Works by Alan Richardson
106 found
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| Alan Richardson [79] | Alan W. Richardson [30] | Alan J. Richardson [2] | Alan Walter Richardson [1] |
| Alanw Richardson [1] |
- Mental Imagery.Alan Richardson -1969 - Routledge.
- Carnap’s Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism.Alan W. Richardson -1997 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt. It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to philosophy (...) of science in the 1930s was largely an attempt to dissolve the tension in his early epistemology. This book fills a significant gap in the literature on the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It will be of particular importance to historians of analytic philosophy, philosophers of science, and historians of science. (shrink)
- Reconsidering Logical Positivism.Michael Friedman &Alan W. Richardson -1999 -Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (1):152-155.No categories
- Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge.Alan W. Richardson &Hans Reichenbach -1938 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Notre Dame Press.Hans Reichenbach was a formidable figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy of science. Educated in Germany, he was influential in establishing the so-called Berlin Circle, a companion group to the Vienna Circle founded by his colleague Rudolph Carnap. The movement they founded—usually known as "logical positivism," although it is more precisely known as "scientific philosophy" or "logical empiricism"—was a form of epistemology that privileged scientific over metaphysical truths. Reichenbach, like other young philosophers of the exact sciences of his generation, was deeply impressed (...) by the far-reaching changes in physics brought about by Einstein's special and general theories of relativity. Reichenbach responded to scientific advances by doing fundamental work in space-time theories, in quantum mechanics, in statistical mechanics, and in the development of probability theory—making him the most important philosopher of physics in the first generation of logical empiricism. Forced from his academic position by the Nazi race laws in 1933, Reichenbach wrote _Experience and Prediction_ at the University of Istanbul, where had had fled, expressly to introduce logical positivism to English speakers. In the two decades following World War II, during the explosion of scientific advances in North America, logical positivism was the reigning theory of the philosophy of science and Reichenbach was at the peak of his career. But, inevitably, support for logical positivism began to wane as it became obvious that the justification of scientific theories could not be entirely resolved by relying on strictly formal, technical processes. The growth of the discipline of the history of philosophy of science, which has created an audience of scholars eager for seminal classics in scientific philosophy, and the evidence supporting a historicist paradigm within logical positivism are two important reasons to make _Experience and Prediction_ available once again. "Hans Reichenbach's_ Experience and Prediction_ is one of the most important books in twentieth-century philosophy of science. Its author was, along with Rudolf Carnap, one of the two principal ambassadors to North America of the exciting new European philosophical movement known here under the names 'Logical Positivism' and 'Scientific Philosophy.' In 1938, when the book was published, Reichenbach was an exile from his native Germany, teaching in Istanbul, Turkey, and about to emigrate to the United States to take up a prestigious position at UCLA. He wrote_ Experience and Prediction_ in English as his calling card to his new American colleagues. More than any other single book,_ Experience and Prediction_ set the agenda for the new discipline of the philosophy of science that was to emerge after World War II as, perhaps, the most exciting new area in North American philosophy. Many of the problems still at the focus of discussion were given their classic formulations in this book. Long out of print,_ Experience and Prediction_ appears here in a new edition accompanied by a splendid historical introduction by the noted young philosopher and historian of the philosophy of science, Alan Richardson. A jewel of a book may once again be appreciated in its proper setting." —Don A. Howard, University of Notre Dame. (shrink)
- The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism.Alan Richardson &Thomas Uebel (eds.) -2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.If there is a movement or school that epitomizes analytic philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century, it is logical empiricism. Logical empiricists created a scientifically and technically informed philosophy of science, established mathematical logic as a topic in and tool for philosophy, and initiated the project of formal semantics. Accounts of analytic philosophy written in the middle of the twentieth century gave logical empiricism a central place in the project. The second wave of interpretative accounts was constructed to (...) show how philosophy should progress, or had progressed, beyond logical empiricism. The essays survey the formative stages of logical empiricism in central Europe and its acculturation in North America, discussing its main topics, and achievements and failures, in different areas of philosophy of science, and assessing its influence on philosophy, past, present, and future. (shrink)
- Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives From Science and Technology Studies.Flavia Padovani,Alan Richardson &Jonathan Y. Tsou (eds.) -2015 - Cham: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol. 310. Springer.This highly multidisciplinary collection discusses an increasingly important topic among scholars in science and technology studies: objectivity in science. It features eleven essays on scientific objectivity from a variety of perspectives, including philosophy of science, history of science, and feminist philosophy. Topics addressed in the book include the nature and value of scientific objectivity, the history of objectivity, and objectivity in scientific journals and communities. Taken individually, the essays supply new methodological tools for theorizing what is valuable in the pursuit (...) of objective knowledge and for investigating its history. The essays offer many starting points, while suggesting new avenues of research. Taken collectively, the essays exemplify the very virtues of objectivity that they theorize—in reading them together, the reader can sense various anxieties about the dangerously subjective in our age and locate commonalities of concern as well as differences of approach. As a result, the volume offers an expansive vision of a research community seeking a communal understanding of its own methods and its own epistemic anxieties, struggling to enunciate the key problems of knowledge of our time and offer insight into how to overcome them. -/- (Contributors: Alex Csiszar, Scott Edgar, Peter Galison, Ian Hacking, Sandra Harding, Moira Howes, Paolo Savoia, Judy Segal, Joan Steigerwald, and Alison Wylie). (shrink)
- Logical Empiricism, American Pragmatism, and the Fate of Scientific Philosophy in North America.Alan W. Richardson -forthcoming -Logical Empiricism in North America:1.
