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Background Despite decades of anti-racism and equity, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) interventions in academic medicine, medical racism continues to harm patients and healthcare providers. We sought to deeply explore experiences and beliefs about medical racism among academic clinicians to understand the drivers of persistent medical racism and to inform intervention design. Methods We interviewed academically-affiliated clinicians with any racial identity from the Departments of Family Medicine, Cardiac Sciences, Emergency Medicine, and Medicine to understand their experiences and perceptions of medical racism. (...) We performed thematic content analysis of semi-structured interview data to understand the barriers and facilitators of ongoing medical racism. Based on participant narratives, we developed a logic framework that demonstrates the necessary steps in the process of addressing racism using if/then logic. This framework was then applied to all narratives and the barriers to addressing medical racism were aligned with each step in the logic framework. Proposed interventions, as suggested by participants or study team members and/or identified in the literature, were matched to these identified barriers to addressing racism. Results Participant narratives of their experiences of medical racism demonstrated multiple barriers to addressing racism, such as a perceived lack of empathy from white colleagues. Few potential facilitators to addressing racism were also identified, including shared language to understand racism. The logic framework suggested that addressing racism requires individuals to understand, recognize, name, and confront medical racism. Conclusions Organizations can use this logic framework to understand their local context and select targeted anti-racism or EDI interventions. Theory-informed approaches to medical racism may be more effective than interventions that do not address local barriers or facilitators for persistent medical racism. (shrink)

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This edited collection presents the latest cutting-edge research in the philosophy and cognitive science of temporal illusions. Illusion and error have long been important points of entry for both philosophical and psychological approaches to understanding the mind. Temporal illusions, specifically, concern a fundamental feature of lived experience, temporality, and its relation to a fundamental feature of the world, time, thus providing invaluable insight into investigations of the mind and its relationship with the world. The existence of temporal illusions crucially challenges (...) the naïve assumption that we can simply infer the temporal nature of the world from experience. This anthology gathers eighteen original papers from current leading researchers in this subject, covering four broad and interdisciplinary topics: illusions of temporal passage, illusions and duration, illusions of temporal order and simultaneity, and the relationship between temporal illusions and the cognitive representation of time. (shrink)

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Most published discussions in contemporary metaethics include some textual exegesis of the relevant contemporary authors, but little or none of the historical authors who provide the underpinnings of their general approach. The latter is usually relegated to the historical, or dismissed as expository. Sometimes this can be a useful division of labor. But it can also lead to grave confusion about the views under discussion, and even about whose views are, in fact, under discussion. Elijah Millgram’s article, “Does the Categorical (...) Imperative Give Rise to a Contradiction in the Will?” is a case in point. In it, he takes the New Kantians to task for various flaws in their interpretation of Kant’s moral theory, to be detailed shortly. He concludes with a question and a suggestion. In order to properly dissect the first, “universal law” formulation of the Categorical Imperative, he argues, we first need to understand “why an agent wills the universalization of his maxim” (549). He also suggests that in order to answer this question, we must recur to what Kant himself actually says (550). His question is a good one, and his advice on how to go about answering it is sound. But to take Millgram’s advice is to call this division of labor into question, at least for this case. For it demands close and sustained exegesis, not only of his argument against the New Kantians, but also – in order to assess whether and where they go wrong – of Kant’s text itself. (shrink)

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Este artículo es una breve introducción al opúsculo De veritate propositionis de Roberto Grosseteste , acompañada por una traducción inédita de dicho opúsculo, la primera que por primera vez puede ser leído en español. En él Grosseteste comenta el problema de los futuros contingentes tal y como fue expuesto por Aristóteles en Sobre la interpretación, capítulo IX. Las soluciones de Aristóteles y Grosseteste son similares, aunque la idea de necesidad en Grosseteste está más vinculada a la eternidad que a la (...) temporalidad. (shrink)

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Introduction Sartre at One Hundred — a Man of the Nineteenth Century Addressing the Twenty-First? THOMAS R. FLYNN We are celebrating the centennial year of ...

