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This paper proposes a theory to explain the remarkable emotional power of our response to abstract music. It reviews and rejects metaphysical arguments derived from notions of a divine spiritual realm and from absolute forms of human reason. Its conclusion is that musical experience is always essentially inter-subjective and potentially empathetic, and arises from “action-metaphors,” through which we link musical performances, as forms of action, to subconscious, archetypal dimensions of our awareness of ourselves and of our feelings towards others. It (...) ends with a discussion of the implications of this theory for music education. (shrink)

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Much has been written about Husserl and the famous problems of intersubjectivity and solipsism, and some work has been done regarding Husserl's notion ofempathy and its role in the establishment of intersubjectivity. The vast majority of that work, however, focuses on one of Husserl's texts and on the establishment of the possibility of other subjects. What is lacking in the scholarship is an investigation of the role ofempathy in Husserl's corpus which address the related issues: validity, (...) the degrees of evidence with which something can be experienced, the different senses of "objective" in Husserl's texts, whetherempathy contributes to knowledge or just to the validity of one's knowledge, where in the empathetic-communicative process something becomes objective. This dissertation begins to fill that gap by offering an investigation of the role ofempathy in the attainment of objectively valid knowledge in each of Husserl's three introductions to phenomenology: Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology , Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology , and The Crisis of European Sciences andTranscendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy . ;Despite accusations by commentators that Husserl's is a solipsistic philosophy, I show thatempathy is related to one's knowledge on the view offered in each of Husserl's introductions to phenomenology.Empathy is significantly related to knowledge in at least two ways and Husserl's epistemology might, consequently, be called a social epistemology:empathy helps to offer evidence for validity and thus solidify one's knowledge and it helps to broaden one's knowledge by affording the ability to gain access to what others have constituted and known. These roles ofempathy are not at odds with one another; rather, both are at play in each of the introductions and, given his position in the earlier work, Husserl needed to expand the role ofempathy as he did. Such a reliance onempathy, however, calls into question whether Husserl's is atranscendental philosopher in the sense Husserl claimed it is. (shrink)

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Husserl’s theory ofempathy plays a crucial role in histranscendental phenomenology and has ever since been critically examined. Among various critiques leveled at Husserl, the issue of bodily similarity between oneself and the other lies at the core, not only because Husserl conceives of it as the motivating factor ofempathy but also because his account of it has been taken to be problematic. In this article, I review a main interpretation of the issue of bodily (...) similarity in Husserl, which takes the bodily similarity in question to be a visual resemblance between oneself and the other. By contrast, I give a new interpretation of bodily similarity by taking into account Husserl’s emphasis on tactual experience with regard to the constitution of one’s own lived body and the foreign body. I argue that the bodily similarity in question amounts to a similar manner of twofold bodily manifestation in oneself and the other, and I also suggest that this interpretation further enables a new understanding of interpersonal relation in Husserl. (shrink)

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RESUMEN Considerando que los estudios sobre la intersubjetividad en Husserl deben ir más allá del camino cartesiano, D. Zahavi propone ir "más allá de la empatía" y profundizar en el concepto husserliano de "constitución". Para demostrar que la dimensión intersubjetiva no depende del encuentro con otro sujeto, sino que pertenece a priori a la subjetividad, este autor esclarece la dependencia de la intencionalidad de horizonte respecto de la intersubjetividad trascendental. Se analiza en qué sentido es posible establecer esta dependencia y (...) se evalúa la viabilidad general del intento de ir "más allá de la empatía" en el tratamiento fenomenológico de la alteridad. ABSTRACT Convinced that studies on intersubjectivity in Husserl should depart from the Cartesian path, D. Zahavi proposes going "beyondempathy" and focusing on the Husserlian concept of "constitution". In order to demonstrate that the intersubjective dimension does not depend on the encounter with another subject but is rather an a priori component of subjectivity, Zahavi clarifies the dependency of horizonintentionality ontranscendental intersubjectivity. The paper analyzes how it is possible to establish such a dependency and evaluates the general viability of the attempt to go "beyondempathy" in the phenomenological study of alterity. (shrink)

