Works by Amelie Rorty
116 found
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| Amelie Oksenberg Rorty [76] | Amélie Rorty [37] | Amelie O. Rorty [10] | Amélie Oskenberg Rorty [1] |
| Amelie Oxenberg Rorty [1] |
- Explaining Emotions.Amélie Rorty (ed.) -1980 - University of California Press.The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the..
- Survival and Identity.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) -1976 - University of California Press.
- Explaining emotions.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1978 -Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.The challenge of explaining the emotions has engaged the attention of the best minds in philosophy and science throughout history. Part of the fascination has been that the emotions resist classification. As adequate account therefore requires receptivity to knowledge from a variety of sources. The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the assumptions built into his conceptual apparatus. The contributors to this volume have (...) approached the problem of characterizing and classifying emotions from the perspectives of neurophysiology, psychology, and social psychology as well as that of philosophical psychology. They discuss the difficulties that arise in classifying the emotions, assessing their appropriateness and rationality, and determining their function in motivating moral action. (shrink)
- Perspectives on Self-Deception.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty &Brian P. McLaughlin -1988 - University of California Press. Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty.Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as wishful thinking, bad faith, and false consciousness. The book has six sections, each exploring self-deception and related phenomena from a different perspective.
- (1 other version)Identities of Persons.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) -1976 - University of California Press.In this volume, thirteen philosophers contribute new essays analyzing the criteria for personal identity and their import on ethics and the theory of action: it presents contemporary treatments of the issues discussed in Personal Identity, edited by John Perry (University of California Press, 1975).No categories
- Essays on Aristotle's De anima.Martha Craven Nussbaum &Amélie Rorty (eds.) -1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.Bringing together a group of outstanding new essays on Aristotle's De Anima, this book covers topics such as the relation between soul and body, sense-perception, imagination, memory, desire, and thought, which present the philosophical substance of Aristotle's views to the modern reader. The contributors write with philosophical subtlety and wide-ranging scholarship, locating their interpretations firmly within the context of Aristotle's thought as a whole.u.
- The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1986 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):399-412.
- Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1995 -Philosophical Review 104 (4):608.Annette Baier sets the title, the genre, and the task of her book from Hume’s essay "Of Moral Prejudices." Rather than arguing from or towards general principles, these essays call upon a wide range of reading, observation, and experience: we are not only meant to be enlightened, but also invited to adopt the reflective habits of mind they exemplify. Like Hume, Baier analyzes and evaluates our attitudes and customs; like him, she finds that our foibles and our strengths are closely (...) linked; and like him, she is both a proponent and a model of good sense. When she is unfairly prejudiced— as she is against what she sees as the harsh and narrow rigors of Kant—she is, with all the bonnehommie of Hume, more ready to tease than to demolish. (shrink)
- Where does the akratic break take place?Amelie Rorty -1980 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):333 – 346.
- Essays on Aristotle's Ethics.Amélie Rorty (ed.) -1980 - University of California Press.Aristotle's _Nicomachean Ethics_ deals with character and its proper development in the acquisition of thoughtful habits directed toward appropriate ends. The articles in this unique collection, many new or not readily available, form a continuos commentary on the _Ethics_. Philosophers and classicists alike will welcome them.
- 1. The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin,Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 11-28.
- Essays on Aristotle's "De anima.".Martha C. Nussbaum &Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1995 -Ethics 105 (2):413-416.
- Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology,.Owen J. Flanagan &Amélie Rorty (eds.) -1989 - MIT Press.Many philosophers believe that normative ethics is in principle independent of psychology. By contrast, the authors of these essays explore the interconnections between psychology and moral theory. They investigate the psychological constraints on realizable ethical ideals and articulate the psychological assumptions behind traditional ethics. They also examine the ways in which the basic architecture of the mind, core emotions, patterns of individual development, social psychology, and the limits on human capacities for rational deliberation affect morality.
- Descartes on thinking with the body.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1992 - In John Cottingham,The Cambridge companion to Descartes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 1980.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1980 - In Amélie Rorty,Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press.No categories
- Agent regret.Amélie O. Rorty -1980 - In Amélie Rorty,Explaining Emotions. University of California Press. pp. 489--506.
- Rorty.Amélie Rorty (ed.) -1986 - Univ of California Press.The essays in this volume form a commentary on Descartes' _Meditations_. Following the sequence of the meditational stages, the authors analyze the function of each stage in transforming the reader, to realize his essential nature as a rational inquirer, capable of scientific, demonstrable knowledge of the world. There are essays on the genre of meditational writing, on the implications of the opening cathartic section of the book on Descartes' theory of perception and his use of skeptical arguments; essays on the (...) theory of ideas and their role of Descartes' reconstructive analytic method; essays on the proofs for the existence of God, on the role of the will in the formation and malformation of judgments; and the essays on the foundations of the science of extension and on Descartes' account of the union of mind and body. (shrink)
- Akratic Believers.Amelie Rorty -1983 -American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183.A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.
