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The book's aim is to give a working representation of what metaphysics is today. The historical contributions reveal the roots of metaphysical themes and how today's methods are linked to their Aristotelian and Leibnizian past. The volume also touches on the relationships between ontological and linguistic analysis, the questions of realism and ontological commitment, the nature of abstract objects, the existential meaning of particular quantification, the primitiveness of identity, the question of epistemic versus ontological vagueness, the necessity of origin, the (...) nature of natural necessity, the possibility of intermittent existence, the notion of a temporal part and its place in an account of persistence, the question of identity and change across time and possible worlds, and many more. Readership: A toolbox for any researcher in metaphysics and an essential source for any PhD student with ontological interests. (shrink)

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According to David Lewis, the argument from temporary intrinsics is ‘the principal and decisive objection against endurance’. I focus on eternalist endurantism, discussing three different ways the eternalist endurantist can try to avoid treating temporary intrinsics as relational. Two of them, generally known as ‘adverbialism’ and ‘SOFism’, are familiar and controversial. I scrutinize them and argue that Lewis’ scepticism about them is well founded. Then, I sketch a further, to some extent new, version of eternalist endurantism, where the key idea (...) is that intrinsic monadic properties had simpliciter by objects are eternal, time-transcendent properties in Fine’s sense, i.e., properties had by objects regardless of time. Eternal properties of an object are ipso facto sempiternal. When something is P at one time and not P at another, it is radically indeterminate whether it is Psimpliciter or not. I argue that an account along these lines is better placed to treat intrinsic monadic properties of changing objects than any other known alternatives insofar as it recognizes that something is Psimpliciter ; it is able to account for x’s being P at a time in terms of something’s being P simpliciter; it has an answer to the question ‘is \simpliciter?’ when x is P at one time and not P at another. I conclude that endurantism is no less at ease with intrinsics than perdurantism is. (shrink)

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The volume collects essays by an international team of philosophers aimed at elucidating three fundamental and interconnected themes in ontology. In the first instance, there is the issue of the kind of thing that, in the primary sense, is or exists: must the primitive terms be particular or universal? Any reply will itself raise the question of how to treat discourse that appears to refer to things that cannot be met with in time and space: what difference is there between (...) saying that someone is not sad and saying that something does not exist? If we can speak meaningfully about fictions, what makes those statements true and how can the entities in question be identified? Assessment of the options that have been opened up in these fields since the work of Bertrand Russell and Alexius Meinong at the beginning of the twentieth century remains an important testing-ground for metaphysical principles and intuitions. (shrink)

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1. Ramificazioni Talvolta, un’entità di qualche sorta si divide in due o più entità della stessa sorta (un’ameba in due amebe, un lombrico in due lombrichi, una pianta in due piante). Quando questo accade, si usa dire che l’entità originale si è – metaforicamente parlando – “ramificata”. Non ogni distacco di parti è una ramificazione. Né il taglio della coda a un cane né la divisione a metà di una carta da gioco lo sono, perché nel primo caso una delle (...) entità prodotte dalla divisione non è de... (shrink)

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In their Introduction, the editors of the volume briefly describe how ontological questions have been taken as fundamental since the very origins of analytic philosophy, eventually gaining centrality during the last decades, and how they have been coming to the centre of interest in Italian-speaking analytic-style philosophy since the mid-1990s. The editors give a schematic outline of the overall structure of the volume and say how it can be grounded on the distinction between formal and material ontology.

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