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The recognition of the other as subject has achieved a prominent place in contemporary psychoanalysis on both sides of the analytic relationship, but this development has tended to focus on the recognition of who the other is and has been. It is the purpose of this article to add the future, the transcendent experience of the other, to the recognition of the other in the analytic dyad. Heidegger's concept of the “ek-static” will be used to elucidate the human subject as (...) moving beyond him or herself in a continual process of becoming. The result of the peeling back of defenses is not a homunculus waiting to be unearthed, but affective dispositions and desires that have yet to become organized modes of being. It is the purpose of the analytic process to bring this potential to fruition. For this process to take place, the therapist must have a concept of not only who the patient is, but also who she or he is not but may be. It will be suggested that dispositional affects, desires, and passions that emerge when defenses give way provide clues to unformed possibilities that can become ways of being if perceived as such by the therapist. A clinical strategy is proposed in which the analytic space becomes a negative capability for the formation of new ways of being and relating. This idea is illustrated with a clinical example in which the patient's compliant pattern was transcended. (shrink)

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RESUMEN En su primera investigación, Edith Stein se propuso definir la esencia de la Einfühlung (empatía) como experiencia de la conciencia ajena; pretendía así fundamentar que, como había indicado Husserl, ese acto abría la posibilidad de una intersubjetividad trascendental como solución al solipsismo de la conciencia. Stein halló la clave de esa esencia en la idea de originariedad, pero intentó evitar el problema de la empatía estética, sirviéndose de Los ídolos del autoconocimiento de Scheler. ABSTRACT In her first research project, (...) Edith Stein set out to define the essence of Einfühlung (empathy) as an experience of another's consciousness. Her objective was to justify the fact that such an act opened up the possibility of atranscendental subjectivity as a solution to the solipsism of consciousness, as Husserl had indicated. Stein found the key to that essence in the idea of originariety, but she tried to avoid the problem of aestheticempathy by resorting to Scheler's Idols of Self-Knowledge. RESUMO Em sua primeira pesquisa, Edith Stein se propôs a definir a essência da Einfühlung (empatia) como experiência da consciência alheia; pretendia assim fundamentar que, como tinha indicado Husserl, esse ato abria a possibilidade de uma intersubjetividadetranscendental como solução ao solipsismo da consciência. Stein encontrou a chave dessa essência na ideia de originalidade, mas tentou evitar o problema da empatia estética ao se servir de Os ídolos do autoconhecimento de Scheler. (shrink)

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A pervasive interpretation among Husserl scholars is that histranscendental idealism inevitably leads to some form of solipsism. The aim of this dissertation is to defend Husserl against this charge. First, I argue that Husserl’stranscendental idealism is not a metaphysical theory.Transcendental phenomenology brackets all metaphysical presuppositions and argues from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience. Husserl’stranscendental idealism should therefore be interpreted as atranscendental theory of knowledge. Second, it follows (...) from the above characterization of Husserl’stranscendental idealism that the responses Husserl gives to the problem of solipsism are in no way meant to prove the existence in-itself of an external world or the existence in-themselves of othertranscendental egos. The purpose of Husserl’s engagement with the problem of solipsism is to explain how it is thattranscendental phenomenology can account for the constitution of both the Objectivity of the world of experience and other psycho-physical subjects. The result is a set oftranscendental arguments that explain the necessary conditions of the cognition of a shared external world and of other persons. I conclude with Husserl that the solipsism is atranscendental illusion, and that Husserl’stranscendental idealism does not lead to a problematic solipsism. Through a careful study of Husserl’s Nachlass, with particular attention paid to Ideas I, Formal andTranscendental Logic, and Cartesian Meditations, I lay the framework for atranscendental-epistemological interpretation of Husserl’s idealism. Applying this interpretive strategy to Husserl’s discussions of the problem of solipsism and intersubjective monadology, I argue that, for Husserl,empathy is the condition of the experience of other subjects, but that it does not allow us to experience the mental-lives of othertranscendental egos. (shrink)

