink)
Fulfilment.JocelynBenoist -2008 - In Jesús Padilla Gálvez,Phenomenology as Grammar. Heusenstamm [Germany]: De Gruyter. pp. 77-96.detailsIt seems reasonable to say that the basic problem of Husserl’s phenomenology is the possibility for the mind to get related to the world. In Brentano’s view, intentionality was a universal characterization of the mental. In Husserl’s, it becomes as well the framework of the possible contact of the mind with the world. As Hilary Putnam observes: “‘Brentano’s thesis’ was meant by him to serve as a way of showing the autonomy of mentalistic psychology (‘act-psychology’) by showing that the mental (...) was separate from the real (external) world. Brentano himself, to my knowledge, never used the word ‘intentionality’, nor did he use the terms ‘intentional inexistence’ and ‘intentional existence’ to refer to the relation between mind and the real world, as philosophers have come to use the word ‘intentionality’ after Husserl.”1 * I owe my understanding of what Wittgenstein says on ‘intentionality’ to Bouveresse 1987, p.279-302. My further criticism of ‘intentional objects’, and my present conception of intentionality, was also deeply influenced by Vincent Descombes’s realist strand of intentionalism. See Descombes 1995 and 1996. John McDowell (see “Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein”, reprinted in McDowell 1998a, 297-321, among other papers) gave me the decisive clue as to the problem of the basic ‘harmony’ between thought and reality in Wittgenstein, and illuminating discussions with Jean-Philippe Narboux, in particular on the occasion of a lecture in which he presented a sharp criticism of Husserl’s conception of indexicality, helped me to measure up all the difficulty of a comparison with Husserl. See Narboux 2008. As to my awareness of the trouble one may have ‘meaning’ and sticking to a use, I owe it to Stanley Cavell’s radical reading of Wittgenstein that shows that realism makes room for scepticism, far from extinguishing it, and Sandra Laugier’s sensitive research in the field of moral philosophy, following in the footsteps of Cora Diamond, drew my attention to the role some experiences play in overcoming such difficulty (as the lack of such experiences can make it a dead-end).. (shrink)
Democracy and populism: the Telos essays.Alain deBenoist -2018 - Candor, NY: Telos Press Publishing. Edited by Russell A. Berman & Timothy W. Luke.detailsAn interview with Alain deBenoist -- Confronting globalization -- Nazism and communism : evil twins -- What is sovereignty? -- The first federalist : Johannes Althusius -- On politics -- On the French right-new and old : an interview with Alain deBenoist -- On identity -- On the French referendum -- Our American friend Paul Piccone was a free spirit and a loud talker -- The current crisis of democracy -- Dismantling the left-right divide -- What (...) is populism? (shrink)
Nazism And Communism: Evil Twins?Alain deBenoist -1998 -Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 1998 (112):178-192.detailsThe publication of this Black Book by a group of historians to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the October Revolution has opened a heated debate, first in France and then abroad. Edited by Stéphane Courtois, who also wrote the preface (instead of François Furet, who died a few months before its publication), this work attempts to provide an accurate account of the human cost of communism in view of the documentary evidence available today. The estimate is around 100 million dead—four (...) times the body-count of Nazism. These figures are not really a revelation. From Boris Souvarine to Robert Conquest and…. (shrink)
Rangs et types de rang maximum dans les corps différentiellement clos.FranckBenoist -2002 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 67 (3):1178-1188.detailsIt is known that in differentially closed fields of characteristic zero, the ranks of stability $RU$, $RM$ and the topological rank $RH$ need not to be equal. Pillay and Pong have just shown however that the ranks $RU$ and $RM$ coincide in a group definable in this theory. At the opposite, we will show in this paper that the ranks $RM$ and $RH$ of a definable group can also be different, and even lead to non-equivalent notions of generic type.
The structural revolution.Jean MarieBenoist -1978 - New York: St. Martin's Press.detailsIn this important contribution to the debate, Jean-MarieBenoist provides a lucid expositor of the progress which structuralism has so far made and of the main problems which it has encountered. In particular he brings out the full philosophical implications and reveals the metaphysical obstacles with which some philosophers and structuralist have become ensnared.