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_Truth and Existence_, written in response to Martin Heidegger's _Essence of Truth_, is a product of the years when Sartre was reaching full stature as a philosopher, novelist, playwright, essayist, and political activist. This concise and engaging text not only presents Sartre's ontology of truth but also addresses the key moral questions of freedom, action, and bad faith. _Truth and Existence_ is introduced by an extended biographical, historical, and analytical essay by Ronald Aronson. "_Truth and Existence_ is another important element (...) in the recently published links between Sartre's existentialist ontology and his later ethical, political, and literary concerns.... The excellent introduction by Aronson will help readers not experienced in reading Sartre."—_Choice_ "Accompanied by an excellent introduction, this dense, lucidly translated treatise reveals Sartre as a characteristically 20th-century figure."—_Publishers Weekly_ Jean-Paul Sartre was offered, but declined, the Nobel Prize for literature in 1964. His many works of fiction, drama, and philosophy include the monumental study of Flaubert, _The Family Idiot_, and _The Freud Scenario_, both published in translation by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

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I want to examine the implications of a metaphysical thesis which is presupposed in various objections to Rawls' theory of justice.Although their criticisms differ in many respects, they concur in employing what I shall refer to as the continuity thesis. This consists of the following claims conjointly: (1) The parties in the original position (henceforth the OP) are, and know themselves to be, fully mature persons who will be among the members of the well-ordered society (henceforth the WOS) which is (...) generated by their choice of principles of justice. (2) The OP is a conscious event among others, integrated (compatibly with the constraints on knowledge and motivation imposed on the parties) into the regular continuity of experience that comprises each of their ongoing constitutes lives. (3) The parties in the OP thus are, and regard themselves as, psychologically continuing persons, partially determined in personality and interests by prior experiences, capable of recollection and regret concerning the past, anticipation and apprehensiveness regarding the future, and so on. Although the continuity thesis as stated above is not at odds with any of the conditions that define the OP, its exegetical validity is a matter for discussion. I shall be concerned to argue that if it is indeed contained in or a consequence of Rawls' theory, then it casts into doubt the capacity of the OP to generate or justify any principles of justice at all. On the other hand, if the continuity thesis is viewed as dispensable and unnecessary to the Rawlsian enterprise, then Rawls is correct in maintaining the irrelevance of the question of personal identity to the construction of his moral theory. In this case, the contract-theoretic, instrumentalist justification for the two principles of justice (henceforth the 2PJ) needs to be supplanted by a modified conception of wide reflective equilibrium. The considerations that form the bulk of this discussion then may be understood as providing a rationale for Rawls' recent revisions in the model of justification on which his theory of justice rests, and for his increasing emphasis on us as moral mediators between the OP and the WOS. Now I want to consider the question of whether or not, given the textual evidence, anything like the continuity thesis is stated or implied by Rawls, and what problems for his theory, if any, turn on a positive or negative answer to this question. -/- . (shrink)

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In “The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity,” The Journal of Philosophy CX, 8 (August 2013), 460-464, Johan E. Gustafsson contends that if Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes’ diachronic money-pump argument in their "Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I," Philosophy of Science 22 (1955), 140-160 is valid, so is the synchronic argument Gustafsson himself offers. He concludes that the latter renders irrelevant diachronic choice considerations in general, and the two best-known diachronic solutions to the money pump problem (...) in particular. I argue here that this reasoning is incorrect, and that Gustafsson’s synchronic argument is faulty on independent grounds. Specifically, it is based on a false analogy between the derivation of a synchronic ordinal ranking from a transitive series of pairwise comparisons, and the putative derivation of such a ranking from an intransitive series. The latter is not possible under the assumption of revealed preference theory, and is highly improbable even if that assumption is rejected. Moreover, Gustafsson’s argument raises issues of fidelity to the historical texts that must be addressed. I conclude that the money pump, and cyclical choice more generally, are necessarily diachronic; and therefore that the two best-known diachronic solutions to the money pump problem remain relevant. (shrink)