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Vasily Sesemann’s aesthetics is atranscendental philosophy that seeks to answer the question of how an experience of beauty is possible. Sesemann insists that aesthetics should focus on the study of the aesthetic object itself, and through it go to the problematics of the act of perception and creativity. Sesemann states that not only the relationship between the work of art and the perceiver is important in order to understand the aesthetic object, but also the relationship between the work (...) of art and the creator. The aesthetic object in its sedimented form not only retains indications of the act of creation, but also makes demands on the perceiving subject. Aesthetic objects are sedimented passive structures that can be activated by the performative actions of the perceiver when she discovers the appropriate way of perception. Sesemann, like Moritz Geiger, claims that aesthetics is impossible without an analysis of feelings. He, like Geiger, recognizes the importance ofempathy in aesthetic experience. However, Sesemann develops the concept of aestheticempathy using Max Scheler’s arguments.Empathy is necessary, because the perceiver must be able to understand expressions. The aim of this paper is to analyse the phenomenological aspects of Vasily Sesemann’s aesthetics. Firstly, this paper analyzes the Sesemann’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Secondly, it shows that the analysis performed by Sesemann demonstrates whyempathy plays a leading role in aesthetic experience. (shrink)

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This synthetic survey of the models on which theEinflihlungstheorie is based has showed the deficiency of a pattern and the oscillation of a distinction.The hydraulic model, which following a radical subjectivism is specified as a projection or transfer of pathemic contents from the subject into the object, experiences a crisis if confronted with the rights of the object, which claims to be empathized in this way or in that way. Such a claim induces to recognize a character proper to the (...) object, which does not accept to be reduced to a mere neutral container ready to receive the subjective pathemic contents.Consequently, the distinction betweenempathy towards the human andempathy towards the sub-human — which appeared to be a major difference —vanishes, since the relation with the object (natural or artistic) is specified in terms of intersubjectivity andalter-ego.The subjectivistic hydraulic pattern is not just substituted by an opposite, objectivistic pattern, which would create the same difficulties, only upset; but rather by ananalogic model, in which sense is established in the correlation between subject and object, and on the aesthetic ground of the qualitative affinities, which determine a horizon of style.It is an analogic model which characterizes, in Husserl, the constitution of thetranscendental intersubjectivity:empathy becomes the condition of possibility of the comprehension of other subjects in their typic or stylistic structure.InAesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft Max Dessoir severely criticizes the theorists ofempathy because they hyposthatize organic metaphors creating a “schablonenhafte Versprachlichung.”44Empathy is certainly metaphor, yet not in the sense of a figurative expression, but as a realmetapherein ortransfert: as translation of sense — not from a full to an empty vessel, but rather in the circular form of the analogic circuit. (shrink)

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Wilhelm Worringer's landmark study in the interpretation of modern art, first published in 1908, has seldom been out of print. Its profound impact not only on art historians and theorists but also for generations of creative writers and intellectuals is almost unprecedented. Starting from the notion that beauty derives from our sense of being able to identify with an object, Worringer argues that representational art produces satisfaction from our "objectified delight in the self," reflecting a confidence in the world as (...) it is--as in Renaissance art. By contrast, the urge to abstraction, as exemplified by Egyptian, Byzantine, primitive, or modern expressionist art, articulates a totally different response to the world: it expresses man's insecurity. Thus in historical periods of anxiety and uncertainty, man seeks to abstract objects from their unpredictable state and transform them into absolute,transcendental forms. Abstraction andEmpathy also has a sociological dimension, in that the urge to create fixed, abstract, and geometric forms is a response to the modern experience of industrialization and the sense that individual identity is threatened by a hostile mass society. Hilton Kramer's introduction considers the influence of Worringer's thesis and places his book in historical context. (shrink)

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ArgumentThis paper builds on a neglected philosophical idea,Evidenz. Max Weber used it in his discussion ofVerstehen, as the goal of understanding either action or such things as logic. It was formulated differently by Franz Brentano, but with a novel twist: thatanyonewho understood something would see the thing to be understood as self-evident, not something dependent on inference, argument, or reasoning. The only way one could take something as evident in this sense is by being able to treat other people as (...) having the same responses – byempathy with them, in the weak sense of following their thought. Brentano's philosophical claim is that without some stopping point at what is self-evident, justifications fall into infinite regress. This is radically opposed to much of conventional philosophy. The usual solutions to the regress problem rely on problematic claims about the supposed hiddentranscendental structure behind reasoning. In contrast,empathy is a genuine natural phenomenon and a better explanation for the actual phenomenon of making sense of the reasoning of others. What is evident to all who are capable of understanding is an empirically-defined subset of this class. (shrink)