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Traženje i pronalaženje. Intencionalnost kao unutarnja i izvanjska relacija.JocelynBenoist -2006 -Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):347-358.detailsAutor pita može li se intencionalnost opisati kao unutarnji ili kao izvanjski odnos. Nakon što je pokazao da je nemoguće reducirati intencionalnost na puke izvanjske odnose, on naglašuje da nije moguće niti pojmiti ju ekskluzivno kao unutarnji odnos. Nema intencionalnog unutarnjeg odnosa bez njegova konteksta izvanjskih odnosa koji mu dopuštaju da djeluje. Autor pokušava pokazati primjer za to analizirajući problem determiniranja intencionalnosti kao povezane s anticipativnom strukturom intencionalnosti, s posebnom pozornošću, s jedne strane, prema stvari ambigviteta, te s druge strane, (...) prema onoj nemogućnosti. On pokušava pokazati da sposobnost intencionalnosti da sebe determinira ovisi o uvjetima koji pripadaju okolnostima. Njegova demonstracija je na liniji s nekom vrstom eksternalizma u filozofiji uma.The author asks whether intentionality could be described as an internal or an external relation. Afterhe has shown that it is impossible to reduce intentionality to mere external relations,he emphasizes that it is not possible either to consider it to be an internal relation exclusively.There is no intentional internal relation without its context of external relations that permit it towork. The author tries to make a case for that by analyzing the problem of the determination of intentionalityas related to the anticipative structure of intentionality, with special attention on theone hand to the issue of ambiguities and on the other hand to the one of impossibilities. He tries toshow that the ability for the intentionality to self-determine depends on conditions which pertain tocircumstances. His demonstration is in line with some kind of externalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)
Le bruit du sensible.JocelynBenoist -2013 - Paris: Les éditions du Cerf.detailsQu'est-ce que la perception? Par elle, que nous disent les sens du monde, de l'autre et de nous-mêmes? Rien! Les sens sont muets. Ils n'ont rien à nous dire! Telle est la réponse de JocelynBenoist. Il est essentiel, pourtant, que nous puissions en parler. Seulement c'est nous qui parlons, non eux. Et si, voulant faire droit à la réalité de notre expérience sensible. nous commencions par renoncer à la traiter d'abord comme un discours? Le mutisme des sens demeure (...) traversé de bruits. JocelynBenoist, envers et contre un certain traitement philosophique de la perception - qui la confond avec la connaissance que nous pouvons en tirer ou le sens que nous pouvons lui donner -, nous invite à écouter en elle le bruissement du sensible. Selon lui, pour rendre celui-ci pleinement audible. il faut congédier ce que la philosophie aujourd'hui appelle le "problème de la perception" et, peut-être, renoncer au concept même de "perception" tel que nous l'héritons de la philosophie moderne, au profit d'une enquête sur la texture réelle et poétique du sensible. (shrink)
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L'a priori conceptuel: Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick.JocelynBenoist -1999 - Paris: J. Vrin.detailsLa question du synthétique a priori définie par Husserl, malgré la critique adressée par le Cercle de Vienne, est réouverte. Plutôt que de fonder le concept à partir de l'intuition, l'auteur propose de le fonder à partir du concept. Il s'appuie sur la pensée de Bolzano, pour en faire le principe d'une lecture de Kant, Husserl, Schlick et Wittgenstein.
Toward a contextual realism.JocelynBenoist -2021 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.detailsEsteemed philosopher JocelynBenoist argues for a renewed realism that takes seriously the context in which intention occurs. "What there is"-the traditional subject of metaphysics-can be determined only in context,Benoist contends, carving out a new path that rejects acontextual ontologies and approaches to the mind.
