Risk it? Direct and collateral impacts of peers' verbal expressions about hazard likelihoods.Paul D. Windschitl,Andrew R. Smith,Aaron M.Scherer &Jerry Suls -2017 -Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):259-291.detailsWhen people encounter potential hazards, their expectations and behaviours can be shaped by a variety of factors including other people's expressions of verbal likelihood. What is the impact of such expressions when a person also has numeric likelihood estimates from the same source? Two studies used a new task involving an abstract virtual environment in which people learned about and reacted to novel hazards. Verbal expressions attributed to peers influenced participants’ behaviour toward hazards even when numeric estimates were also available. (...) Namely, verbal expressions suggesting that the likelihood of harm from a hazard is low yielded more risk taking with respect to said hazard. There were also inverse collateral effects, whereby participants’ behaviour and estimates regarding another hazard in the same context were affected in the opposite direction. These effects may be based on directionality and relativity cues inferred from verbal likelihood expressions. (shrink)
Examining the Effectiveness of Climate Change Frames in the Face of a Climate Change Denial Counter‐Frame.Aaron M. McCright,Meghan Charters,Katherine Dentzman &Thomas Dietz -2016 -Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):76-97.detailsPrior research on the influence of various ways of framing anthropogenic climate change do not account for the organized ACC denial in the U.S. media and popular culture, and thus may overestimate these frames' influence in the general public. We conducted an experiment to examine how Americans' ACC views are influenced by four promising frames for urging action on ACC —when these frames appear with an ACC denial counter-frame. This is the first direct test of how exposure to an ACC (...) denial message influences Americans' ACC views. Overall, these four positive frames have little to no effect on ACC beliefs. But exposure to an ACC denial counter-frame does significantly reduce respondents' belief in the reality of ACC, belief about the veracity of climate science, awareness of the consequences of ACC, and support for aggressively attempting to reduce our nation's GHG emissions in the near future. Furthermore, as expected by the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis, exposure to the ACC denial counter-frame has a disproportionate influence on the ACC views of conservatives, effectively activating conservatives' underlying propensity for anti-reflexivity. (shrink)
Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.Aaron M. Griffith -2012 -European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):193-222.detailsAbstract: Philosophers interested in Kant's relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content—notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais—have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of ‘nonconceptual content’. However, I think the ‘nonconceptualist’ interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the (...) Transcendental Deduction, for a ‘conceptualist’ reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. My contention is that since Kant's notion of empirical intuition makes essential reference to the categories, it must be true for him that no empirical intuition can be given in sensibility independently of the understanding and its categories. (shrink)
The Rights of Future Persons and the Ontology of Time.Aaron M. Griffith -2017 -Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (1):58-70.detailsMany are committed to the idea that the present generation has obligations to future generations, for example, obligations to preserve the environment and certain natural resources for those generations. However, some philosophers want to explain why we have these obligations in terms of correlative rights that future persons have against persons in the present. Attributing such rights to future persons is controversial, for there seem to be compelling arguments against the position. According to the “nonexistence” argument, future persons cannot have (...) rights (and so should not be attributed rights) because they do not exist. According to the “no-satisfaction” argument, future persons cannot have a right to resources that do not exist at the time of their existence because such a right could not, in principle, be satisfied. In this paper, I will argue that an eternalist ontology of time provides the resources for satisfactorily responding to both the nonexistence and the no-satisfaction arguments. (shrink)
On Some Alleged Truthmakers for Negatives.Aaron M. Griffith -2012 -Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):301-308.detailsThis article considers three recent attempts by David Armstrong, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer to provide truthmakers for negative existential truths. It is argued that none of the proposed truthmakers are up to the task of making any negative existential truth true and, it will turn out, for the same reason.