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THE MAIN OBJECTIVES of the following discussions are, first, to show the logical inconsistency of Hegel’s theory of the necessity of private property and, second, to show its exegetical inconsistency with the most plausible and consistent interpretations of Hegel’s theory of the self and its relation to the state in Ethical Life. I begin with the latter objective, by distinguishing three basic conceptions of the self that can be gleaned from various passages in the Philosophy of Right. I suggest viable (...) connections between each of these three conceptions and three respective interpretations of what I call the Hegelian requirement, i.e., that the individual be able to identify his personal interests and values with those of the state [141, 147, 147r, 151, 155].1 This can be understood as the requirement that the individual be capable of transcending certain limits of individuality in the service of broader and more inclusive political goals. I argue that Hegel’s theory of Personality and the requirements of Ethical Life in the state commit him to a conception of the self as capable of achieving such selftranscendence through action, despite appearances to the contrary that suggest that self-transcendence is to be primarily achieved through acquisition of various kinds. I then try to demonstrate the logical inconsistency of Hegel’s theory of the necessity of private property. I argue that the fallacies inherent in his exposition of this theory can be explained by his presupposing a conception of the self which both is inadequate to meet the criteria of Hegel’s theories of Personality and Ethical Life and also, therefore, fails the Hegelian requirement. (shrink)

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El presente artículo tratará de dirimir hasta qué punto el concepto de “genio no-original” propuesto por Perloff y Goldsmith es concebible. Para ello, tras una situación introductoria de su producción ensayística en el estado del arte, se reconstruirá lo que ambos autores quieren decir por los dos conceptos que integran el binomio: “originalidad” y “genio”. Después, con la ayuda de un panorama y algunos de los autores más importantes de la filosofía del arte, se comparará su propuesta conceptual con la (...) originalidad que históricamente ha definido al genio. This article will attempt to determine to what extent the concept of "unoriginal genius" proposed by Perloff and Goldsmith is conceivable. In order to do so, after an introductory situation of their essayistic production in the state of the art, we will reconstruct what both authors mean by the two concepts that integrate the aforementioned binomial: "originality" and "genius". Subsequently, with the help of a panorama and some of the most important authors within the philosophy of art, their conceptual proposal will be compared with the originality that has historically defined genius. (shrink)

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Historically, the view, prevalent in contemporary economics and decision theory as well as philosophy, that rational action consists simply in satisfying one’s desires, whatever they may be, as efficiently as possible, is to be found first in Book II of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. This view has counterintuitive and self-refuting implications, in that it recognizes as rational behavior that may reveal a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Accordingly, many Hume scholars have tried to show recently that this (...) view was not Hume’s; and that, on the contrary, Hume did supply an account of rational final ends--in his discussion of the calm passions, the “steady and general view” that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual’s desires and perceptions, and elsewhere. But a detailed reconstruction of Hume’s views on these matters that assembles all the relevant texts does not support this thesis. Instead, it undermines it. Hence the counterintuitive and self-refuting implications of Hume’s view of rational action must be allowed to stand. (shrink)

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In 1951 John Rawls expressed these convictions about the fundamental issues in metaethics: [T]he objectivity or the subjectivity of moral knowledge turns, not on the question whether ideal value entities exist or whether moral judgments are caused by emotions or whether there is a variety of moral codes the world over, but simply on the question: does there exist a reasonable method for validating and invalidating given or proposed moral rules and those decisions made on the basis of them? For (...) to say of scientific knowledge that it is objective is to say that the propositions expressed therein may be evidenced to be true by a reasonable and reliable method, that is, by the rules and procedures of what we may call "inductive logic"; and, similarly, to establish the objectivity of moral rules, and the decisions based upon them, we must exhibit the decision procedure, which can be shown to be both reasonable and reliable, at least in some cases, for deciding between moral rules and lines of conduct consequent to them.1 In this passage Rawls reconfigured the issue of moral objectivity and so reoriented the practice of metaethics from linguistic analysis to rational methodology. In so doing, his work has provided inspiration to philosophers as disparate in normative views as Thomas Nagel,2 Richard Brandt3, Alan Gewirth4, and David Gauthier.5 Rawls replaced the Moorean question, Do moral terms refer? with the Rawlsian question, Can moral judgments be the outcome of a rational and reliable procedure? He later gave a resoundingly positive answer to this question6 and later still, a more tentative one.7 Rawls' considered qualification of his earlier enthusiasm about the extent to which moral philosophy could be "part of the theory of rational choice"8 is a tribute to the seriousness with which he took his critics' objections. (shrink)