- Belief and self-deception.Amelie Rorty -1972 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):387-410.In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I (...) analyze the conditions of self-deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self-deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self-deception. (shrink)
- Mind in Action.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1992 -Ethics 102 (4):844-846.
- (2 other versions)The Identities of Persons.Christopher Peacocke &Amelie Rorty -1978 -Philosophical Review 87 (3):456.
- The place of contemplation in Aristotle's nicomachean ethics.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1978 -Mind 87 (347):343-358.
- The Two Faces of Courage.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1986 -Philosophy 61 (236):151-171.Courage is dangerous. If it is defined in traditional ways, as a set of dispositions to overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous actions, its claim to be a virtue is questionable. Unlike the virtue of justice, or a sense of proportion, traditional courage does not itself determine what is to be done, let alone assure that it is worth doing. If we retain the traditional conception of courage and its military connotations–overcoming and combat–we should be suspicious (...) of it. Instead of automatically classifying it as a virtue, attempting to develop and exercise it, we should become alert to its dangers. And yet and yet. There is an aspect of traditional courage that serves us: we require the capacities and traits that enable us to persist in acting well under stress, to endure hardships when following our judgments about what is best is difficult or dangerous. If courage is checked, redefined as the virtue that enables virtue–the various sets of dispositions, whatever they may be, that make us resolute in worthy, difficult action–then we need not fear the dangers of courage. We need rather to reform it by diversifying it, as a heterogeneous variety of traits that enable us to act well under stress, against the natural movements of self-protection. (shrink)
- The Burdens of Love.Amelie Rorty -2016 -The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):341-354.While we primarily love individual persons, we also love our work, our homes, our activities and causes. To love is to be engaged in an active concern for the objective well-being—the thriving—of whom and what we love. True love mandates discovering in what that well-being consists and to be engaged in the details of promoting it. Since our loves are diverse, we are often conflicted about the priorities among the obligations they bring. Loving requires constant contextual improvisatory adjustment of priorities (...) among our commitments. Besides delighting in—and being enhanced by—the presence and existence of another person, love requires extended reflection and work. (shrink)
- From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1982 -Philosophy 57 (220):159 - 172.During the period from Descartes to Rousseau, the mind changed. Its domain was redefined; its activities were redescribed; and its various powers were redistributed. Once a part of cosmic Nous, its various functions delimited by its embodied condition, the individual mind now becomes a field of forces with desires impinging on one another, their forces resolved according to their strengths and directions. Of course since there is no such thing as The Mind Itself, it was not the mind that changed. (...) Conceptions of the mind changed. Yet even to say this is misleading, because it suggests that somewhere out there in nowhere there is Nous, Psyche, Soul or Mind, the true but opaque object of all these conceptions. But of course there is no Mind in the realm of things in themselves, waiting for us to see it truly, like a China of the noumenal world, amused that our various conceptions reveal as much about ourselves as about it. (shrink)
- User-Friendly Self-Deception.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1994 -Philosophy 69 (268):211 - 228.Since many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it would be wise to be ambivalent about at least some of its forms.1 It is open-eyed ambivalence that acknowledges its own dualities rather than ordinary shifty vacillation that we need. To be sure, self-deception remains dangerous: sensible ambivalence should not relax vigilance against pretence and falsity, combating irrationality and obfuscation wherever they occur.
- Kant's Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim: a critical guide.Amélie Rorty &James Schmidt (eds.) -2009 - New York: Cambridge University Press.Lively current debates about narratives of historical progress, the conditions for international justice, and the implications of globalisation have prompted a renewed interest in Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. The essays in this volume, written by distinguished contributors, discuss the questions that are at the core of Kant's investigations. Does the study of history convey any philosophical insight? Can it provide political guidance? How are we to understand the destructive and bloody upheavals that constitute so (...) much of human experience? What connections, if any, can be traced between politics, economics, and morality? What is the relation between the rule of law in the nation state and the advancement of a cosmopolitan political order? These questions and others are examined and discussed in a book that will be of interest to philosophers, social and political theorists, and intellectual and cultural historians. (shrink)
- Fearing Death.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1983 -Philosophy 58 (224):175 - 188.Many have said, and I think some have shown, that it is irrational to fear death. The extinction of what is essential to the self—whether it be biological death or the permanent cessation of consciousness—cannot by definition be experienced by oneself as a loss or as a harm.