Social Construction and Grounding.Aaron M. Griffith -2017 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):393-409.detailsThe aim of this paper is to bring recent work on metaphysical grounding to bear on the phenomenon of social construction. It is argued that grounding can be used to analyze social construction and that the grounding framework is helpful for articulating various claims and commitments of social constructionists, especially about social identities, e.g., gender and race. The paper also responds to a number of objections that have been leveled against the application of grounding to social construction from Elizabeth Barnes, (...) Mari Mikkola, and Jessica Wilson. (shrink)
The morality of autonomous robots.Aaron M. Johnson &Sidney Axinn -2013 -Journal of Military Ethics 12 (2):129 - 141.detailsWhile there are many issues to be raised in using lethal autonomous robotic weapons (beyond those of remotely operated drones), we argue that the most important question is: should the decision to take a human life be relinquished to a machine? This question is often overlooked in favor of technical questions of sensor capability, operational questions of chain of command, or legal questions of sovereign borders. We further argue that the answer must be ?no? and offer several reasons for banning (...) autonomous robots. (1) Such a robot treats a human as an object, instead of as a person with inherent dignity. (2) A machine can only mimic moral actions, it cannot be moral. (3) A machine run by a program has no human emotions, no feelings about the seriousness of killing a human. (4) Using such a robot would be a violation of military honor. We therefore conclude that the use of an autonomous robot in lethal operations should be banned. (shrink)
Realizing race.Aaron M. Griffith -2020 -Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1919-1934.detailsA prominent way of explaining how race is socially constructed appeals to social positions and social structures. On this view, the construction of a person’s race is understood in terms of the person occupying a certain social position in a social structure. The aim of this paper is to give a metaphysically perspicuous account of this form of race construction. Analogous to functionalism about mental states, I develop an account of a ‘race structure’ in which various races (Black, White, Asian, (...) etc.) are functionally defined social positions. Individual persons occupy these social positions by ‘playing the role’ characteristic of those positions. The properties by which a person plays a race role, are the realizers for one’s race. I characterize the social construction of a person’s race in terms of a realization relation that satisfies a ‘subset’ condition on the social powers of raced persons. Races, on this view, are functionally defined, multiply realizable social kinds. The final section of the paper outlines some explanatory benefits of the account. (shrink)
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Towards a Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.Aaron M. Griffith -2015 -Erkenntnis 80 (6):1157-1173.detailsThis paper introduces a new approach to the theory of truthmaking. According to this approach, there are multiple forms of truthmaking. Here, I characterize and motivate a specific version of this approach, which I call a ‘Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.’ It is suggested that truthmaking is a plural, variegated phenomenon wherein different kinds of truths, e.g., positive truths, negative truths, counterfactual truths, etc., are made true in different ways. While the paper only aims to lay the groundwork for a Pluralist (...) Theory of Truthmaking, I show how the theory can be applied to positive and negative truths. The upshot of this application is that truthmaking pluralism allows us to provide negative truths with ‘non-suspicious’ truthmakers. Finally, it is argued that Truthmaker Maximalists would do well to endorse truthmaking pluralism, as it offers a new strategy for upholding Maximalism while diminishing controversial ontological commitments. (shrink)
Truthmaking and Grounding.Aaron M. Griffith -2014 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):196-215.detailsThis paper is concerned with the relation between two important metaphysical notions, ‘truthmaking’ and ‘grounding’. I begin by considering various ways in which truthmaking could be explicated in terms of grounding, noting both strengths and weaknesses of these analyses. I go on to articulate a problem for any attempt to analyze truthmaking in terms of a generic and primitive notion of grounding based on differences we find among examples of grounding. Finally, I outline a more complex view of how truthmaking (...) and grounding could relate. On the view explored, truthmaking is a species of grounding differentiated from other species of grounding by the unique form of dependence it involves. (shrink)
Hegel and Externalism About Intentions.Aaron M. Mead -2009 -The Owl of Minerva 41 (1/2):107-142.detailsMy aim in this paper is to suggest that intentions are, as G. E. M. Anscombe puts it, not exclusively “private and interior” act-descriptions that agents alone determine. Rather, I argue that the true intention of an action is frequently constrained, and sometimes even determined, by the intersubjective and retrospective view of an action. I begin by offering an interpretation of Hegel’s account of intention in The Philosophy of Right—an interpretation that fits well with work by Charles Taylor and Michael (...) Quante, but not with a recent paper by Arto Laitinen. Next I offer examples that support the view—consistent with my reading of Hegel—that sometimes the intersubjective and retrospective account of an action trumps the agent’s prior subjective act-description. Finally, I suggest that the Hegelian view I sketch might be taken as a kind of externalism about intentions, on the order of externalism about epistemic justification. (shrink)