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By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant's view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant's view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. This last point is worth emphasizing, in order to correct an interpretation of Kant's account of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment that wrongly reads Kant as claiming that aesthetic judgments do not have to satisfy the same basic requirements of judgment that any other kind of judgment also must satisfy, such as the synthetic subsumption of such objects under certain necessary and hard-wired concepts of understanding, the internal coherence of such judgments with other, non-aesthetic ones of a more abstract and comprehensive character, the unified consciousness within which such judgments are intelligibly made, and the like. Of course Kant recognizes the special character of aesthetic judgments and unpacks it in the... (shrink)

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Seit kurzem wird des öfteren in Deutschland die Ansicht geäußert, Deutschland solle nun seine fremdenfeindliche Vergangenheit im Zweiten Weltkrieg endlich hinter sich lassen und von nun ab als >>normalisiertes<< Land der Zukunft gegenübertreten. Diese Meinung entsteht aus der Voraussetzung, daß Deutschland durch seine Geschichte von Xenophobie und Genozid im Zweiten Weltkrieg als abnormal, als ungewöhnlich gekennzeichnet ist. Aber das ist nicht wahr. Deutschlands blutige Geschichte ist mit derjenigen der Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritanniens, der Niederlande, Rußlands, Chinas, Japans, der Türkei, Vietnams, Kambodschas, (...) Somalias, Ruandas, des Irak, des Kosovo, Bosniens, und anderer Länder vergleichbar. Zu vergleichen bedeutet weder zu relativieren, noch zu entschuldigen, sondern bloß anzuerkennen, daß die Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, die in verschiedenen Ländern stattfinden, einige gemeinsame Eigenschaften haben. (shrink)

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By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). 1 These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about (...) particular works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. (shrink)

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The present essay contends that progressive readings of Smith ignore the influence of theological concepts and religious ideas on his work, notably three distinct strands: first, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural theology; second, Jansenist Augustinianism; third, Stoic arguments of theodicy. Taken together, these theological elements help explain why Smith’s moral philosophy and political economy intensifies the secular early modern and Enlightenment idea that the Fall brought about ‘radical evil’ and a ‘fatherless world’ in need of permanent divine intervention. As such, Smith (...) views the market as divine regulation of human sinfulness and an instrument to serve God’s providential plan. Indeed, the ‘invisible hand of the market’ represents a nominalist realm where human cooperation intersects with divine providence, blending private self-interest with the public commonweal. I will also argue that Smith’s conception of a morally neutral market is ultimately incompatible with creedal Christianity, in particular orthodox catholic Christian ideas of the common good in which all can share and the practice of charity for those most in need who have been abandoned by state bureaucracy and the marketplace. The main reason is that Smith, not unlike Calvin, tends to divorce human contract from divine gift by dividing the theo-logic of gratuitous reciprocal giving from the economic logic of contract – a dualism that bears an uncanny resemblance with Suárez’s Baroque scholasticism of which Smith’s friend David Hume was rightly critical. In particular, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation theology of Calvin, Luther and Suárez sunders ‘pure nature’ from the supernatural and develops a ‘two ends’ account of human nature, according to which human beings have a natural end separate from their supernatural finality. So instead of participating in the divine oikonomia of asymmetrical gift-exchange, human society and the economy operate autonomously and are ordered towards a purely natural end. Smith conceptualises the market mechanism as both a fundamental precondition for interpersonal relationality and at the same time separate from the sociality it engenders. Smith’s anthropology hovers half-way between Machiavelli and Mandeville’s homo œconomicus in search for maximal profit, on the one hand, and the diametrically opposed conception of man as a gift-exchanging animal striving for mutual social recognition, on the other hand. By viewing market exchange as separate from the private virtues of benevolence, justice and prudence, he introduces a split between the exercise of moral virtues and the operation of commercial society. Such a divide is wholly foreign to the project of an overarching civil compact in the writings of Smith’s contemporary Antonio Genovesi and other members of the Italian schools of civic humanism and civil economy. In consequence, Smith’s œuvre marks a decisive shift from civil to political economy. (shrink)

