Results for ' vagueness'
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- Sur ia convergence dans Les espaces topologiques.Vaguélis Félouzis -forthcoming -Eleutheria.No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest.Varieties ojVagueness -2001 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2).
- Timothy WILLIAMSON University of Oxford.Horgan OnVagueness -2002 -Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie; Gps 63:273-285.Export citation Bookmark
- L'aurore sur le gué du Iaboc: histoire de l'homme, histoire des hommes.Jean Vague -1993 - La Calade, Aix-en-Provence: Edisud.No categories
- Patrick maynakd.Vague Predicates -1972 -American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3).No categories
- Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely.Higher-OrderVagueness -2003 - In J. C. Beall,Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 195.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Ph ilosophi cal abstracts.Meditations Leibnitziennes,MeaningVagueness &Haig Absurdity -1965 -American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (2).No categories
- What is so good about moral freedom?, Wes Morriston.Vagueness as A. Modality -2000 -Philosophy 75 (293).
- Learned to stop worrying and let the children drown 1–22 Jonathan schaffer/overdetermining causes 23–45 Sharon ryan/doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief 47–79 Sarah mcgrath/causation and the making/allowing. [REVIEW]Theodore Sider,Against Vague Existence,Jim Stone &Evidential Atheism -2003 -Philosophical Studies 114:293-294.
- Zhuangzi and Early Chinese Philosophy:Vagueness, Transformation, and Paradox.Steve Coutinho -2004 - Routledge.Drawing on several issues and methods in Western philosophy, from analytical philosophy to semiotics and hermeneutics, the author throws new light on the ancient Zhuangzi text. Engaging Daoism and contemporary Western philosophical logic, and drawing on new developments in our understanding of early Chinese culture, Coutinho challenges the interpretation of Zhuangzi as either a skeptic or a relativist, and instead seeks to explore his philosophy as emphasizing the ineradicablevagueness of language, thought and reality. This new interpretation of the (...) Zhuangzi offers an important development in the understanding of Daoist philosophy, describing a world in flux in which things themselves are vague and inconsistent, and tries to show us a Way (a Dao) to negotiate through the shadows of a "chaotic" world. (shrink)
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 91.Present Desire Satisfaction,Past Well-Being,Volatile Reasons,Epistemic Focal Bias,Some Evidence is False,Counting Stages,Vague Entailment,What Russell Couldn'T. Describe,Liberal Thinking &Intentional Action First -2013 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4).No categories
- The dynamics ofvagueness.Chris Barker -2002 -Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-36.
- Is there higher-ordervagueness?Mark Sainsbury -1991 -Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):167-182.
- (1 other version)The rationality ofvagueness.Igor Douven -forthcoming - In Richard Dietz,Vagueness and rationality. Springer.
- (2 other versions)Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy andVagueness.Matti Eklund -2008 -Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:6.This chapter discusses the defence of metaphysical indeterminacy by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams and discusses a classical and bivalent theory of such indeterminacy. Even if metaphysical indeterminacy arguably is intelligible, Barnes and Williams argue in favour of it being so and this faces important problems. As for classical logic and bivalence, the chapter problematizes what exactly is at issue in this debate. Can reality not be adequately described using different languages, some classical and some not? Moreover, it is argued (...) that the classical and bivalent theory of Barnes and Williams does not avoid the problems that arise for rival theories. (shrink)
- Is IncommensurabilityVagueness?John Broome -1997 - In Ruth Chang,Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
- The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes ofVagueness.Hartry Field -2003 - In J. C. Beall,Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 262-311.Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing withvagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of (...)vagueness and indeterminacy, there is no worry about inconsistency; but a central intuition is that we must reject the factual status of certain sentences, and it hard to see how we can do that while claiming that the law of excluded middle applies to those sentences. So despite the different routes, we have a similar conclusion in the two cases. (shrink)
- Representationalism and the problem ofvagueness.Ryan Perkins &Tim Bayne -2013 -Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account ofvagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism.
- Ambiguity, indeterminacy, deixis andvagueness: Evidence and theory.Brendan S. Gillon -2004 - In Steven Davis & Brendan S. Gillon,Semantics: a reader. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157--190.
- Ambiguity, polysemy, andvagueness.David Tuggy -1993 -Cognitive Linguistics 4 (3):273-290.