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This article explores the fundamental experience ofempathy, combining the theoretical perspectives of phenomenology and enactivism with exemplary cases from radiology praxis. It is shown that the phenomenological tradition includes different conceptualisations ofempathy. The problem ofempathy in phenomenology can no longer be viewed only from Husserl’s perspective, and further developments must be introduced. However, the analysis of Husserl’s scattered work on biological phenomena clears the way to apply insights on Image consciousness, categorial intuition, and other (...) projects in order to grasp the specific causality at play in the nexus of biological processes beyond anthropomorphism and the principle of similarity. This in turn reveals thetranscendental status of the self-organizing and sense-making capacities of biological systems and presents them as affordances for skillful diagnostic action. Hence, we demonstrate how life-regulation processes generate forms of meaning or sense-making that underlie and motivate human conceptual cognition. (shrink)

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This article explores the key role of “experiential style” (Erfahrungsstil) in Husserl’s account of social habituality. It demonstrates the developmental bridge this concept throws between the distinct intentionalities ofempathy and communalization. The importance of Erfahrungsstil in Husserl has largely escaped scholarly attention. I claim, however, that in his later work, it becomes an inherent component to the relational dynamics of intermonadic temporalization, the process which underpins the generative constitution of sociality and opens a possibility for atranscendental (...) phenomenological anthropology, a project Husserl only sketched out but never ventured on. (shrink)

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The foundational status that Edmund Husserl envisages for phenomenology in relation to the sciences would seem to suggest that the successful unfolding of contemporary debates in the field of social cognition will be conditioned by progress in resolving certain central controversies in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, notably in long-standing questions pertaining to the priority of subjectivity in relation to intersubjectivity, and the priority ofempathy in relation to other forms of intersubjectivity. That such controversies are long-standing is in no (...) small part attributable to the fact that the debate surrounding Husserl’s seminal attempts to elucidate these problems has placed his account, and certainly his published position, under a certain amount of pressure, pressure which stems from the suspicion that intentionality toward others may be more deeply embedded in subjectivity than the Husserl of Cartesian Meditations seems prepared to admit. Is the primordinally reduced solipsistic subject of the Fifth Meditation really capable of discovering intersubjectivity in the way that Husserl describes, or is such putative discovery (indeed, subjective transformation) already conditioned by a more primitive form of intersubjectivity? This paper investigates two ways in which this kind of “circularity” objection might arise. Firstly, it might be argued that Husserl presupposes an external perspective on one’s own body, a perspective which rationally would have to be correlated with an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Secondly, the view has been advanced (Zahavi in Husserl andtranscendental intersubjectivity: a response to the linguistic-pragmatic critique. Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2001b) that horizonal perceptual awareness of another spatio-temporal entity turns out to be essentially intersubjective, on the grounds that awareness of some of an object’s averted aspects commits one to positing the possibility in principle of those averted aspects being available to an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Objections such as these seem to place the phenomenological enquiry into the encounter with another person at something of a crossroads. On the one hand, they have led some to argue that basicempathy, as Husserl conceives it, must indeed be conditioned by the anonymous constituting influence of a more primitive form of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the option remains open to seek to defend Husserl’s published position against the charges of circularity. This paper pursues the latter alternative, and argues that, with appropriate clarification, the objections from circularity can be convincingly answered. It will be argued that the key to understanding why the standard Husserlian position can be sustained lies in recognising the centrality of the activity of the imagination as a condition for the possibility of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

