Results for 'Aa Bello'
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- Culture and Utopia in the Phenomenological Perspective.Bello Aa -1976 -Analecta Husserliana 5:305-341.Export citation
Bookmark - From empathy to solidarity: Intersubjective connections according to Edith Stein: The deep springs of mundanity in human co-existence: Moral sense, empathy, solidarity, communication, intersubjective grounding.AaBello -1996 -Analecta Husserliana 48:367-375.
- La phase nationale de l'histoire de l'État.Aa Gouseïnov -1992 -Polis 5:18-19.Export citation Bookmark
- Explaining individual predictions when features are dependent: More accurate approximations to Shapley values.Kjersti Aas,Martin Jullum &Anders Løland -2021 -Artificial Intelligence 298 (C):103502.
- Myth of reincarnation: a challenge for mental health profession.Aa Muhammad Gadit -2009 -Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (2):91-91.
- EduardoBello Reguera in memoriam.GabrielBello Reguera -2011 -Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía:9-15.Palabras en memoria de EduardoBello pronunciadas en la sesión inaugural del V Congreso Internacional de la Sociedad Académica de Filosofía, celebrado del 2 al 4 de febrero de 2011 en La Laguna (Tenerife).
- El pensamiento pedagógico de AndrésBello.F. Luis B. Prieto &AndrâesBello -1989 - Valencia [Venezuela]: Vadell Hermanos Editores. Edited by Andrés Bello.Export citation Bookmark
- The divine in Husserl and other explorations.Angela AlesBello -2009 -Analecta Husserliana 98.
- Distributing Collective Obligation.Sean Aas -2015 -Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (3):1-23.In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the collective obligation, but (...) also what they should do if they cannot do their part because others will not do theirs. I go on to argue (contra recent proposals) that it is not good enough for members in this situation to reasonably believe that others will not do their part. Rather, for a member of an obligated collective to permissibly escape doing her part in a collective obligation, she must both reasonably doubt that others will do their part and stand ready to act in case others do as well. -/- This necessary condition for collective obligation points the way to plausible sufficient conditions – conditions that, I argue, allow unstructured collectives to bear obligations. For (a) if a collective’s members are individually obligated to be ready to do their part, in a given collective action, and (b) if that individual readiness makes it sufficiently likely that the collective will in fact act, then it is hard to see what could block an attribution of collective obligation. In particular, in that case there ought to be no additional objection that there is no existing, organized “agent” on which the obligation might fall. For agents are, simply, things that can act. To be able to act is just to be able to succeed by trying. Unstructured collectives try to do something, I argue, when each member acts on their willingness to do their part in that thing if others do theirs; sometimes they succeed, producing a collective action. Some unstructured collectives, therefore, can succeed by trying; therefore, they can act; therefore they are agents. (shrink)
- Forgotten paths: The making of Vico’s etymology.Davide DelBello -1997 -Semiotica 113 (1-2):171-188.
- Threshold setting procedures in studies of perception without awareness.Aa Thieman &Ll Avant -1987 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):341-341.Export citation Bookmark
- Présences hébraïques dans l'histoire de l'Eglise in Croisées du judaïsme.Aa Winogradsky -1986 -Recherches de Science Religieuse 74 (4):511-536.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Goodbye to rehearsal as the mechanism for the primacy effect.Aa Wright,Rg Cook,Sf Sands &M. Shyan -1986 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):334-335.Export citation Bookmark
- Memory processing of serial lists by monkeys and people.Aa Wright -1987 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):345-345.Export citation Bookmark
- Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello DiBello -2019 -Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.Suppose one hundred prisoners are in a yard under the supervision of a guard, and at some point, ninety-nine of them collectively kill the guard. If, after the fact, a prisoner is picked at random and tried, the probability of his guilt is 99%. But despite the high probability, the statistical chances, by themselves, seem insufficient to justify a conviction. The question is why. Two arguments are offered. The first, decision-theoretic argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics (...) in the prisoner scenario is unacceptable so long as the goal of expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints. The second, risk-based argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics in the prisoner scenario lets the risk of mistaken conviction surge potentially too high. The same, by contrast, cannot be said of convictions solely based on DNA evidence or eyewitness testimony. A noteworthy feature of the two arguments in the paper is that they are not confined to criminal trials and can in fact be extended to civil trials. (shrink)
- Vital prostheses: Killing, letting die, and the ethics of de‐implantation.Sean Aas -2020 -Bioethics 35 (2):214-220.Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them—and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient’s heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, however, about cases (...) at the boundary—procedures involving items that seem bodily in some respects, but not others? When, for instance, does deactivating an implanted device like a pacemaker count as killing, and when as letting die? Contra existing proposals, I argue that the boundaries of the body for this purpose are not drawn at the boundaries of the self, or (if this is different) the human organism. Nor should we determine when we are killing and when we are letting die by deferring to existing practices for distinguishing ongoing from completed treatment. Rather, I argue that whether something (organic or inorganic) counts as body part for purposes of this distinction depends on the results of a normative analysis of the particular character of our rights in it—particularly, whether and in what way these rights ought to be alienable. I conclude by arguing that there are likely good reasons to recognize distinctively “bodily” rights and restrictions in at least some implantable devices. (shrink)