- The Ethics of Collaborative Ambivalence.Amelie Rorty -2014 -The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):391-403.We are all ambivalent at every turn. “Should I skip class on this gorgeous spring day?” “Do I really want to marry Eric?” Despite being uncomfortable and unsettling, there are some forms of ambivalence that are appropriate and responsible. Even when they seem trivial and superficial, they reveal some of our deepest values, the self-images we would like to project. In this paper, I analyze collaborative ambivalence, the kind of ambivalence that arises from our identity-forming close relationships. The sources and (...) resolutions of collaborative ambivalence reveal how much of our thinking—and so also of our motivational structure—emerges from the details of our collaborative and dialogical engagements. The imaginative skills and strategies exercised in remaining justifiably of two minds—of preserving appropriate ambivalence—are central to practical reasoning. Because these skills provide models for addressing conflicts in the public sphere, because they prompt shared deliberation, they are among the civic virtues. (shrink)
- A Plea for Ambivalence.Amelie Rorty -2009 - In Peter Goldie,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.
- The Lures of Akrasia.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -2017 -Philosophy 92 (2):167-181.There is more akrasia than meets the eye: it can occur in speech and perception, cognitively and emotionally as well as between decision and action. The lures of akrasia are the same as those that are exercised in ordinary psychological and cognitive inferential contexts. But because it is over-determined and because it occurs in opaque intentional contexts, its attribution remains highly fallible.
- Characters, Selves, Individuals.Amelie Oxenberg Rorty &Literary Postscript -1976 - In Amélie Rorty,The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
- Essays on Aristotle's Poetics.Amélie Rorty (ed.) -1992 - Princeton University Press.Aimed at deepening our understanding of the Poetics, this collection places Aristotle's analysis of tragedy in its larger philosophical context.
- Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of Pathe.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1984 -Review of Metaphysics 37 (3):521 - 546.CONTEMPORARY discussions of the passions are often puzzlingly pulled in what appear to be opposing directions. We sometimes hold people responsible for their emotions and the actions they perform from them. Yet abnormal behavior is often explained and excused by the person "suffering" an emotional condition. We treat emotions as interruptions or deflections of normal behavior, and yet also consider a person pathological if he fails to act or react from a standard range of emotions. Sometimes emotions are classified as (...) a species of evaluative judgments whose analysis will be given in an adequate theory of cognition. But sometimes the cognitive or intentional character of an emotion is treated as dependent on, and ultimately explained by, a physical condition. These conflicting intuitions about the emotions are not easily reconciled: we cannot, for example, construct a tidy taxonomy of emotions, sorting out varieties that are cognitively from those that are primarily physically identifiable, or distinguish those that are strongly associated with "normal" motivational processes from those that are invasive interruptions. (shrink)
- Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric.Amélie O. Rorty -1996 -Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):447-450.No categories
- The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1991 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):53-72.
- Vi. akrasia and conflict.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1980 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):193 – 212.As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of (...) the akratic alternative: its power to focus or dominate the agent's attention; its being strongly habitual; its having the pull of social streaming: following the charismatic leader, the mechanisms of sympathetic or antipathetic infection, the models of role casting. Following these strategies is by no means pathological: these are relatively automatic (though still voluntary) psychological functions. That is precisely their power and attraction: they provide the conflicted akrates with an action solution, though not one that accords with his preferred judgment. (shrink)
- Spinoza on the pathos of idolatrous love and the hilarity of true love.Amelie Rorty -2009 - In Moira Gatens,Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Aristotle on the Virtues of Rhetoric.Amélie Rorty -2011 -Review of Metaphysics 64 (4):715-733.Aristotle’s phronimos is a model of the virtues: he fuses sound practical reasoning with well formed desires. Among the skills of practical reasoning are those of finding the right words and arguments in the process of deliberation. As Aristotle puts it, virtue involves doing the right thing at the right time and for the right reason. Speaking well, saying the right thing in the right way is not limited to public oratory: it pervades practical life. Aristotle’s phronimos must acquire the (...) habits that are engaged in rhetorical persuasion. (shrink)
- Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.Amélie Rorty (ed.) -1996 - Univ of California Press.Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric offers a fresh and comprehensive assessment of a classic work. Aristotle's influence on the practice and theory of rhetoric, as it affects political and legal argumentation, has been continuous and far-reaching. This anthology presents Aristotle's Rhetoric in its original context, providing examples of the kind of oratory whose success Aristotle explains and analyzes. The contributors—eminent philosophers, classicists, and critics—assess the role and the techniques of rhetorical persuasion in philosophic discourse and in the public sphere. They connect (...) Aristotle's Rhetoric to his other work on ethics and politics, as well as to his ideas on logic, psychology, and philosophy of language. The collection as a whole invites us to reassess the place of rhetoric in intellectual and political life. (shrink)
- Self-deception, akrasia and irrationality.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1985 - In Jon Elster,The Multiple Self. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Enough already with "theories of the emotions".Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -2004 - In Robert C. Solomon,Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
- The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1994 -Political Theory 22 (1):152-166.While cultural identification --cultural essentialism and reification-- can play an important liberating role. it is also internally oppressive; it denies the dynamics of intra cultural divisions.