Social construction: big-G grounding, small-g realization.Aaron M. Griffith -2018 -Philosophical Studies 175 (1):241-260.detailsThe goal of this paper is to make headway on a metaphysics of social construction. In recent work, I’ve argued that social construction should be understood in terms of metaphysical grounding. However, I agree with grounding skeptics like Wilson that bare claims about what grounds what are insufficient for capturing, with fine enough grain, metaphysical dependence structures. To that end, I develop a view on which the social construction of human social kinds is a kind of realization relation. Social kinds, (...) I argue, are multiply realizable kinds. I depart from the Wilson by further arguing that an appeal to grounding is not otiose when it comes to social construction. Social construction, I claim, belongs to the “big-G” Grounding genus, but it is the specific “small-g” relation of realization at work in cases of human kind social construction. (shrink)
Metaphysics and social justice.Aaron M. Griffith -2019 -Philosophy Compass 14 (6).detailsMetaphysics is the branch of philosophy that aims to give a theoretical account of what there is and what it is like. Social justice movements seek to bring about justice in a society by changing policy, law, practice, and culture. Evidently, these activities are very different from one another. The goal of this article is to identify some positive connections between recent work in metaphysics and social justice movements. I outline three ways in which metaphysical work on social reality can (...) make a contribution to movements seeking social justice, viz., (1) by providing basic categories and concepts useful for clarifying and defending claims made by social justice movements; (2) by offering accounts of the natures of social categories, structures, and institutions that these movements seek to change; and (3) by contributing to “unmasking” or “debunking” projects that reveal putatively natural arrange- ments to be social in nature and hence subject to moral critique, alteration, and possibly eradication. (shrink)
Individualistic and Structural Explanations in Ásta’s Categories We Live By.Aaron M. Griffith -2019 -Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2):251-260.detailsÁsta’s Categories We Live By is a superb addition to the literature on social metaphysics. In it she offers a powerful framework for understanding the creation and maintenance of social categories. In this commentary piece, I want to draw attention to Ásta’s reliance on explanatory individualism – the view that the social world is best explained by the actions and attitudes of individuals. I argue that this reliance makes it difficult for Ásta to explain how many social categories are maintained (...) and why certain categories are reliably available to us and so resistant to change. These explanatory deficiencies could be overcome, I argue, by eschewing explanatory individualism and positing social structures to figure in structural explanations of the maintenance and availability of social categories. (shrink)
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The dependence of truth on being in Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking.Aaron M. Griffith -2021 -Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-6.detailsIn this commentary piece, I argue that Asay’s accounts of truth and truthmaking in A Theory of Truthmaking give no role to the idea that truth depends on being. In fact, some of the positions taken in the book are in tension with this idea that has been central to truthmaker theory. I consider how three aspects of Asay’s account relate to the idea that truth depends on being.
Anti-reflexivity.Aaron M. McCright &Riley E. Dunlap -2010 -Theory, Culture and Society 27 (2-3):100-133.detailsThe American conservative movement is a force of anti-reflexivity insofar as it attacks two key elements of reflexive modernization: the environmental movement and environmental impact science. Learning from its mistakes in overtly attacking environmental regulations in the early 1980s, this counter-movement has subsequently exercised a more subtle form of power characterized by non-decision-making. We examine the conservative movement’s efforts to undermine climate science and policy in the USA over the last two decades by using this second dimension of power. The (...) conservative movement has employed four non-decision-making techniques to challenge the legitimacy of climate science and prevent progress in policy-making. We argue that reflexive modernization scholars should focus more attention on similar forces of anti-reflexivity that continue to shape the overall direction of our social, political and economic order, and the life chances of many citizens. Indeed, better understanding of the forces and effectiveness of anti-reflexivity may very well be crucial for societal resilience and adaptation, especially in the face of global environmental problems like climate change. (shrink)
Presentism, truthmaking, and the nature of truth.Aaron M. Griffith -2021 -Analytic Philosophy 63 (4):259-267.detailsA recent presentist strategy has been to deny that truths about the past need presently existing truthmakers. These presentists do not deny that such truths need grounding; they hold that each truth about the past is true because of how the world was, not how it is. This paper argues that this position faces two problems, one of which can be overcome by adopting a certain view of the property of truth for propositions about the past. The second problem cannot (...) be solved. The upshot is that this form of presentism is not a theory of truthmaking for propositions about the past. Rather, it is a theory about why such truths need no present grounding that is motivated by a novel theory of truth. (shrink)
How negative truths are made true.Aaron M. Griffith -2015 -Synthese 192 (1):317-335.detailsIdentifying plausible truthmakers for negative truths has been a serious and perennial problem for truthmaker theory. I argue here that negative truths are indeed made true but not in the way that positive truths are. I rely on a distinction between “existence-independence” and “variation-independence” drawn by Hoffman and Horvath to characterize the unique form of dependence negative truths exhibit on reality. The notion of variation-independence is then used to motivate a principle of truthmaking for contingent negative truths.