- Carnap's Construction of the World.Alan W. Richardson -2000 -Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):717-720.No categories
- Occasions for an Empirical History of Philosophy of Science: American Philosophers of Science at Work in the 1950s and 1960s.Alan Richardson -2012 -Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):1-20.The text- and argument-focused histories of philosophy that we have are mainly interested in teasing out the details of the positions taken on philosophical issues by individual philosophers. But this is a long way from having a historical explanation of the larger-scale trajectory of philosophical development. An empirical history of philosophy, however, examines the institutionalized places and venues for philosophical work that provide a rich, shared structure for the promotion of particular sorts of work. Mid-twentieth-century philosophers of science such as (...) Herbert Feigl and Philipp Frank knew what they were doing—they were creating the space to promote certain sorts of work in venues such as the Institute for the Unity of Science and the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and, ultimately, in publication venues such as Daedalus and the Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science. Here the engine of progress is the institution-building activity of committed philosophers making a space within the institutional structures of philosophy for their own projects and other projects aligned with them and transmitting these as live philosophical projects to the next generation. (shrink)
- Interpreting Carnap: Critical Essays.Alan W. Richardson &Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.) -2024 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.A comprehensive, systematic, and historical collection of essays on Rudolf Carnap's philosophy and legacy, written by leading international experts. This volume provides a redressing of Carnap's place in the history of analytic philosophy, through his approach to metaphysics, values, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science.
- Logical Empiricism as Scientific Philosophy.Alan W. Richardson -2024 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.This Element offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.
- 'That Sort of Everyday Image of Logical Positivism': Thomas Kuhn and the Decline of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science.Alan Richardson -2007 - In Alan Richardson & Thomas Uebel,The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 346--370.
- Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. XVI.Ronald N. Giere &Alan W. Richardson (eds.) -1996 - Univ of Minnesota Press.This latest volume in the eminent Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series examines the main features of the intellectual milieu from which logical empiricism sprang, providing the first critical exploration of this context by ...
- Logical Empiricism in North America.Gary L. Hardcastle &Alan W. Richardson (eds.) -2003 - Univ of Minnesota Press."An essential overview of an important intellectual movement, Logical Empiricism in North America offers the first significant, sustained, and multidisciplinary attempt to understand the intellectual, cultural, and political dimensions of ...