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ArgumentThis essay considers the metaphors of projection in Hugo Münsterberg's theory of cinema spectatorship. Münsterberg (1863–1916), a German born and educated professor of psychology at Harvard University, turned his attention to cinema only a few years before his untimely death at the age of fifty-three. But he brought to the new medium certain lasting preoccupations. This account begins with the contention that Münsterberg's intervention in the cinema discussion pursued his well-established strategy of pitting a laboratory model against a clinical one, (...) in this case the “master-trope” of early cinema a spectatorship drawn from hysteria, hypnosis, and related phenomena like double-consciousness. Münsterberg's laboratory-oriented account also flowed from his account of cinema technology as an outgrowth of the apparatus of his own discipline of experimental psycho-physiology, which entailed a model of cinema spectatorship continuous with the epistemological setting of laboratory relations. I argue that inThe Photoplayand related writings projection functioned in three registers: material, psychological, and philosophical. Münsterberg's primary concern was with psychological projection, where he drew upon his own work in experimental aesthetics to articulate an account of how the basic automatisms of cinema produce a state of oscillation between immersion and distraction. I show how Münsterberg's experimental aesthetics drew upon German doctrines of aestheticempathy, orEinfühlung, which Münsterberg sought to modify in accordance with the dynamic and temporal characteristics of psycho-physiological experiment. Finally, I argue that Münsterberg's cinema theory was enfolded in his action or double-standpoint theory, in which thetranscendental self posits the material, objective conditions of laboratory experience as a means to know itself. This philosophical projection explained cinema's uncanny ability to suspend ordinary perceptions of space, time, and causality. It also made cinema uniquely suited for the philosophical emancipation of a popular mass audience. (shrink)

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Understanding the mental life of persons with psychosis/schizophrenia has been the crucial challenge of psychiatry since its origins, both for scientific models as well as for every therapeutic encounter between persons with and without psychosis/schizophrenia. Nonetheless, a preliminary understanding is always the first step of phenomenological as well as other qualitative research methods addressing persons with psychotic experiences in their life-world. In contrast to Rashed's assertions, in order to achieve such understanding, phenomenological psychopathologists need not necessarily adopt thetranscendental-phenomenological (...) attitude, which, however, is often required if performing phenomenological philosophy. Additionally, in the course of these scientific endeavors, differences between persons with psychosis/schizophrenia and so-called normal people seem to have a methodological function and value driving the scientist in her enterprise. Yet, these differences do not extend to ethical dimensions, and therefore, do not by any means touch ethical equality. (shrink)

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It is well-known that in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl puts forth a theory of intersubjectivity. Most commentators of Husserl have read his Cartesian Meditations as presenting a theory of intersubjectivity whose basis isempathy, in the form of a process of constituting the sense of “other” in one’s own experience, as the primary origin of the intersubjective layer of experience. In this paper, I claim that the structure of intersubjectivity as Husserl presents it in the Cartesian (...) Meditations is articulated as being governed by a logic of parts and wholes rather than that of a phenomenology ofempathy, and that the articulation of this logic demonstrates that thetranscendental ego is intrinsically intersubjective. My main philosophical claim in this regard is that the way Husserl’s account oftranscendentalempathy unfolds in the Cartesian Meditations implies a prior fundamental mereological structure of which the individualtranscendental ego is only a part. That is, thetranscendental ego has an eidetic a-priori intersubjective structure, in the sense of being a moment of an intersubjectively structuredtranscendental whole. In this sense, rather than being a singulare tantum, it is more fitting to say thattranscendental subjectivity is actually a plurale tantum. (shrink)

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This book fills an important gap in previous Husserl scholarship by focusing on intersubjectivity andempathy (i.e., the experience of others as other subjects) and by addressing the related issues of validity, the degrees of evidence with which something can be experienced, and the different senses of 'objective' in Husserl's texts. Despite accusations by commentators that Husserl's is a solipsistic philosophy and that the epistemologies in Husserl's late and early works are contradictory, Hermberg shows thatempathy, and thus (...) other subjects, are related to one's knowledge on the view offered in each of Husserl's Introductions to Phenomenology.Empathy is significantly related to knowledge in at least two ways, and Husserl's epistemology might, consequently, be called a social epistemology: (a)empathy helps to give evidence for validity and thus to solidify one's knowledge, and (b) it helps to broaden one's knowledge by giving access to what others have known. These roles ofempathy are not at odds with one another; rather, both are at play in each of the Introductions (if even only implicitly) and, given his position in the earlier work, Husserl needed to expand the role ofempathy as he did. Such a reliance onempathy, however, calls into question whether Husserl's is atranscendental philosophy in the sense Husserl claimed. (shrink)