- Adaptive Resonance Theory as a model of polysemy andvagueness in the cognitive lexicon.George Dunbar -2012 -Cognitive Linguistics 23 (3).
- The Multiple-Line View ofVagueness.Yilun Zhai -unknownNo categories
- How Barnes and Williams have failed to present an intelligible ontic theory ofvagueness.Ken Akiba -2015 -Analysis 75 (4):565-573.Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams claim to offer a new ontic theory ofvagueness, the kind of theory which considersvagueness to exist not in language but in reality. This paper refutes their claim. The possible worlds they employ are ersatz possible worlds, i.e., sets of sentences. Unlike reality, they don’t contain concrete and often material objects. As a result, there is nothing in Barnes and Williams’s description of the theory that the semanticist cannot or does (...) not accept. Thus, they have failed to establish their theory as a genuine intelligible ontic alternative to semantic theories. (shrink)
- Indeterminacy as Indecision, Lecture I:Vagueness and Communication.John MacFarlane -2020 -Journal of Philosophy 117 (11/12):593-616.I can say that a building is tall and you can understand me, even if neither of us has any clear idea exactly how tall a building must be in order to count as tall. This mundane fact poses a problem for the view that successful communication consists in the hearer’s recognition of the proposition a speaker intends to assert. The problem cannot be solved by the epistemicist’s usual appeal to anti-individualism, because the extensions of vague words like ‘tall’ are (...) contextually fluid and can be constrained significantly by speakers’ intentions. The problem can be seen as a special case of a more general problem concerning what King has called “felicitous underspecification.” Traditional theories ofvagueness offer nothing that can help with this problem. Appeals to diagonalization do not help either. A more radical solution is needed. (shrink)No categories
- Problem of the Many and theVagueness of Constitution.E. J. Lowe -1995 -Analysis 55 (3):179-182.E. J. Lowe; The problem of the many and thevagueness of constitution, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 179–182, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/.
- The Value ofVagueness.Timothy Endicott -2011 - In Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames,Philosophical foundations of language in the law. New York: Oxford University Press.
- A deflationist approach to indeterminacy andvagueness.Ken Akiba -2002 -Philosophical Studies 107 (1):69 - 86.Deflationists cannot make sense ofthe notion of referential indeterminacybecause they deny the existence of substantivereference. One way for them to make sense ofthe objective existence of linguisticindeterminacy is by embracing theworldly (or objectual) view ofindeterminacy, the view that indeterminacyexists not in reference relations but in the(non-linguistic) world itself. On this view,the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is dividedinto temporal slices and (arguably) alethicpossible worlds. Supervaluationism proves tobe neutral with respect to the debate betweenthe worldly view (...) and the referential view ofindeterminacy. (shrink)
- On the Instrumental Value ofVagueness in the Law.Hrafn Asgeirsson -2015 -Ethics 125 (2):425-448.It is natural to think that law ought not to be vague. After all, law is supposed to guide conduct, and vague law seems poorly suited to do that. Contrary to this common impression, however, a number of authors have argued thatvagueness in the law is sometimes a good thing, because it is a means to achieving certain valuable legislative ends. In this article, I argue that many authors—including Timothy Endicott and Jeremy Waldron—wrongly associatevagueness with instrumental (...) roles that are really played by a closely related semantic phenomenon. (shrink)
- Against the status response to the argument fromVagueness.David Mark Kovacs -2022 -Synthese 200 (6):1-20.The Argument fromVagueness for Universalism contends that any non-arbitrary restriction on composition must be vague, but that vague composition leads to unacceptable count indeterminacy. One common response to the argument is that borderline cases of composition don’t necessarily lead to count indeterminacy because a determinately existing thing may be a borderline case of a presently existing concrete composite object. We can collectively refer to such views as versions of the Status Response. This paper argues that the Status Response (...) cannot handle count indeterminacy about various categories of things, such as events, states of affairs, tropes, holes, shadows, and created abstracta, when these are understood in the right way. This makes the Status Response objectionablfy ad hoc, which should lead us to look for alternative ways of resisting the Argument fromVagueness. (shrink)No categories
- On Why We Cannot Escape Higher OrderVagueness.R. Jobanputra &P. R. Bhat -2001 -Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):57-68.Export citation Bookmark
- The philosophical problem ofvagueness.Dorothy Edgington -2001 -Legal Theory 7 (4):371-378.Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. "There is no such point", is a natural thought: one color just shades gradually into the next.