- Toward a History of Scientific Philosophy.Alan Richardson -1997 -Perspectives on Science-Historical Philosophical and Social 5 (3):418--451.Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, philosophers of various sorts, including Helmholtz, Avenarius, Husserl, Russell, Carnap, Neurath, and Heidegger, were united in promulgating a new, “scientific” philosophy. This article documents some of the varieties of scientific philosophy and argues that the history of scientific philosophy is crucial to the development of analytic philosophy and the division between analytic and continental philosophy. Scientific philosophy defined itself via criticisms of old-fashioned systematic metaphysics and, in the twentieth century, of Lebensphilosophie. It (...) offered a modernist vision of philosophy participating in a progressive, problem-solving, piecemeal, and collaborative scientific ethos. The article argues that the rise of scientific philosophy indicates a change of the conception of science as well as philosophy in the late nineteenth century and notes some tensions in the accounts of science offered by scientific philosophers. The article offers some preliminary lessons for the interpretation of logical empiricism and phenomenology as episodes within a larger history of scientific philosophy. (shrink)
- Carnap on Unity of Science.Bianca Crewe &Alan Richardson -2024 - In Alan W. Richardson & Adam Tamas Tuboly,Interpreting Carnap: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.It is no secret that various versions of logical empiricism argued for the importance of unified science. Carnap was a proponent of unity of science views, although he expressed this in different idioms at different times. In the Aufbau (1928) he spoke of the unity of the object domain secured through definability in the constitutional system, in his physicalist period he argued that a physicalist language could serve as the universal language of science, and in his mature philosophical work he (...) investigated a variety of meanings that might be attached to reductionist projects for unifying various scientific fields. Our essay focuses less on Carnap’s several proposals than on a prior interpretive question: what was philosophically at stake for Carnap in the question of the unity of science? We begin with some suggestions in Carnap’s 1963 Intellectual Autobiography, where he calls unity of science “one of the main tenets of our general philosophical conception” and one in which Neurath’s emphasis on the “interdependence of all decisions … made a strong impression” on him. We follow Carnap in the suggestion that an account of his approach to unity of science does not take us into questions of unity of nature but rather of the scientific attitude and the unity of reason. (shrink)
- 'The Fact of Science' and the Critique of Knowledge: Exact Science as Problem and Resource in Marburg Neo-Kantianism.Alan Richardson -2006 - In Michael Friedman & Alfred Nordmann,The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science. MIT Press. pp. 211-226.
- Narrating the history of reason itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a constitutive a priori for the twenty-first century.Alan W. Richardson -2002 -Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274.: This essay explores some themes in use of a relativized Kantian a priori in the work of Thomas Kuhn and Michael Friedman. It teases out some shared and some divergent beliefs and attitudes in these two philosophers by comparing their characteristic questions and problems to the questions and problems that seem most appropriately to attend to an adequate understanding of games and their histories. It argues for a way forward within a relativized Kantian framework that is suggested but not (...) argued for in Friedman (2001): philosophers of science should move from a concern with unreason as meaninglessness to a concern with unreason as argumentative coercion. It ends with a few suggestions regarding a place for philosophy in the history of reason. (shrink)
- Scientific Philosophy as a Topic for History of Science.Alan Richardson -2008 -Isis 99 (1):88-96.In lieu of a programmatic argument about the general relations of history of science and philosophy of science, this essay offers a particular topic in the history of philosophy of science that should be of interest to both historians and philosophers of science. It argues that questions typical of contemporary history of science could illuminate the recent history of philosophy of science and analytic philosophy. It also suggests that the history of scientific philosophy is a particularly fruitful arena for historians (...) of science interested in issues of marginal science. (shrink)
- Two Dogmas about Logical Empiricism.Alan Richardson -1997 -Philosophical Topics 25 (2):145-168.
- A Critical Context For Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism.Miriam Solomon &Alan Richardson -2005 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):211-222.
- (1 other version)Engineering philosophy of science: American pragmatism and logical empiricism in the 1930s.Alan W. Richardson -2002 -Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S36-S47.This essay examines logical empiricism and American pragmatism, arguing that American philosophy's embrace of logical empiricism in the 1930s was not a turning away from Dewey's pragmatism. It places both movements within scientific philosophy and finds two key points on which they agreed: their revolutionary ambitions and their social engineering sensibility. The essay suggests that the disagreement over emotivism in ethics should be placed within the context of a larger issue on which the movements disagreed: demarcationism and imperialism.
- Taking the Measure of Carnap's Philosophical Engineering: Metalogic as Metrology.Alan Richardson -2013 - In Erich H. Reck,The Historical turn in Analytic Philosophy. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 60--77.
- Imagery: Definition and types.Alan Richardson -1983 - In Anees A. Sheikh,Imagery: Current Theory, Research, and Application. Wiley. pp. 3--42.
- Logical idealism and Carnap's construction of the world.Alan W. Richardson -1992 -Synthese 93 (1-2):59 - 92.
- The Many Unities of Science: Politics, Semantics, and Ontology.Alan W. Richardson -2006 - In¸ Itekellersetal:Sp. pp. 1--25.No categories
- From Epistemology to the Logic of Science: Carnap’s Philosophy of Empirical Knowledge in the 1930s.Alan W. Richardson -1996 - In Ronald N. Giere & Alan W. Richardson,Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. XVI. Univ of Minnesota Press. pp. 309--332.