Logique du phénomène.JocelynBenoist -2016 - Paris: Hermann.detailsQu'est-ce qu'un phenomene? La pensee moderne emploie ce terme avec une forme d'evidence. On se dispute sur ce que sont les phenomenes, mais on ne doute pas qu'il y en ait ni qu'ils constituent un point de depart sur lequel on puisse construire. Ce livre, a travers une mise en perspective historique et conceptuelle globale, remet en question cette evidence. Non pas qu'il rejette la notion de phenomene, mais il essaie de comprendre d'abord de quel type de decision philosophique elle (...) est le produit et quel type de montage elle suppose. Sur cette base, il met en lumiere sous quelles conditions on peut effectivement parler de phenomenes et dissipe la mythologie liee a un emploi inconditionne de ce terme, frequent dans la philosophie contemporaine. Contre tout phenomenalisme, il fait valoir le lien metaphysique dans lequel le langage nous met immediatement avec les choses. (shrink)
Représentations sans objet: aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique.JocelynBenoist -2001 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France - PUF.detailsL'idée d'une origine commune de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique commence à être bien admise. On essaie ici de lui donner quelque consistance en la mettant à l'épreuve d'une question, qui fut décisive pour les auteurs à la source de ces deux traditions, à la fin du XIXème siècle et au début du XXème : celle de la référence manquante ou des " objets inexistants ". On montre comment ce problème a pu orienter d'un côté les débats internes (...) à l'école brentanienne (Brentano lui-même, Twardowski, Meinong, le jeune Husserl), et de l'autre les réflexions des auteurs sources de la tradition dite analytique (Bolzano, Frege, Russell). Par opposition à d'autres études plus " syncrétiques ", il s'agit avant tout, dans la démarche adoptée, de mettre en avant des différences. D'abord au sein de l'école intentionaliste, beaucoup plus diversifiée et traversée de tensions qu'on ne le croit souvent. Puis, aussi et surtout, entre cette école et les auteurs qui ont choisi délibérément une autre voie : Frege et Russell, bien sûr, mais aussi déjà Bolzano. Il s'agit par là même de mesurer un écart qui devait s'avérer déterminant pour toute la philosophie du XXème siècle et de mieux définir le champ propre de cette philosophie. (shrink)
Entre acte et sens: recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification.JocelynBenoist -2002 - Paris: J. Vrin.detailsCette enquête sur la théorie de la signification de Husserl conduit à revisiter tous les lieux classiques de la philosophie du langage et de la logique contemporaine, mis en vedette depuis par la philosophie analytique.
Concepts: introduction à l'analyse.JocelynBenoist -2010 - Paris: Les éditions du Cerf.detailsQu'est-ce qu'un concept ? Cette question concerne au premier chef ceux qui ont fait du concept une profession : chercheurs dans les diverses sciences, humaines ou non, et travailleurs intellectuels en général. Plus largement, elle exprime cette curiosité naturelle, non dénuée d'inquiétude, à laquelle toute pensée, commune ou savante, semble exposée et qui nous pousse à souhaiter, sans savoir sans doute exactement ce que nous recherchons par là, une détermination plus exacte de ce que nous entendons par « pensée ». (...) Que veut dire pour la pensée que celle-ci, en un certain sens, passe par la mise en œuvre de ce que nous appelons « concepts » ? Quelle est la nature exacte de cette discrimination faite alors entre le conceptuel et le non-conceptuel ? Les concepts, étymologiquement, sont censés nous ménager une prise sur quelque chose. Cette chose, est-ce bien la réalité même ? Sommes-nous ainsi capables de penser « les choses telles qu'elles sont » ? Et, si c'est le cas, à quel prix ? Quelles limites faut-il accepter à l'efficacité de nos pensées ? Telles sont les questions recouvertes par leur caractérisation en termes de « concepts », et celles que ce livre, au fil des exemples et mises en situation, s'attache à résoudre. (shrink)
Intentionalité Et Langage Dans les Recherches Logiques de Husserl.JocelynBenoist -2001 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.detailsA la lumière des recherches menées dans l'ouvrage complémentaire Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique, il s'agit ici de livrer une analyse détaillée des Recherches logiques de Husserl, centrée sur le concept d'intentionalité, sur ses usages et sa structure. L'intentionalité telle que la construit alors Husserl est étudiée dans sa détermination fondamentalement sémantique, et on interroge systématiquement le rapport qu'il y a, dans les Recherches, entre la théorie de l'intentionalité et la théorie de (...) la référence linguistique. Cette étude débouche sur une comparaison de fond entre les doctrines de Husserl et de Frege et leurs implications respectives pour la philosophie du langage aujourd'hui - jusqu'à la remise en question, à la lumière de Frege, des insuffisances d'une pensée de l'intentionalité. La question peut alors se poser de la possibilité d'inventer une autre phénoménologie (qui ne passerait plus primairement par le concept d'intentionalité), à élaborer dans une nécessaire confrontation avec les philosophies du langage contemporaines. J. B. (shrink)
Ce que penser veut dire: penser avec Goethe, Heidegger, Rousseau, Schmitt, Péguy, Arendt..Alain deBenoist -2017 - Monaco: Éditions du Rocher.detailsLes auteurs présentés attestent que le travail de la pensée a joué un rôle décisif dans l'histoire, entraînant des mutations bien différentes des révolutions bruyantes, des grandes explosions restées sans lendemain. De Heidegger à A. Koestler, de Goethe à G. Sorel, de Nietzsche à Montherlant, de Leo Strauss à Jean Baudrillard, diverses façons de voir et comprendre le monde et d'agir sur lui.