- Informational richness and its impact on algorithmic fairness.Marcello DiBello &Ruobin Gong -2025 -Philosophical Studies 182 (1):25-53.The literature on algorithmic fairness has examined exogenous sources of biases such as shortcomings in the data and structural injustices in society. It has also examined internal sources of bias as evidenced by a number of impossibility theorems showing that no algorithm can concurrently satisfy multiple criteria of fairness. This paper contributes to the literature stemming from the impossibility theorems by examining how informational richness affects the accuracy and fairness of predictive algorithms. With the aid of a computer simulation, we (...) show that informational richness is the engine that drives improvements in the performance of a predictive algorithm, in terms of both accuracy and fairness. The centrality of informational richness suggests that classification parity, a popular criterion of algorithmic fairness, should be given relatively little weight. But we caution that the centrality of informational richness should be taken with a grain of salt in light of practical limitations, in particular, the so-called bias-variance trade off. (shrink)
- Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions.Marcello DiBello &Collin O’Neil -2020 -Ethics 130 (2):147-178.Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other (...) forms of evidence, such as eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence, does not violate equal protection. (shrink)
- Prosthetic embodiment.Sean Aas -2019 -Synthese 198 (7):6509-6532.What makes something a part of my body, for moral purposes? Is the body defined naturalistically: by biological relations, or psychological relations, or some combination of the two? This paper approaches this question by considering a borderline case: the status of prostheses. I argue that extant accounts of the body fail to capture prostheses as genuine body parts. Nor, however, do they provide plausible grounds for excluding prostheses, without excluding some paradigm organic parts in the process. I conclude by suggesting (...) that embodiment is moralized all the way down: to be a body part is to be the sort of thing that ought to be protected, in a certain way, by social practices. (shrink)
- The ethics of sexual reorientation: what should clinicians and researchers do?Sean Aas &Candice Delmas -2016 -Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (6):340-347.Technological measures meant to change sexual orientation are, we have argued elsewhere, deeply alarming, even and indeed especially if they are safe and effective. Here we point out that this in part because they produce a distinctive kind of ‘clinical collective action problem’, a sort of dilemma for individual clinicians and researchers: a treatment which evidently relieves the suffering of particular patients, but in the process contributes to a practice that substantially worsens the conditions that produce this suffering in the (...) first place. We argue that the role obligations of clinicians to relieve the suffering of their patients put them in a poor position to solve this problem, though they can take measures to avoid complicity in the harms that would result from widespread use of individually safe and effective reorientation biotechnology. But in the end the medical community as a whole still seems obligated to provide these measures, if they become technologically feasible. Medical researchers are in a better position to prevent the harms that would result if reorientation techniques were safe, effective and widely available. We argue that the harms attendant on the development of safe and effective re-orientation techniques give researchers reason to avoid ‘applied‘ research aimed at developing these techniques, and to be careful in the conduct of basic orientation research which might be applied in this way. (shrink)
- Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996): Een moderne komedie van vergissingen?Aa Derksen -1997 -Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 89 (3):205-229.Export citation Bookmark
- Edward Meryon Wilson 1906-1977.Aa Parker &Dw Cruickshank -1983 - In Parker Aa & Cruickshank Dw,Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 68: 1982. pp. 643-666.Export citation Bookmark
- Edith Stein and Edmund Husserl: philosophical exchanges.Angela AlesBello -2025 - Lanham: Lexington Books. Translated by Antonio Calcagno.Offers a reconsideration and re-evaluation of the philosophical exchange between Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Angela AlesBello highlights the depth and breadth of the philosophers' thinking on questions related to subjects such as ethics, religion, personhood, and psychology.Export citation Bookmark
- Brain–computer interfaces and disability: extending embodiment, reducing stigma?Sean Aas &David Wasserman -2016 -Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):37-40.
- Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Gerda Walther: fenomenologia della persona, della vita e della comunità.Angela AlesBello,Francesco Alfieri &Mobeen Shahid (eds.) -2011 - Bari: G. Laterza.No categories
- Larry laudans leerzame lessen of hoe de wetenschapsfilosofie Van de wetenschap Kan leren.Aa Derksen -1984 -Bijdragen 45 (1):15-27.No categories
- El Tahdib de al-Baradiì en al-Andalus: a propósito de un manuscrito aljamiado de la Real Academia de la Historia.María Isabel FierroBello -2000 -Al-Qantara 21 (1):227-236.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- ¿ Hubo propaganda Fatimi entre los Kutama andalusíes?María Isabel FierroBello -2004 -Al-Qantara 25 (1):239-243.Export citation Bookmark
- Attitude and preferences of Nigerian antenatal women to social support during labour.I. O. Morhason-Bello,O. Olayemi,O. A. Ojengbede,B. O. Adedokun,O. O. Okuyemi &B. Orji -2008 -Journal of Biosocial Science 40 (4):553.
- Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?Marcello DiBello -2020 -Mind 129 (516):1269-1285.Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.No categories
- When statistical evidence is not specific enough.Marcello DiBello -2021 -Synthese 199 (5-6):12251-12269.Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive (...) analysis of why statistical evidence should raise concerns in some cases but not others. I argue that when there is a mismatch between the specificity of the evidence and the expected specificity of the accusation, statistical evidence—as any other kind of evidence—should be considered insufficient to sustain a conviction. I rely on different stylized court cases to illustrate the explanatory power of this analysis. (shrink)
- What We Argue About When We Argue About Death.Sean Aas -2024 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (4):399-413.The literature on the determination of death has often if not always assumed that the concept of human death should be defined in terms of the end of the human organism. I argue that this broadly biological conceptualization of human death cannot constitute a basis for agreement in a pluralistic society characterized by a variety of reasonable views on the nature of our existence as embodied beings. Rather, following Robert Veatch, I suggest that we must define death in moralized terms, (...) as the loss of an especially significant sort of moral standing. Departing from Veatch, however, I argue that we should not understand death in terms of the loss of all moral status whatsoever. Rather, I argue, what we should argue about, when we argue about death, is when and why people lose their rights-claims to the protection and promotion of their basic bodily functioning. (shrink)
- Note & Recensioni.V. V. Aa -2023 -Aisthesis: Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 16 (1):191-198.No categories
- Images >> Yevgen Samborsky and the Art of Possibility.Oliver Aas -2023 -Diacritics 51 (4):101-115.Yevgen Samborsky is a multihyphenate, whose work spans not only painting but also video work, installation, and community-based creative projects. His visual language is entirely intermedial: he draws on photography, graffiti, hyperrealism, and internet machine aesthetics. His indebtedness to the digital image has been particularly strong in the last two years, which he has spent watching the news from back home on his computer. He has taken pictures of destroyed cultural institutions like the Kharkiv Art Museum or the Odessa Museum (...) and incorporated them into his more abstract painterly meditations on war and displacement. As part of his process of digital reworking, he combines his memories of a place, the current events in Ukraine, and his own affective charge. (shrink)
- The adaptive neural network organizes the collective muscle behavior so as to enable the desired equilibrium trajectory.Aa Frolov &Ev Birjukova -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (4):739-740.Export citation Bookmark
- Aristotle’s Mathematical Cyclists.Aa Rini -2010 -Logique Et Analyse 53 (212):399-415.Export citation Bookmark
- On a Misapplication of the World-Time Parallel.Aa Rini &Mj Cresswell -2009 -Logique Et Analyse 52 (206):125-130.Export citation Bookmark
- Disabled – therefore, Unhealthy?Sean Aas -2016 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1259-1274.This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known ‘social model of disability’, that we should prefer a usage of ‘disabled’ which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I (...) argue that it is often wrong to use the term ‘healthy’ in a way that makes health inconsistent with any degree whatsoever of health-relevant bodily dysfunction. Whether someone is ‘healthy’ properly-so-called depends on standards of health presupposed in conversational context. Sometimes, I argue, these standards are or ought to be lax enough to allow some people with some health deficits still to count as ‘healthy’ per se. Taking inspiration from David Lewis and Mary Kate Mcgowan, I go on to argue that denying that someone is ‘healthy’ in a context typically succeeds in shifting going presuppositions to require standards strict enough to make that denial acceptable. And this, I conclude by arguing, often constitutes an abuse of conversational power. (shrink)
- Liberté et nécessité selon Simone Weil.Devaux Aa -1976 -Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 1:1-11.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- La via intuitiva y la evolucion del hombre hacia la experiencia mistica de Dios.Aa Alonso -1986 -Studium 26 (2):289-314.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- ST De bonnes raisons de croire quelque chose.Aa Derksen -1985 -Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 77 (2):79-108.Export citation Bookmark
- Historia y mitolgía.Oscar EdwardsBello -1934 - Santiago de Chile,: Imprenta "Le blanc".
- Reseñas varias: Meijide Casas, Redondo García, Domínguez Quintana, Alonso González, Guerrero Ruiz, Alonso Fernández, Iglesias Granda.cc aa -2022 -Endoxa 49.No categories
- Testimonios.V. V. Aa -2010 -Telos: Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas 17 (2):17-22.No categories
- From Empathy to Solidarity: Intersubjective Connections According to Edith Stein.A. AlesBello -1996 -Analecta Husserliana 48:367-376.
- Il filo(sofare) di Arianna: percorsi del pensiero femminile nel Novecento.Angela AlesBello &Francesca Brezzi (eds.) -2001 - Milano: Mimesis.
- Résumé: “Être brut” et hylétique phénoménologique.Angela AlesBello -2008 -Chiasmi International 10:161-161.
- Working-class as subject of culturally creative process.Aa Bulygina -1977 -Filosoficky Casopis 25 (5):689-701.Export citation Bookmark
- Esperienza politica e antropologia in María Zambrano: la centralità della persona.Sara DelBello -2017 - Milano: Mimesis.
- Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 68: 1982.Parker Aa &Cruickshank Dw -1983No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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