Intergenerational Rights and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations.Aaron M. Griffith -2018 -Erkenntnis 83 (4):693-710.detailsThis paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied. The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop a version (...) of the problem of cross-temporal relations regarding cross-temporal normative relations. I then consider and reject various solutions to the problem available to No-Futurists. The upshot of the discussion is that which ontology of time we choose sets constraints on the kinds of explanations we may offer for our future-directed obligations. (shrink)
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Qualitative inquiry, cartography, and the promise of material change.Aaron M. Kuntz -2019 - New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.detailsIntroduction -- Being/becoming material -- Knowledge & class: coming to process -- Truth-telling, inquiry, and affirmative ethics -- Relational inquiry as radical cartography -- Higher education and the governance of things -- Refusal & resistance.
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The responsible methodologist: inquiry, truth-telling, and social justice.Aaron M. Kuntz -2015 - Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press.detailsIntroduction -- Logics of extraction -- Materialism & critical materialism -- Methodological parrhesia: truth-telling -- Methodological materiality: towards productive social change.
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Improving State Medical Board Policies: Influence of a Model.Aaron M. Gilson,David E. Joranson &Martha A. Maurer -2003 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 31 (1):119-129.detailsDespite advances in medical knowledge regarding pain management, pain continues to be significantly undertreated in the United States. There are many drug and nondrug treatments, but the use of controlled substances, particularly the opioid analgesics, is universally accepted for the treatment of pain from cancer. Although opioid analgesics are safe and effective in treating chronic pain, there is continued research and discussion about patient selection and long-term effects. A number of barriers in the health care and drug regulatory systems account (...) for the gap between what is known about pain management and what is practiced. Among the barriers are physicians’ fears of being disciplined by state regulatory boards for inappropriate prescribing.State medical boards are in a unique position not only to address physicians’ concerns about being investigated, but also to encourage pain management. Prior to 1989, a few state medical boards had policies relating to controlled substances or pain. Subsequently, state medical boards began adopting policies regarding the prescribing of opioids for the treatment of pain; many of these specifically addressed physicians’ fear of regulatory scrutiny. (shrink)
What is Systemic Racism?Aaron M. Griffith -2024 -Think 23 (68):79-87.detailsBlack K-12 students are four times more likely to receive out-of-school suspension than their white peers; housing lenders are more likely to offer black homebuyers subprime loans even when they qualify for prime loans; employers call back candidates for interviews with ‘white-sounding’ names 50 per cent more often than candidates with ‘black-sounding’ names. All these are said to be examples of systemic racism. But what does it mean to say that racism is systemic? Using the tools of social ontology, this (...) article explores the various ways in which social systems can be racist. (shrink)
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Do Ontological Categories Exist?Aaron M. Griffith -2015 -Metaphysica 16 (1).detailsThis paper concerns the ontological status of ontological categories (e.g., universal, particular, substance, property, relation, kind, object, etc.). I consider E.J. Lowe’s argument for the view that ontological categories do not exist and point out that it has some undesirable consequences for his realist ontology. I go on to argue that the main premise in Lowe’s argument—that ontological categories cannot be categorized—is false and then develop a conception of ontological categories as formal ontological kinds.
Erratum to: How negative truths are made true.Aaron M. Griffith -2015 -Synthese 192 (9):3051-3051.detailsErratum to: Synthese 192:317–335 DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0570-7The second sentence on page 317 reads “The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how a negative truth, e.g., \ of something could be made true by the existence of some entity”.This sentence should read “The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how a negative truth, e.g., \ that is concerned with the non-existence of something could be made true by the existence of some entity”.
Policy Issues and Imperatives in the Use of Opioids to Treat Pain in Substance Abusers.David E. Joranson &Aaron M. Gilson -1994 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 22 (3):215-223.detailsA great deal has been learned in the past fifteen years from the study of pain mechanisms. More recently, the relief of pain has begun to receive much needed attention as well. Although most, if not all, acute and cancer pain can be relieved, recent evidence shows that inadequate treatment of pain is still common among the general population—even for pain due to cancer. Inadequate treatment of cancer pain is even more likely if the patient is a member of an (...) ethnic minority, female, elderly, or a child. Evidence also suggests that substance abusers are at risk for poor pain treatment.A number of barriers which involve problems of knowledge, attitudes, and laws and regulations affect health care professionals, patients, and the health care system; collectively, they contribute to the inadequate treatment of pain. (shrink)
Expanding horizons in reinforcement learning for curious exploration and creative planning.Dale Zhou &Aaron M. Bornstein -2024 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 47:e118.detailsCuriosity and creativity are expressions of the trade-off between leveraging that with which we are familiar or seeking out novelty. Through the computational lens of reinforcement learning, we describe how formulating the value of information seeking and generation via their complementary effects on planning horizons formally captures a range of solutions to striking this balance.