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The article critically engages with the posthumanist discourse on anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism. It adopts an “integrational” approach to signs, language, and communication, as outlined in the works of Oxford linguist Roy Harris. Integrational linguistics is committed to a demythologized view of “language,” which it considers to exist only as part of the experience of human individuals and human collectivities. From an integrational point of view, language is not an “object” of scientific inquiry, but a complex of human activities that (...) make such an inquiry possible in the first place. This paper argues that posthumanists falsely ascribe language to animals and to hypothetical extraterrestrials. Based on Harris’ concept of the supercategory, it is shown that the worldviews encapsulated in science, history, and religion only make sense because they are human worldviews. No other intelligent life could grasp the various supercategorical discourses, and how they relate to each other, the main reason being that language is a uniquely integrated mode of human communication. The article thus supports a radical anthropocentrism as the only intellectually viable philosophy on which to draw in our reflections on, and inquiries into both intraspecies and interspecies communication. (shrink)

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John Bickle propuso recientemente una lectura metacientífica de ciertas prácticas neurocientíficas vinculadas a fenómenos tradicionalmente estudiados por la psicología. Según esta postura, el proceder explicativo preponderante en neurociencias trata de aplicar reducciones empíricas que expliquen fenómenos psicológicos en términos celulares y moleculares, relegando el papel de la psicología al de una mera heurística, sin poder explicativo. De esta forma, de acuerdo a la fuerza de las conclusiones alcanzadas mediante este procedimiento, se pone en jaque el valor de las explicaciones funcionales (...) psicológicas. En este trabajo, se buscará reformular algunas de estas desafiantes propuestas planteadas en filosofía de las neurociencias. Para este fin, se mostrarán las principales debilidades de la propuesta de Bickle. También se pondrán en perspectiva algunas características (¿reduccionistas, eliminativistas?) del reduccionismo despiadado, mostrando que este modelo quizás represente solo una lectura de la utilización pragmática de ciertos métodos en neurociencias, antes que una declaración de principios generalizables a toda la ciencia cognitiva. (shrink)

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Los especialistas suelen atribuir a Diderot una concepción pesimista de la historia. Si bien de las obras de madurez del editor de la Encyclopédie se desprende una oscura imagen del porvenir, producto entre otras cosas de su encuentro con Catalina II y de la influencia de Galiani, ese pesimismo parece no agotar sus reflexiones acerca de la historia. De los trabajos de la época anterior a su viaje a Rusia se desprende otra concepción de la historia, la cual, no obstante, (...) no se confunde con las Cándidas especulaciones acerca del futuro del marqués de Condorcet. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate, contrary to what experts generally consider, that the criticism that Diderot has directed at Rousseau in the Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron goes beyond the biographical level, and it is deeply rooted in central structures of Diderot’s philosophy. This, on the other hand, sheds light on the place Seneca occupies in the book and on the criticism that Diderot had made to the Roman philosopher in 1745.

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RESUMEN En las primeras páginas de la Histoire de l'empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand, publicada entre 1759 y 1763, Voltaire presenta una serie de reflexiones acerca del método que se debería seguir al escribir un trabajo histórico y de las características que debería tener un historiador ideal. El objetivo de este trabajo es evaluar en qué medida el texto se ajusta a la metodología que Voltaire se propone seguir. Se intenta mostrar que el autor se aleja por momentos (...) de la misma, poniendo en riesgo el plan de la obra. Por otra parte, el artículo pone de relieve ciertas diferencias ideológicas y epistemológicas entre Voltaire y Diderot a propósito de la historia rusa, algo que puede resultar llamativo, en la medida en que sus textos son colocados, en general, bajo las mismas categorías historiográficas. En un plano más general, el texto arroja algunas luces acerca de la teoría de la historia en el siècle des Lumières. ABSTRACT On the first pages of Voltaire's Histoire de l'empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand, published between 1759 and 1763, he reflects upon the method which should be used when writing a historical work and the characteristics an ideal historian should have. The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent the text follows the methodology Voltaire is proposing. This article attempts to demonstrate that the author himself, occasionally, does not respect his own methodology, jeopardizing the objective of his work. On the other hand, the paper highlights some ideological and epistemological differences between Voltaire and Diderot as regards Russian history, something which may be noteworthy, since their texts are usually studied within the same historiogra-phical categories. In a more general sense, this work sheds some light on the theory of history during the siècle des Lumières. (shrink)