- On being in a quandary. Relativismvagueness logical revisionism.Crispin Wright -2001 -Mind 110 (1):45--98.This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement-Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as (...) liable to generate Quandary and as subject to a broad form of evidential constraint. So motivated, the distinctions enshrined in intuitionistic logic provide both for a satisfying resolution of the Sorites paradox and a coherent outlet for relativistic views about, e.g., matters of taste and morals. An important corollary of the discussion is that an epistemic conception ofvagueness can be prised apart from the strong metaphysical realism with which its principal supporters have associated it, and acknowledged to harbour an independent insight. (shrink)
- Epistemicism, Distribution, and the Argument fromVagueness.Ofra Magidor -2016 -Noûs 52 (1):144-170.This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic ofvagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists aboutvagueness should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive question of what, on this framework, it (...) takes for a sentence to be borderline or definite. In the second part of the paper, I apply this result to a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most influential arguments in favour of Universalism about composition is the Lewis-Sider argument fromvagueness. An interesting question, however, is whether epistemicists have any particular reasons to resist the argument. I show that there is no obvious reason why epistemicists should resist the argument but there is a non-obvious one: the rejection of Distribution argued for in the first part of the paper provides epistemicists with a unique way of resisting the argument fromvagueness. (shrink)
- II—Patrick Greenough: Contextualism aboutVagueness and Higher‐orderVagueness.Patrick Greenough -2005 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):167-190.To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-ordervagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order)vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position onvagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key (...) paradoxes of higher-ordervagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe's response to combat both paradoxes. (shrink)
- A Journey From Meaning To MeaningVagueness In Classical Turkish Literature.Oğuzhan ŞAHİN -2007 -Journal of Turkish Studies 2:710-722.No categories
- Useful Review Marked by ConceptualVagueness.Ceci Verbaarschot &Pim Haselager -2018 -American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):47-48.
- Fuzzy and more. Implementing a logic calculator for comparing philosophical theories ofvagueness using Structured Query Language. Part 1.Marian Călborean -manuscriptI aim to develop a tool for comparing theories ofvagueness, using Structured Query Language. Relevant SQL snippets will be used throughout.
- Indeterminacy andVagueness: Logic and Metaphysics.Peter Van Inwagen -2009 -European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2):1 - 19.
- On the structure of higher-ordervagueness.Timothy Williamson -1999 -Mind 108 (429):127-143.Discussions of higher-ordervagueness rarely define what it is for a term to have nth-ordervagueness for n>2. This paper provides a rigorous definition in a framework analogous to possible worlds semantics; it is neutral between epistemic and supervaluationist accounts ofvagueness. The definition is shown to have various desirable properties. But under natural assumptions it is also shown that 2nd-ordervagueness impliesvagueness of all orders, and that a conjunction can have 2nd-ordervagueness (...) even if its conjuncts do not. Relations between the definition and other proposals are explored; reasons are given for preferring the present proposal. (shrink)
- Validity, Uncertainty andVagueness.Dorothy Edgington -1992 -Analysis 52 (4):193 - 204.
- The Epistemic Conception ofVagueness.Crispin Wright -1995 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):133-160.
- Three-dimensionalist’s semantic solution to diachronicvagueness.Irem Kurtsal Steen -2010 -Philosophical Studies 150 (1):79-96.A standard response to the problem of diachronicvagueness is ‘the semantic solution’, which demands an abundant ontology. Although it is known that the abundant ontology does not logically preclude endurantism, their combination is rejected because it necessitates massive coincidence between countless objects. In this paper, I establish that the semantic solution is available not only to perdurantists but also to endurantists by showing that there is no problem with such ubiquitous and principled coincidence.
- Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and its Treatment ofVagueness.Alexander Jackson -2019 -Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):79-108.Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The first half of this paper argues that if we take non-factualism seriously for any matters, such as morality, then we should take rampant non-factualism seriously. The second half of the paper argues that rampant non-factualism makes possible an attractive theory ofvagueness. We can give non-factualist accounts of non-fundamental matters that nicely characterize thevagueness they manifest (if any). (...) I suggest that such non-factualist theories dissolve philosophical puzzlement aboutvagueness. In particular, the approach implies that philosophers should not try to say which of the sorites-paradox-forming claims are true; we should not try to solve the sorites paradox in that sense. (shrink)
- The future of post-human pragmatics: towards a new theory of clarity andvagueness.Peter Baofu -2016 - New Delhi: Overseas Press India Pvt..No categories
- Language, thought and the epistemic theory ofvagueness.Frank Jackson -unknown
- A unified theory of granularity,vagueness and approximation.Thomas Bittner &Barry Smith -2001 - In Bittner Thomas & Smith Barry,COSIT Workshop on Spatial Vagueness, Uncertainty and Granularity. pp. 39.Abstract: We propose a view ofvagueness as a semantic property of names and predicates. All entities are crisp, on this semantic view, but there are, for each vague name, multiple portions of reality that are equally good candidates for being its referent, and, for each vague predicate, multiple classes of objects that are equally good candidates for being its extension. We provide a new formulation of these ideas in terms of a theory of granular partitions. We show that (...) this theory provides a general framework within which we can understand the relation between vague terms and concepts and the corresponding crisp portions of reality. We also sketch how it might be possible to formulate within this framework a theory ofvagueness which dispenses with the notion of truth-value gaps and other artifacts of more familiar approaches. Central to our approach is the idea that judgments about reality involve in every case (1) a separation of reality into foreground and background of attention and (2) the feature of granularity. On this basis we attempt to show that even vague judgments made in naturally occurring contexts are not marked by truth-value indeterminacy. We distinguish, in addition to crisp granular partitions, also vague partitions, and reference partitions, and we explain the role of the latter in the context of judgments that involvevagueness. We conclude by showing how reference partitions provide an effective means by which judging subjects are able to temper thevagueness of their judgments by means of approximations. (shrink)
- What is a forest? On thevagueness of certain geographic concepts.Brandon Bennett -2001 -Topoi 20 (2):189-201.
- What the Epistemic Account ofVagueness Means for Legal Interpretation.Luke William Hunt -2016 -Law and Philosophy 35 (1):29-54.This paper explores what the epistemic account ofvagueness means for theories of legal interpretation. The thesis of epistemicism is that vague statements are true or false even though it is impossible to know which. I argue that if epistemicism is accepted within the domain of the law, then the following three conditions must be satisfied: Interpretative reasoning within the law must adhere to the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded middle, interpretative reasoning within the law must (...) construe vague statements as an epistemic phenomenon, and epistemicism must be expanded to include normative considerations in order to account for legal theories that are consistent with the first two conditions. The first two conditions are internal to a particular theory of legal interpretation, while the third condition is external to a particular theory of legal interpretation. My conclusion shows that there are legal theories that are internally consistent with the fundamental features of epistemicism. However, within the domain of law—and specifically in the case of legal theories that are internally consistent with epistemicism—I show thatvagueness cannot be explained simply by our ignorance of the meaning and use of vague expressions. Rather, epistemicism must also account for ignorance of the requisite normative considerations in legal theories with which it is otherwise consistent. (shrink)
- Why neither diachronic universalism nor the Argument fromVagueness establishes perdurantism.Ofra Magidor -2015 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):113-126.One of the most influential arguments in favour of perdurantism is the Argument fromVagueness. The argument proceeds in three stages: The first aims to establish atemporal universalism. The second presents a parallel argument in favour of universalism in the context of temporalized parthood. The third argues that diachronic universalism entails perdurantism. I offer a novel objection to the argument. I show that on the correct way of formulating diachronic universalism the principle does not entail perdurantism. On the other (...) hand, if diachronic universalism is formulated as Sider proposes, the argument fails to establish his principle, and thus perdurantism. (shrink)
- The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture ofVagueness.Mario Gomez-Torrente -2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi,Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-253.I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...) of use in which the paradigm and generic preconceptions are not jointly satisfied. In them, the relevant degree adjective lacks an extension, and utterances of sentences containing it appearing in sorites arguments do not have truth conditions. I also postulate a probable psychology of paradigm intuitions, used in a psychological explanation of the preference for solutions of the sorites paradox on which paradigm preconceptions retain their intuitive truth-values. (shrink)
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