The core endodermal gene network of vertebrates: combining developmental precision with evolutionary flexibility.Hugh R. Woodland &Aaron M. Zorn -2008 -Bioessays 30 (8):757-765.detailsEmbryonic development combines paradoxical properties: it has great precision, it is usually conducted at breakneck speed and it is flexible on relatively short evolutionary time scales, particularly at early stages. While these features appear mutually exclusive, we consider how they may be reconciled by the properties of key early regulatory networks. We illustrate these ideas with the network that controls development of endoderm progenitors. We argue that this network enables precision because of its intrinsic stability, self propagation and dependence on (...) signalling. The network enables high developmental speed because it is rapidly established by maternal inputs at multiple points. In turn these properties confer flexibility on an evolutionary time scale because they can be initiated in many ways, while buffering essential progenitor cell populations against changes in their embryonic environment on both evolutionary and developmental time scales. Although stable, these networks must be capable of rapid dissolution as cell differentiation progresses. While we focus on the core early endodermal network of vertebrates, we argue that these properties are likely to be general in early embryonic stem cell populations, such as mammalian ES cells. BioEssays 30:757–765, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)
Invasion, alienation, and imperialist nostalgia: Overcoming the necrophilous nature of neoliberal schools.John E. Petrovic &Aaron M. Kuntz -2018 -Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (10):957-969.detailsThe authors present a materialist analysis of the effects of neoliberalism in education. Specifically, they contend that neoliberalism is a form of cultural invasion that begets necrophilia. Neoliberalism is necrophilous in promoting a cultural desire to fix fluid systems and processes. Such desire manufactures both individuals known and culturally felt experiences of alienation which are, it is argued, symptomatic of an imperialist nostalgia that permeates educational policy and practice. The authors point to ‘unschooling in schools’ as a mechanism for resisting (...) the necrophilous tendencies of contemporary formations of education. (shrink)
Overdose Education and Naloxone Distribution Programmes and the Ethics of Task Shifting.Daniel Z. Buchman,Aaron M. Orkin,Carol Strike &Ross E. G. Upshur -2018 -Public Health Ethics 11 (2):151-164.detailsNorth America is in the grips of an epidemic of opioid-related poisonings. Overdose education and naloxone distribution programmes emerged as an option for structurally vulnerable populations who could not or would not access mainstream emergency medical services in the event of an overdose. These task shifting programmes utilize lay persons to deliver opioid resuscitation in the context of longstanding stigmatization and marginalization from mainstream healthcare services. OEND programmes exist at the intersection of harm reduction and emergency services. One goal of (...) OEND programmes is to help redress the health-related inequities common among people who use drugs, which include minimizing the gap between people who use drugs and the formal healthcare system. However, if this goal is not achieved these inequities may be entrenched. In this article, we consider the ethical promises and perils associated with OEND as task shifting. We argue that public health practitioners must consider the ethical aspects of task shifting programmes that may inadvertently harm already structurally vulnerable populations. We believe that even if OEND programmes reduce opioid-related deaths, we nevertheless question if, by virtue of its existence, OEND programmes might also unintentionally disenfranchise structurally vulnerable populations from comprehensive healthcare services, including mainstream emergency care. (shrink)
The Metaphysics of Truth By Douglas Edwards. [REVIEW]Aaron M. Griffith -2019 -Analysis 79 (4):805-809.details_ The Metaphysics of Truth _By EdwardsDouglasOxford University Press, 2018. x + 198 pp.