- (1 other version)How Not to Russell Carnap's Aufbau.Alan Richardson -1990 -PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:3-14.On the standard interpretation Rudolf Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt amounts to a highly derivative work-a rigorous thinking through of Russell's External World program. An examination of the aims and methods of logical analysis reveals significant differences between the epistemologies of Russell and Carnap, however. It is argued that Russell's reliance on acquaintance makes logical analysis subservient to empiricist epistemic concerns while Carnap is determined to carry out a broadly Kantian program of guaranteeing the objectivity of science through the (...) application of formal logic. (shrink)
- Freedom in a Scientific Society: Reading the Context of Reichenbach's Contexts.Alan Richardson -2006 - In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle,Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction. Springer. pp. 41--54.The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, this distinction dear to the projects of logical empiricism, was, as is well known, introduced in precisely those terms by Hans Reichenbach in his Experience and Prediction (Reichenbach 1938). Thus, while the idea behind the distinction has a long history before Reichenbach, this text from 1938 plays a salient role in how the distinction became canonical in the work of philosophers of science in the mid twentieth century. The new contextualist history (...) of philosophy that has arisen in recent years invites us into an investigation of the nuances of philosophical distinctions and their roles in shaping the development of disciplines. Logical empiricism played a key role in the historical development of philosophy of science and this contextualist history has revealed a much richer set of projects in logical empiricism than the potted histories had allowed. Many stories have been told about the contexts of justification and discovery; few of those stories have paid more than passing attention to the larger projects in epistemology and meta-epistemology that Reichenbach was pursuing when he drew the distinction. This brief essay will seek partially to rectify that lack in, I hope, a somewhat surprising way. I shall stress the connection between this canonical distinction and some other epistemological and social terms that loom large in Reichenbach’s text, arguing that the social relevance of scientific philosophy for Reichenbach cannot be set aside in understanding his use of the DJ distinction. My point is, therefore, historical and reflexive. If we attend to the larger significance of the project in scientific philosophy that Reichenbach was advancing, we can see more clearly why the DJ distinction was introduced and rethink the significance of questioning the distinction. (shrink)
- Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing: Neo-Kantianism and the History of the Concept of Experience.Alan W. Richardson -2003 -Topoi 22 (1):55-67.It is often claimed that epistemological thought divides around the issue of the place of experience in knowledge: While empiricists argue that experience is the only legitimate source of knowledge, rationalists find other such sources. The trouble with such accounts is not that they are wrong, but that they are incomplete. On occasion, epistemological differences run deeper, raising the very notion of experience as an issue for epistemology. This paper looks at two epistemological debates which concerned not simply the place (...) of experience in knowledge but also the appropriate account of experience itself. The first episode is the rise of Marburg Neo-Kantianism in the 1870s – in particular the seminal work of Hermann Cohen in his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871). Cohen's principal point was that Kant's significance as an epistemologist was in providing a new theory of experience, one that tied experience to exact science and led to a new stress on the formal conditions of exact knowledge. The second episode is Carnap's rejection of epistemology in the 1930s in favour of a program of the logic of science. My focus in each case will be the interplay between an epistemology focused on exact science as the locus of knowledge and a concomitant call for logical methods in epistemology. (shrink)
- Science as Will and Representation: Carnap, Reichenbach, and the Sociology of Science.Alan W. Richardson -2000 -Philosophy of Science 67 (3):162.This essay explores some of the issues raised as regards the relations of philosophy and sociology of science in the work of Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. It argues that Hans Reichenbach's distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification should not be seen as erecting a principled normative/descriptive distinction that demarcates philosophy of science from sociology of science. The essay also raises certain issues about the role of volition, decision, and the limits of epistemological concern in the work of (...) Carnap and Reichenbach and in some recent sociology of science. The relations of philosophy of science to sociology of science are seen to be more deeply rooted and more interesting than the Science Warriors would have us believe. (shrink)
- Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman : Kantian or Hegelian dynamics of reason?Alan Richardson -2010 - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson,Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
- ‘The Tenacious, Malleable, Indefatigible, and Yet, Eternally Modifiable Will’: Hans Reichenbach’s Knowing Subject.Alan W. Richardson -2005 -Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 79:73 -- 87.