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With his “discovery” of the phenomenological reduction, Husserl confronted the problem of intersubjectivity: How is the Other constituted? Gustav Shpet, a Russian student of Husserl’s in Göttingen, unlike many others accepted the reduction on some level but, unlike Husserl, did not dwell on the problem. In this essay, we look first at the Russian treatment of intersubjectivity in the immediately preceding years and see that the concern was over the possibility of proving our natural conviction in the Other. We then (...) turn to Husserl’s position circa 1912 with its embryonic conception ofempathy as its vehicle into the sphere of the Other’s “ownness.” Finally, we turn to Shpet, who cautiously suggests that Husserl’s division of intuition into two sorts, experiencing and ideal, is insufficient. Affirming Husserl’s claim that each species of being has a correlative cognitive method, Shpet asserts that social being should also have its own method. Shpet recognizes that Husserl does not ascribe originary givenness to whatempathy provides, but might Husserl have been wrong about this? Could it be thatempathy, properly understood as a third form of intuition, “comprehension,” provides social being originarily and therefore functions in the constitution of the Other analogously to the way experiencing intuition functions in the constitution of physical things? However, comprehension is employed on what the Other presents, namely signs, be they in the form of bodily movements, speech or even writing. In this way, Shpet transforms Husserl’stranscendental phenomenology into a hermeneutic phenomenology. (shrink)

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On the mission of philosophy -- Ultimate questions -- World views -- Terminological contextuality -- On contingency and necessity -- Randomness and reason -- Issues of self-reference and paradox -- Explanation and the principle of sufficient reason -- Intelligent design revisited in the light of evolutionary neo-Platonism -- What if things were different? -- On the improvability of the world -- Consciousness -- Control -- Free will in the light of process theory -- Personhood -- The metaphysics of moral obligation (...) --Empathy, shared experience, and other minds -- Philosophy as an inexact science -- Philosophy's involvement withtranscendental issues -- Religious variation and the rationale of belief. (shrink)

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This article suggests that the asymmetrical structure of the self-other relationship can be traced back to the relation betweenempathy andtranscendental intersubjectivity. Drawing on Husserl in particular, I will first recapitulate the argument thatempathy is necessarily preceded by, and built upon, structural implications to potential others, and I will then argue that the empathically encountered actual other is bound to arrive as the fulfilment or concretization of this anonymous, emptily appresented “anybody”. Because of this foundedness, (...)empathy is necessarily built on expectations concerning the other’s similarity, and because of this initial and tacit “similarity thesis” it is bound to have an asymmetrical structure. Towards the end of my paper, I will underline particular ethical implications of this account. Most importantly,I will be claiming that genuine intersubjectivity, and ethical relationship with others, is essentially built on disappointments of our initial subjective expectations. (shrink)

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Bob Sandmeyer - The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-11 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 338-339 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Bob Sandmeyer University of Kentucky Edmund Husserl. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–11. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Edmund Husserl Collected Works, Volume 12. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. Pp. xi + 179. Cloth, $119.00. Husserl's seminal (...) lectures on the phenomenological reduction andtranscendental theory ofempathy have finally been translated into English. Known by the title of the course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology presents some of Husserl's most important innovations in the theory of the phenomenological.. (shrink)

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A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within thetranscendental space of what we could call an event.Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)

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A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within thetranscendental space of what we could call an event.Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)

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A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within thetranscendental space of what we could call an event.Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)

