History and scientific practice in the construction of an adequate philosophy of science: revisiting a Whewell/Mill debate.Aaron D. Cobb -2011 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):85-93.detailsWilliam Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science which suggested that Mill’s views were not properly informed by the history of science or by adequate reflection on scientific practices. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian criticism of Mill’s views by assessing Mill’s account of Michael Faraday’s discovery of electrical induction. The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill’s reconstruction is an inadequate reconstruction of this historical episode and the scientific (...) practices Faraday employed. But a study of Faraday’s research also raises some questions about Whewell’s characterization of this discovery. Thus, this example provides an opportunity to reconsider the debate between Whewell and Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an adequate philosophy of scientific methodology.Keywords: Inductivism; Experiment; Theory; Methodology; Electromagnetism. (shrink)
Hope as an Intellectual Virtue?Aaron D. Cobb -2015 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):269-285.detailsHope is a ubiquitous feature of human experience, but there has been relatively little scholarship within contemporary analytic philosophy devoted to the systematic analysis of its nature and value. In the last decade, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of hope and, in particular, its role in human agency. This scholarly attention reflects an ambivalence about hope's effects. While the possession of hope can have salutary consequences, it can also make the agent vulnerable to certain (...) kinds of personal risk. The pervasiveness of hope is not a sign of its quality; only a well‐tuned hope can be a virtue. Recently, Nancy Snow has argued that hope can be an intellectual virtue. Framing her account as a contribution to regulative epistemology, she contends that the intellectual virtue of hope can (i) motivate the pursuit of important epistemic ends, (ii) create dispositions that enable the successful pursuit of these aims, and (iii) generate a method for enduring intellectual projects. In this paper, I provide a critical appraisal of Snow's account of hope as an intellectual virtue. One important implication of this critique is that hope can function as an intellectual virtue only to the extent that it has benefitted from the correcting and perfecting influence of other cognitive excellences. (shrink)
Acknowledged Dependence and the Virtues of Perinatal Hospice.Aaron D. Cobb -2015 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (1):25-40.detailsPrenatal screening can lead to the detection and diagnosis of significantly life-limiting conditions affecting the unborn child. Recognizing the difficulties facing parents who decide to continue the pregnancy, some have proposed perinatal hospice as a new modality of care. Although the medical literature has begun to devote significant attention to these practices, systematic philosophical reflection on perinatal hospice has been relatively limited. Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the virtues of acknowledged dependence, I contend that perinatal hospice manifests and facilitates (...) virtues essential to living well with human dependency and vulnerability. For this reason, perinatal hospice deserves broad support within society. (shrink)
Disability and the Theodicy of Defeat.Aaron D. Cobb &Kevin Timpe -2017 -Journal of Analytic Theology 5:100-120.detailsMarilyn McCord Adams argues that God’s goodness to individuals requires God to defeat horrendous evils; it is not enough for God to outweigh these evils through compensatory goods. On her view, God defeats the evils experienced by an individual if and only if God’s goodness to the individual enables her to integrate the evil organically into a unified life story she perceives as good and meaningful. In this essay, we seek to apply Adams’s theodicy of defeat to a particular form (...) of suffering. We argue that God’s goodness to individuals requires that God defeat the suffering to which a range of disabilities can give rise. (shrink)
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Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry.Kent Staley &Aaron Cobb -2011 -Synthese 182 (3):475-492.detailsWhile epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist-externalist debate—from the perspective of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo’s (...) error-statistical theory of evidence because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts. (shrink)
Christian Humility and the Goods of Perinatal Hospice.Aaron D. Cobb -2021 -Christian Bioethics 27 (1):69-83.detailsPerinatal palliative and hospice care (hereafter, perinatal hospice) is a novel approach to addressing a family’s varied needs following an adverse in utero diagnosis. Christian defenses of perinatal hospice tend to focus on its role as an ethical alternative to abortion. Although these analyses are important, they do not provide adequate grounds to characterize the wide range of goods realized through this compassionate form of care. This essay draws on an analysis of the Christian virtue of humility to highlight the (...) ways a Christian virtue-based defense of perinatal hospice can account for these goods. I argue that humility can play an important facilitating role in helping Christian physicians to meet the needs of families in profoundly difficult circumstances. (shrink)
Inductivism in Practice: Experiment in John Herschel’s Philosophy of Science.Aaron D. Cobb -2012 -Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-54.detailsThe aim of this work is to elucidate John F. W. Herschel’s distinctive contribution to nineteenth-century British inductivism by exploring his understanding of experimental methods. Drawing on both his explicit discussion of experiment in his Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy and his published account of experiments he conducted in the domain of electromagnetism, I argue that the most basic principle underlying Herschel’s epistemology of experiment is that experiment enables a particular kind of lower-level experimental understanding of phenomena. Experimental practices provide (...) knowledge of a particular phenomenon as a genuine effect produced under precise material conditions whose connections with other phenomena can be traced by variations in experimental parameters. The orienting concern of experimental inquiry seems to be the production of a secure understanding of phenomena even if it has no direct theoretical significance. Insofar as one can generate this lower-level understanding, it can function both as a fertile source for explanatory principles about phenomena and as a body of evidence against which one can test the adequacy of an explanatory hypothesis. This project provides evidence of Herschel’s inductivism not merely as a philosophical approach to understanding the sciences but as a methodological commitment in scientific practice. (shrink)