- Legitimating Transnational Standard-Setting: The Case of the International Accounting Standards Board.Burkard Eberlein &Alan Richardson -2011 -Journal of Business Ethics 98 (2):217-245.The increasing use of transnational standard-setting bodies to address quality uncertainties and coordination issues across the global economy raises questions about how these bodies establish and maintain their legitimacy and accountability outside the sovereignty of democratic states. Based on a discussion of the legitimacy challenge posed by global governance, we provide an overview of mechanisms by which such bodies can defend their legitimacy claims and examine the actual mechanisms used by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). While the IASB staked (...) its initial credibility on technical competence and independence, it has increasingly emphasized due process norms in its claim for support. Our analysis evaluates the IASB due process against the cultural benchmarks established by domestic standard-setters in the USA and UK and against a normative model of procedural legitimacy. These comparisons help us to understand the modifications that were made in the hope of due process adding legitimacy to accounting standard-setting beyond the state. They also reveal the broader political context of competing legitimacy criteria that confronts transnational standard-setters. (shrink)
- The Limits of Tolerance: Carnap’s Logico-Philosophical Project in Logical Syntax.Alan W. Richardson -1994 -Proceedings of Aristotelian Society:67--82.
- But what then am I, this inexhaustible, unfathomable historical self? Or, upon what ground may one commit empiricism?Alan Richardson -2011 -Synthese 178 (1):143 - 154.This essay examines the perspective from which Bas van Fraassen, in his book, The Empirical Stance, explains the project of empiricism. I argue that this perspective is a robustly transcendental perspective, which suggests that the tradition of empiricism lacks the resources to explain itself. I offer an alternative history of epistemic voluntarism in twentieth-century philosophy to the history van Fraassen himself provides, one that finds the novelty in van Fraassen's own views to be precisely his reintroduction of the knowing mind (...) into the tradition of analytic philosophy of science. (shrink)
- Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Alan Richardson &Dan Isaacson -1994 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1):67 - 83.I see the perspective of Tolerance as enshrining an attitude toward philosophical work that stresses its continuity with the procedures of conceptual clarification through mathematisation found in the sciences. What I have tried to show is that Carnap's understanding of the philosophical foundations of mathematics is inseparable from his understanding of the business of philosophy of empirical science.
- Signal transduction through integrins: A central role for focal adhesion kinase?Alan Richardson &J. Thomas Parsons -1995 -Bioessays 17 (3):229-236.The integrins are receptors for proteins of the extracellular matrix, both providing a physical link to the cytoskeleton and transducing signals from the extracellular matrix. Activation of integrins leads to tyrosine and serine phosphorylation of a number of proteins, elevation of cytosolic calcium levels, cytoplasmic alkalinization, changes in phospholipid metabolism and, ultimately, changes in gene expression. The recently discovered focal adhesion kinase localizes to focal contacts, which are sites of integrin clustering, and focal adhesion kinase can physically associate with integrins (...) in vitro. As integrins lack intrinsic catalytic activity, focal adhesion kinase is a candidate for a signaling molecule that is recruited by integrins in order to trigger the generation of intracellular second messengers. Thus, focal adhesion kinase may play a central role in signal transduction through integrins. (shrink)
- A Theological Word Book of the Bible.Alan Richardson -1951No categories
- Metaphysics and Idealism in the Aufbau.Alan Richardson -1992 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1):45-72.The received view of the anti-metaphysics of Camap's Aufbau finds that it rests exclusively on verificationism. Alberto Coffa has recently put forward an interpretation of the antimetaphysical stance that claims that Camap was confusedly moving from ontological to semantical ideahsm. After raising objections to both of these views another interpretation is put forward. The crucial aspect of Camap's rejection of metaphysics rests on his reinterpretation of epistemology as the logic of objective knowledge. This leads to a rejection of metaphysics inasmuch (...) as the peculiar status of logic as the framework constitutive of the possibility of rational inquiry means that it neither needs nor allows of completion or interpretation by traditional metaphysics. This view of Camap's is compared to the views of the Marburg and Southwest NeoKantians. (shrink)
- The Geometry of Knowledge: Lewis, Becker, Carnap and the Formalization of Philosophy in the 1920s.Alan Richardson -2003 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):165-182.On an ordinary view of the relation of philosophy of science to science, science serves only as a topic for philosophical reflection, reflection that proceeds by its own methods and according to its own standards. This ordinary view suggests a way of writing a global history of philosophy of science that finds substantially the same philosophical projects being pursued across widely divergent scientific eras. While not denying that this view is of some use regarding certain themes of and particular time (...) periods, this essay argues that much of the epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century in a variety of projects looked to the then current context of the exact sciences, especially geometry and physics, not merely for its topics but also for its conceptual resources and technical tools. This suggests a more variable project of philosophy of science, a deeper connection between early twentieth-century philosophy of science and its contemporary science, and a more interesting and richer history of philosophy of science than is ordinarily offered. (shrink)
- Tolerating Semantics: Carnap’s Philosophical Point of View.Alan W. Richardson -2004 - In Carsten Klein & Steven Awodey,Carnap Brought Home - The View from Jena. Open Court. pp. 63--78.