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Diverse Populations are Conflated with Heterogeneous Collectives.Ayelet Shavit &Aaron M. Ellison -2021 -Journal of Philosophy 118 (10):525-548.detailsThe concept of difference has a long and important research tradition. We identify and explicate a heretofore overlooked distinction in the meaning and measurement of two different meanings of 'difference': 'diversity' and 'heterogeneity'. We argue that ‘diversity’ can describe a population well enough but does not describe a collective well. In contrast, ‘heterogeneity’ describes a collective better than a population and therefore ought to describe a collective. We argue that ignoring these distinctions can lead to a surprising and disturbing conflict (...) between diversity and heterogeneity. In particular, focusing on the 'diversity' of human communities can be self-defeating for those who truly care about the importance of diversity, inclusion, and belonging. (shrink)
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Fixing Education.John E. Petrovic &Aaron M. Kuntz -2017 -Studies in Philosophy and Education 37 (1):65-80.detailsIn this article we consider the material dimensions of schooling as constitutive of the possibilities inherent in “fixing” education. We begin by mapping out the problem of “fixing education,” pointing to the necrophilic tendencies of contemporary education—a desire to kill what otherwise might be life-giving. In this sense, to “fix” education is to make otherwise fluid processes-of-living static. We next point to the material realities of this move to fix. After establishing the material consequences of perpetually fixing schools, we provide (...) a brief overview of two critical perspectives that might be shown as attempts to “unfix” education: critical pedagogy and unschooling. Though both offer critiques of normative education, these approaches are also bound by their failure to fully engage with the material dimensions of schooling. As such, both critical pedagogy and unschooling inadvertently cut off key possibilities for human flourishing within educational environments. In their rush to “unfix”—to counter the necrophilic tendencies of contemporary education—these approaches exclude or otherwise foreclose upon resistive challenges to the normative order that extend from the margins. In response, we turn to the possibilities for unschooling within the materially public spaces of schools. These are the spaces where fixity fails—possibility extends from unschooling in schools, from unfixing the process of fixing education. We end by considering the possibilities inherent in Community Service Learning as a valuable means to engage in a radically public, and unfixed, educational system. (shrink)
Is Clarity Essential to Good Teaching?Mason Marshall &Aaron M. Clark -2010 -Teaching Philosophy 33 (3):271-289.detailsIt is common to think that clarity is an essential ingredient of good teaching, meaning, in part, that good teachers always make it as easy as possible to follow what they say. We disagree. What we argue is that there are cases in which a philosophy teacher needs to forego clarity, making strategic use of obscurity in the undergraduate classroom.
Improving Pain Management through Policy Making and Education for Medical Regulators.David E. Joranson &Aaron M. Gilson -1996 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 24 (4):344-347.detailsPhysician concern about regulatory scrutiny as a barrier to appropriate prescribing for pain management has been identified and studied. A 1991 Pain Research Group survey demonstrated a need to provide updated information about opioids and pain management to state medical board members. Indeed, a national survey even showed a need to provide more education about pain management to oncology Physicians. Two approaches for responding to these concerns have been undertaken in several states by the state medical boards and the pain (...) management community: the development and adoption of administrative policies designed to bring disciplinary standards in line with clinical practice; and the creation of education programs for state medical board members and staffs. Each can have a substantial impact on removing real and perceived regulatory barriers to effective pain relief. (shrink)
Gender and Scientists’ Views about the Value-Free Ideal.Daniel Steel,Chad Gonnerman,Aaron M. McCright &Itai Bavli -2018 -Perspectives on Science 26 (6):619-657.detailsA small but growing body of philosophically informed survey work calls into question whether the value-free ideal is a dominant viewpoint among scientists. However, the survey instruments in used in these studies have important limitations. Previous work has also made little headway in developing hypotheses that might predict or explain differing views about the value-free ideal among scientists. In this article, we review previous survey work on this topic, describe an improved survey instrument, report results from an initial administration of (...) it that strengthen and refine previous results, and develop two hypotheses that may account for gender effects found in the data. (shrink)
Two Roads Diverge in a Wood: Indifference to the Difference Between ‘Diversity’ and ‘Heterogeneity’ Should Be Resisted on Epistemic and Moral Grounds.Ayelet Shavit,Anat Kolumbus &Aaron M. Ellison -unknowndetailsWe argue that a conceptual tension exists between “diversity” and “heterogeneity” and that glossing over their differences has practical, moral, and epistemic costs. We examine how these terms are used in ecology and the social sciences; articulate a deeper linguistic intuition; and test it with the Corpus of Contemporary American English. The results reveal that ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ have conflicting rather than interchangeable meanings: heterogeneity implies a collective entity that interactively integrates different entities, whereas diversity implies divergence, not integration. Consequently, (...) striving for diversity alone may increase social injustice and reduce epistemic outcomes of academic institutions and governance structures. (shrink)
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