- (1 other version)A literary postscript: Characters, persons, selves, individuals.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1976 - In Amélie Rorty,The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 301--323.
- Virtues and Their Vicissitudes.Amelie O. Rorty -1988 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):136-148.
- Descartes and Spinoza on Epistemological Egalitarianism.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1996 -History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (1):35 - 53.
- The Advantages of Moral Diversity.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1992 -Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):38.We are well served, both practically and morally, by moral and ethical diversity. Moral deliberation requires the collaboration of distinctive perspectives: consequentialist, deontological, perfectionist considerations each contribute significant dimensions in determining what is good and what is right; virtue theory highlights the development of reliable ethical character.
- The Two Faces of Spinoza.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty -1987 -Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):299 - 316."NOTHING," SAYS SPINOZA "can be destroyed except by an external cause." And he adds, "An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind.... The mind endeavors to think of those things that increase or assist the body's power of activity... and to think only of those things that affirm its power of activity". These upbeat passages are mystifying, and sometimes downright disturbing to us dark, obsessive minds, who are prone to think of things that diminish (...) our powers, prone to diminish our powers precisely by thinking about what diminishes us, who are easily capable of thinking of a world that would, could and does exclude us. I want to try to make sense of the motifs expressed in these passages, reading them in such a way that they are not offensive to our sensibility--automatic grounds for distrusting the Spinozistic enterprise. Difficulties remain; but they are the ironies of all Stoics who speak with forked tongue. The optimism of the Stoic-enlightenment program of self-improvement is joined, Janus-faced, with an equally familiar Stoic resignation in the face of necessity. The dynamic energy of conatus as the essence of individuals is revealed as mere partiality: conatus and the individual mind, the contrast between activity and passivity, the contrast between external and internal causes--all these are temporary and temporizing notions which the fully enlightened mind will recognize to be inadequate ideas. Necessary as they are, they are nevertheless merely perspectival. Individuals bent on self-improvement, perceiving themselves bounded by and opposed to the forces of similar individuals, mistake the ontological importance of their individuality and their activities. The Hobbesian strand that is woven through Spinozistic doctrine is visible only within middle-range opinion: it is not ontologically or epistemologically fundamental. Yet, though it is partial and misleading, it remains among the phenomena to be explained. The enlightened will not eliminate but rather explain and understand the middle range talk of conatus, activity and passivity, external and internal, individuals and relations. Indeed, having questioned and even undermined the starting point of individuation, Spinoza returns the repressed: in book 5, particular finite individuals are represented within eternity. (shrink)
- Persons and personae.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1990 - In Christopher Gill,The Person and the human mind: issues in ancient and modern philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Experiments in Philosophic Genre: Descartes' "Meditations".Amelie Oksenberg Rorty -1983 -Critical Inquiry 9 (3):545-564.It would be pretty to think that Descartes’ Meditations is itself a structured transformation of the meditational mode, starting with the dominance of an intellectual, ascensional mode, moving through the penitential form, and ending with the analytic-architectonic mode. Unfortunately the text does not sustain such an easy resolution to our problems. Instead, we see that different modes seem dominant at different stages; their subterranean connections and relations remain unclear.We could try to construct a nesting of mask, face, and skeleton in (...) Descartes’ use of these distinct traditions. He might have unselfconsciously inherited a Stoic skeletal structure, fleshed it with the weight of his analytic-architectonic meditation, and masked it with a penitential meditation for the sake of safety in orthodoxy. But the penitential mode provides essential structural support—it cannot be unmasked. And, as we have seen, the analytic-architectonic flesh does not always conform to the Stoic skeletal structure.The problem is that the various readings subtly undermine one another. It is as if the Meditations were composed like a Francis Bacon painting. There are plenty of good solid clues for how to read the composition of the work—in fact there are too many. The work we see when using some of those clues is quite different from the work we see when following others.Did Descartes do this deliberately? An extremely chartable reading would turn him into a new sort of Socrates, constructing puzzles to force us to examine the truth of his arguments dialectically. But whatever Descartes may be, he is not Socrates, any more than he is Hume. He is defensive as well as devious, proud as well as prickly; and he is not funny. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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