A Virtue-Based Defense of Perinatal Hospice.Aaron D. Cobb -2019 - Routledge.detailsPerinatal hospice is a novel form of care for an unborn child who has been diagnosed with a significantly life-limiting condition. In this book, Aaron D. Cobb develops a virtue-based defense of the value of perinatal hospice. He characterizes its promotion and provision as a common project of individuals, local communities, and institutions working together to provide exemplary care. Engaging with important themes from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Robert Adams, he shows how perinatal hospice manifests virtues crucial to (...) meeting the needs of families in these difficult circumstances. As a work of applied virtue ethics, this book has important normative, social, and political implications for the creation and development of structured programs of care. It grounds the view that communities ought to devote resources to ensure that these programs are widely available and to develop social structures that promote awareness of and accessibility to these forms of care. A Virtue-Based Defense of Perinatal Hospice will be of interest to philosophers working in bioethics and applied virtue ethics, as well as scholars in the fields of neonatology, nursing, palliative and hospice care, and counseling who are interested in the study of perinatal hospice. (shrink)
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Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy.Aaron D. Cobb -2010 -Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):101-114.detailsThomas Reid thinks of natural philosophy as a purely nomothetic enterprise but he maintains that it is proper for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology in formulating their explanatory claims. In this paper, I analyze this puzzle in light of Reid's distinction between efficient and physical causation – a distinction he grounds in his strict understanding of active powers. I consider several possible reasons that Reid may have for maintaining that natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology and suggest that (...) the underlying rationale for his views is his understanding of the aims of explanation and their connection to the interests of human agents. The ultimate aim of knowing the causes of phenomena is to mollify the natural intellectual curiosity of human inquirers and provide guidance that insures successful action. The discovery of laws governing phenomena fulfills this aim and, as such, it is appropriate for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology. (shrink)
Is John F. W. Herschel an Inductivist about Hypothetical Inquiry?Aaron D. Cobb -2012 -Perspectives on Science 20 (4):409-439.detailsJohn Herschel's discussion of hypotheses in the Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy has generated questions concerning his commitment to the principle that hypothetical speculation is legitimate only if warranted by inductive evidence. While Herschel explicitly articulates an inductivist philosophy of science, he also asserts that “it matters little how {a hypothesis or theory} has been originally framed” when it can withstand extensive testing and empirical scrutiny. This evidence has convinced some that Herschel endorses an early form of hypothetico-deductivism. I aim (...) to clarify this interpretive puzzle and adduce evidence in support of the inductivist interpretation of Herschel's philosophy of science by examining his published account of a series of experiments in the domain of electromagnetism. (shrink)
The Silence of God and the Theological Virtue of Hope.Aaron Cobb -2017 -Res Philosophica 94 (1):23-41.detailsHope is crucial human agency, but its fragility grounds a substantive challenge to Christian belief. It is not clear how a perfectly loving God could permit despairinducing experiences of divine silence. Drawing upon a distinctively Christian psychology of hope, this paper seeks to address this challenge. I contend that divine silence can act as a corrective to misplaced natural hopes. But there are risks in God’s choice to allow a person to lose all natural hope. Thus, if God is perfectly (...) loving, God ought to find a way to demonstrate goodness to those who are tempted by theological despair. I argue that the Church demonstrates God’s goodness through its merciful care and hope for the afflicted. The local community can act to sustain or recover a person’s capacity to remain open to the gift of hope even in the midst of divine silence. (shrink)
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The Theological Virtue of Hope as a Social Virtue.Aaron D. Cobb &Adam Green -2017 -Journal of Analytic Theology 5:230-250.detailsAnalyses of the theological virtue of hope tend to focus on its interior dispositional structure, shifting attention away from the social dimensions crucial to its formation and exercise. We argue that one can better appreciate the place of hope in Christian thought by attending to communal features that have been peripheral to or excluded from traditional analyses. To this end, we employ resources from the literature on the extended mind and group agency to develop an account of the theological virtue (...) of hope as a socially extended virtue—that is, a virtue scaffolded by and enacted within a community whose practices are ordered toward a shared conception of human flourishing. (shrink)
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Hope and the Problem of Divine Silence.Aaron D. Cobb -2016 -European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (4):157--178.detailsThe silence of God either by itself or in circumstances of profound suffering can induce hopelessness and despair, eroding a person’s ability to act in ways conducive to her own good. Given the role of hope in human agency, the loss of hope is an event of a significant moral and personal concern. And the standard responses to the problem of divine hiddenness may not address the existential crises occasioned by God’s silence. This paper seeks to develop and address this (...) challenge by evaluating two potential responses to the problem of despair-inducing experience of divine silence. (shrink)
Mill's Philosophy of Science.Aaron D. Cobb -2016 - In Christopher Macleod & Dale E. Miller,A Companion to Mill. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. pp. 234–249.detailsJohn Stuart Mill's System of Logic was a significant early work in the history of the philosophy of science. The goal of this essay is to characterize Mill's views concerning the central purposes of the sciences and the methods that give to scientific inquiry its distinctive quality and power. More broadly, this chapter explores the implications of Mill's philosophy of science for important debates concerning the nature of inductivism and the normativity of scientific practice in the construction of an adequate (...) philosophy of science. To this end, it addresses William Whewell's trenchant criticisms of Mill's views and some the implications of their debates for the discipline of the philosophy of science. (shrink)
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