- Due Process and Standard-setting: An Analysis of Due Process in Three Canadian Accounting and Auditing Standard-setting Bodies.Alan Richardson -2008 -Journal of Business Ethics 81 (3):679-696.Due process is the means by which ethical constraints are placed on administrative decision-making. I have developed a model of variation in due process and use this model to explore the implementation of “due process” norms by three standard-setting bodies that are created, funded, and overseen by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants – the Accounting Standards Board, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, and the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board. I conducted two analyses: a comparative analysis of the implementation (...) of due process norms based on differences among the three cases; and, a critique of the due process norms followed by these boards based on their internal logic and a set of best practices identified in other contexts for due process by standard setters. I have presented evidence that due process norms are more fully developed, where standards are enforced by the state and the heterogeneity of users is greatest. (shrink)
- Literature and the Cognitive Revolution.Alan Richardson &Francis F. Steen -2002 - Duke University Press.Since the 1950s, the cognitive revolution has been transforming work in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. Literary scholars, however, have only recently begun to grapple with the significance of cognitive understandings of language, mind, and behavior for literary and cultural studies. This unique issue of Poetics Today brings the concerns of literary history and cultural studies for the first time into a sustained and productive dialogue with cognitive methods, findings, and paradigms.The introduction situates the collection in relation to previous work, defines (...) the issues, highlights the stakes. Articles by Mark Turner and Paul Hernadi propose a bold extension of notions of literary history to include not only preliterature oral forms but the entire history of the species, viewing literary activity as a crucial human adaptation. Ellen Spolsky's essay provides an unprecedented statement of common ground shared by cognitive-evolutionary approaches and poststructuralist theory. The final three essays examine works by Aphra Behn, A. L. Barbauld, and Jane Austen in terms of their contemporary cultural and political contexts as well as in light of paradigms drawn from cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary theory. A commentary by Tony Jackson surveys the entire issue from the viewpoint of an informed outsider. (shrink)
- What Good is a (Indeed, This) History of Pragmatism?Alan Richardson -2013 -Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49 (3):405.“Pragmatism” is a term to conjure with in recent history of philosophy—for a little over one hundred years various philosophers have used the term to advocate certain projects, to abjure others, to bind themselves with groups of like-minded philosophers, to distance themselves from other groups, to draw narrative arcs through recent history, to obscure other possible arcs, and so on. No one does quite so much with words as philosophers do. But what have they done with the word “pragmatism”?I have (...) begun with the word because the word’s existence cannot be doubted. Whether there is anything in particular meant by or even referred to by the word is a harder question. If pragmatism exists, it exists as a.. (shrink)
- Précis of logical empiricism as scientific philosophy.Alan Richardson -2025 -Asian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):1-7.Logical Empiricism as Scientific Philosophy offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the (...) world. (shrink)No categories
- Alan W. Richardson. 'The tenacious, malleable, indefatigable, and yet, eternally modifiable will': Hans Reichenbach's knowing subject.Alan W. Richardson &Thomas E. Uebel -2005 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):73–87.No categories
- (1 other version)Philosophy of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions: Remarks on the VPI Program for Testing Philosophies of Science.Alan W. Richardson -1992 -PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:36 - 46.In this paper I argue that the program of L. Laudan et al for empirically testing historiographical philosophies of science ("the VPI program") does not succeed in providing a consistent naturalist program in philosophy of science. In particular, the VPI program endorses a nonnaturalist metamethodology that insists on a hypothetico-deductive structure to scientific testing. But hypothetico-deductivism seems to be both inadequate as an account of scientific theory testing in general and fundamentally at odds with most of the historiographic philosophies under (...) test. I sketch an account of testing historiographic philosophies of science more consistent with the views about scientific testing of those philosophies and argue that such a program is neither viciously circular nor necessarily self-refuting. (shrink)
- An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann.Alan Richardson -1957 -Philosophical Quarterly 7 (27):189.
- Eidetic imagery, occipital EEG activity, and palinopsia.Alan Richardson -1979 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):613-613.
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