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The essay examines Schumpeter’s understanding of the capitalist process and develops a critical analysis of his explanation of why capitalism cannot survive. Part I deals with how Schumpeter understood capitalism. Part II studies why –- from his point of view — capitalism couldn’t survive. Part III analysis why it is actually socialism, as a socio-political alternative, that is impractical and must collapse from contradictions inherent in it. Part IV presents some final reflections, presenting the public choice and the thought of (...) James M. Buchanan, as an alternative to the pessimist Schumpeterian view. (shrink)

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Últimamente se ha producido una copiosa traducción de textos de Hei-degger. Ante la complejidad de sus expresiones, es necesario un trabajo de revisión y unificación de los términos castellanos. Con el ánimo de abrir un proceso de diá-logo entre los traductores, expondremos brevemente algunos puntos en los que se ejemplifica el problema. Por un lado, se trata de mostrar las tareas de traducción todavía pendientes de Ser y tiempo, a pesar de las dos traducciones existentes. A tal efecto se realizan (...) una serie de calas de pasajes, tanto de la versión de Gaos como de la de Rivera, ofreciendo en cada caso las propias sugerencias de traduc-ción. Y, por otro lado, se expone a discusión un elenco de términos que todavía están pendientes de una traducción definitiva.In recent times, there has been a lot of translation of Heidegger's texts. The complexity of his philosophical expressions and the diversity of translation solu-tions offered so far need to be unified. In order to open a dialogue among transla-tors we would like to expose briefly some examples that illustrate the problem of translation. On the one hand, we show that the task of translating Sein und Zeit is not yet finished, despite the translations of Gaos and Rivera. We take under consid-eration some quotes from Gaos's and Rivera's versions, offering in each case our own translation suggestion. On the other hand, we bring up for discussion different Heideggerian terms whose translations are still problematic. (shrink)

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Both modern political economy and capitalism rest on the separation of economics from ethics, which in turn can be traced to a number of shifts within philosophy and theology – notably the move away from practices of reciprocity and the common good towards the sole pursuit of individual freedom and self-interest. In his latest book, Luigino Bruni provides a compelling critique of capitalist markets and an alternative vision that fuses Aristotelian-Thomist virtue ethics with the Renaissance and Neapolitan Enlightenment tradition of (...) ‘civil economy’. The book develops three broad yet closely intertwined theses. First, that Greco-Roman Antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages invented models of civil life that transcended tribalism and political absolutism but produced sacral communities wherein the power and privilege of the ‘few’ denied freedom and equality to the ‘many’. Second, that modernity inaugurated the primacy of free and equal individuals over communities but that it undermined and destroyed the social bonds on which societies ultimately depend. Just as in Antiquity and the Middle Ages we had communities without individuals, so in the modern era we have individuals without communities. Beyond these two similarly undesirable conditions, Bruni proposes the ‘civil economy’ model as the most radical alternative – the book’s third and most important thesis. Accordingly, the ‘civil economy’ alternative combines the relationality and sociability of all human beings with the flourishing of each and everyone by fusing self-interest with wider social benefit. Crucially, the ties of public faith (fides) and friendship (philia) can overcome the false divide between egoism and altruism in the direction of a moral market that is governed not just by the pursuit of profit but also by the practice of virtue. (shrink)

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Reflection is today a watchword in many learning contexts. Experience is said to be transformed to knowledge when we reflect on it, university students are expected to acquire the ability to reflect critically, and we want practitioners to be reflective practitioners in order to improve their professional practice. If we consider what people mean when they talk about reflection in practice, we will discover that they often mean different things. Moreover, their conceptions of reflection are guided by images rather than (...) by definitions. This paper explores six distinct images of reflection and discusses the consequences of adopting one or more of these images in learning situations: (1) dedoublement, (2) analogical thinking, (3) mirror, (4) experiment, (5) puzzle solving, (6) criss-crossing a landscape. Reflective thinking can be improved if we are sensible of what we are reflecting about and according to which image of reflection we are doing it, since the step between using an image and seeing this image as a model is short. Using models, in turn, implies knowing their limits. (shrink)

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I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’: first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to (...) shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative’, and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity’. (shrink)

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