Movatterモバイル変換

Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Epicurus a curious account of truth and falsehood, according to which these characteristics belong to things in the world about which one speaks, not to what one says about them. I propose an interpretation that takes this account seriously and explains the connection between truth and existence that the Epicureans also seem to recognise. I then examine a second Epicurean account of truth and falsehood and show how it is related to the first.

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

In several of his philosophical works, Cicero gives reports of the Epicurean views on bivalence and the excluded middle that are not always consistent. I attempt to establish a coherent account that fits the texts as well as possible and can reasonably be attributed to the Epicureans. I argue that they distinguish between a semantic and a syntactic version of the law of the excluded middle, and that whilst they reject bivalence and the semantic law for fear of certain fatalistic (...) consequences, they endorse the syntactic law. Subsequently, I show that certain principles that they seem to endorse in the context of Cicero’s discussion of Chrysippus’ argument for fate, when modified by the addition of the atomic swerve, suggest that the Epicureans have in mind something like a supervaluationist model of truth at times, which has the desired results with respect to the three logical principles. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

My aim in this chapter is to present the fundamentals of Epicurus’ views on physics and ontology and to raise some questions that a competitor to Aristotelian hylomorphism ought to be able to handle. In section 1, I present the basic ontological framework; in section 2, I introduce atoms, which most closely correspond in Epicurus’ system to Aristotelian matter, and show how he attempted to account for some phenomenal and psychological properties of compound bodies by appealing just to the characteristics (...) and arrangement of their atomic parts. But it turns out that not all macroscopic properties are regarded as explicable in this way. In section 3, I introduce an alternative Epicurean analysis of bodies that treats them not as aggregates of material parts but rather as complexes of attributes that have so-called ‘permanent natures’ at their core. I argue that this analysis must play an ineliminable explanatory role in some contexts, in order to account for the unity of compound bodies, their persistence over time, and to ground modal claims about what belongs to them necessarily or non-necessarily. In section 4, I briefly discuss a semi-technical formulation that some Epicurean philosophers use when making such claims. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

The topic of demonstration lies at the intersection of logic and epistemology. It is motivated by the following question: what features must an argument possess to be suitable for providing us with knowledge? A first, obvious thought is that it ought to be valid and to have true premises. But some ancient philosophers came to the view that this is not yet sufficient for an argument to grant knowledge of the truth of its conclusion; there are further requirements, concerning the (...) epistemic status of its premises and the relations they bear towards its conclusion. The expression ‘demonstration’ (apodeixis) was used as a label for arguments that are capable of yielding knowledge, and various accounts were proposed of the features that a demonstration must possess. This chapter introduces this topic by giving an overview of three treatments of demonstration in antiquity: those of Aristotle; the Stoics; and some philosophers working in the Epicurean tradition. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark