Abstracties en idealisaties: de constructie van de moderne taalkunde.Martin Stokhof &Michiel van Lambalgen -2010 -Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 72 (4):749-776.detailsThe paper addresses the way in which modern linguistics, − in particular, but not exclusively, the generative tradition − , has constructed its core concepts. It argues that a particular form of construction, reminiscent of, but crucially different from, abstrac- tion, which is dubbed ‘idealisation’, plays a central role here. The resemblances and differences between abstractions and idealisations are investigated, and consequences of the reliance on idealisations are reviewed.
Modal Deduction in Second-Order Logic and Set Theory: II.Johan van Benthem,Giovanna D'Agostino,Angelo Montanari &Alberto Policriti -1998 -Studia Logica 60 (3):387 - 420.detailsIn this paper, we generalize the set-theoretic translation method for polymodal logic introduced in [11] to extended modal logics. Instead of devising an ad-hoc translation for each logic, we develop a general framework within which a number of extended modal logics can be dealt with. We first extend the basic set-theoretic translation method to weak monadic second-order logic through a suitable change in the underlying set theory that connects up in interesting ways with constructibility; then, we show how to tailor (...) such a translation to work with specific cases of extended modal logics. (shrink)
Directed Evolution.Albert van Eyken -1996 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (3):251-258.detailsThough we humans are immensely more gifted than other animals, yet we are not the outcome of an inevitable selection of the ‘fittest’. Nor on the other hand is our importance diminished by our evolutionary inheritance. Besides, we are already here! Faith in inevitable progress is a ‘scientific’, not a Christian, delusion. We realise that the universe has its own rules and complications which intrude on our lives and often thwart our choices. It is therefore legitimate to talk of chance, (...) but we often fail to appreciate the real significance of this word. Chance is not a cause; in essence it refers to our own consciousness that we are immersed in circumstance, and it has no reality without our own purposiveness. Thus chance is not some blind and indifferent or even hostile cosmic mystery; it is the occasion of our own responses, and it even offers the opportunity of human growth. Just as we accept the laws (and dangers) of physics (e.g. gravitation), as the framework of our ordered existence, so also we may accept the surprises of chance without any despairing conclusion either from our latest researches in astronomy or from a fatal accident in the street. (shrink)
Gillian Brock, Global justice: a cosmopolitan account.Stan van Hooft -2009 -Ethics and Global Politics 2 (4):369-382.detailsThis is a review of Gillian Brock’s new book, Global justice: a cosmopolitan account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) which sets out the central theses of the book and then offers a critical appraisal of its central arguments. My specific concern is that Brock gives an insufficiently robust account of human rights with which to define the nature of global justice and thereby leaves cosmopolitanism too vulnerable to the normative pull of local and traditional moral conceptions that fall short of (...) the universalism that cosmopolitans should be able to embrace. Keywords: cosmopolitanism; human rights; global justice; Rawls; humanitarian intervention; global governance; liberal nationalism; democracy; equality; immigration (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 369–382. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2107. (shrink)
Language Mirrors Relational Positions in Recovery: A Response to Commentaries by Falzer and Davidson, Gillett, and Suppes.C. W. Van Staden -2002 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2):137-140.detailsTHE FIRST PART OF MY RESPONSE to the commentaries on my earlier paper is about the place of language and logical systems in the understanding of the personal positions that recovering patients occupy in their life experiences. It includes the main reasons for using Frege's philosophy. Thereafter, I make the point that relational positions in recovery extend broader than positions of actor and patient.
Note sur le concept de « Gattungswesen » dans la pensée de Karl Marx. Trân-vàn-Toàn -1971 -Revue Philosophique De Louvain 69 (4):525-536.detailsL'homme est Gattungswesen (être générique) en tant qu'il se réalise comme un être universel, et ce de plusieurs façons. En tant qu'être vivant, il est ouvert sur la nature tout entière. Par son travail l'homme associe la nature à sa vie en la transformant effectivement en son corps inorganique. Sa pensée atteint les objets universels, c'est-à-dire les genres, les concepts. En tant qu'être pensant, l'individu humain s'identifie au genre humain dans son ensemble. Cependant l'homme n'est pas immédiatement Gattungswesen : il (...) lui faut réaliser, dans le monde du travail, son unité effective avec les autres par une action historique commune menée consciemment. (shrink)
On Crime and Punishment and The Contexts of Law.Frank van Dun -unknowndetailsSocieties and communities are understood as orders (or laws) of persons, i.e., types of arrangements of human relations that are in principle conflict-free or equipped to solve conflicts among their members. As not all human relations fall into member-member patterns, there is need for the concept of a natural order (law) of persons, regardless of their memberships. The main theme is the comparison of the three orders, with special focus on how they deal with crime, punishment and law enforcement.
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