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Dear Colleague: Your letter shook me so profoundly that I was unable to answer it as soon as I should have. I am continuously concerned with it in my thoughts. Judge for yourself whether I have not inflicted more pain on myself than on you, and whether I may not ethically regard this guilt towards you and blame towards myself as stemming from the best conscience, something I have had to accept, and still must accept, as my fate. Clarifing the (...) matter requires that I lay out a part of my life history. I had quickly realized that the project for Parts II and III of my Ideas was inadequate, and in an effort (beginning in the autumn of l9l2) to improve them and to shape in a more concrete and differentiated fashion the horizon of the problems they disclosed, I got involved in a new, quite far-ranging investigations. (These included the phenomenology of the person and personalities of a higher order, culture, the human environment in general; thetranscendental phenomenology of “empathy” and the theory oftranscendental intersubjectivity, the “transcendental aesthetic” as the phenomenology of the world purely as the world of experience, time and individuation, the phenomenology of association as the theory of the constitutive achievements of passivity, the phenomenology of the logos, the phenomenological problematic of “metaphysics,” etc.) These investigations stretched on all through the workfilled Freiburg years, and the manuscripts grew to an almost unmanageable extent. As the manuscripts grew so too did the ever greater the apprehension about whether, in my old age, I would be able to bring to completion what had been entrusted to me. This impassioned work led to repeated setbacks and repeated states of depression. In the end what I was left with was an allpervasive basic mood of depression, a dangerous collapse of confidence in myself. It was in this period that Heidegger began to mature -— for a number of.. (shrink)

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How do we understand other minds? The current debate uses the iridescent term “empathy” to explain our quite different mindreading capacities. Since no alternatives seemed to be available the discussion has been mostly in a deadlock between “simulation theory” and “theory theory”. Only recently the relevance of phenomenological findings on the issue has been brought forward. In this paper Husserl’s two concepts of “Einfühlung”, as developed in the second volume of his Ideas, are set against the background of the (...) latest discussion. Husserl’s explanation ofempathy in terms of analogical experience highlights thetranscendental role ofempathy in the context of constitution. At the same time it may solve some of the many riddles left by the recent debate. (shrink)

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A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within thetranscendental space of what we could call an event.Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)

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Current debates over multiculturalism often pit those who believe that every perspective should be represented against those who hold fast to the notion of a universal "common ground." In this timely and original work, David L. Norton persuasively argues for the power of a "transcendental imagination," that is, an imagination that can go beyond itself to gain another's perspective without necessarily assimilating that perspective. Imagination, Understanding, and the Virtue of Liberality will be an important work for all intellectuals and (...) very useful in courses that address multiculturalism. (shrink)

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A Brilliant Introduction To The Essence Of Living Hinduism The Thirteen Principal Upanisads, Sanskrit Texts In The Religious Traditions Of The Vedas, Lie At The Heart Of Hinduism. Devoted To Understanding The Inner Meaning Of The Religion, They Explicate Its Crucial Doctrines Rebirth, The Law Of Karma, The Means Of Conquering Death And Of Achieving Detachment, Equilibrium And Spiritual Bliss. They Emphasize The Perennial Search For True Knowledge Especially That Of The Connection Between The Self And TheTranscendental Absolute. (...) In This Translation, Marked ByEmpathy And Erudition, Valerie Roebuck Approaches The Upanisads As Belonging To The Tradition Of 'Sruti', Literature Which Is Heard, As Distinct From 'Smriti', Which Is Remembered. Seeking To Reveal The Intent Of The Authors, She Attempts To Represent What, In Fact, Constitutes The Original Text. Care Is Taken To Exclude Later Accretions Of Commentaries. The Invocations Included Underline The Traditional Recitation Of These Texts, And The Literary Devices Repetitions, Dialogue And Word Combat, Riddles, Paradoxes And Word Play Used By The Sages To Express Their Teachings. This Accurate And Exceptional Rendering, While Making Accessible To The Modern Reader Something Of The Beauty And Variety Of The Original Language, Reaffirms The Place Of The Upanishads As One Of The Most Profound Works Of World Literature. This Authentic And Nuanced Rendering Makes Accessible To The Modern Reader Something Of The Beauty And Variety Of These Ancient And Rich Texts Of Hinduism. The Upanisads Belong To The Tradition Of Literature That Is Heard Rather Than Remembered , And In Her Translation Roebuck Seeks To Reveal The Intent Of The Authors And Arrive At 'The Original' Text. (shrink)

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This collection makes available, in one place, the very best essays on the founding father of phenomenology, reprinting key writings on Husserl's thought from the past seventy years. It draws together a range of writings, many otherwise inaccessible, that have been recognized as seminal contributions not only to an understanding of this great philosopher but also to the development of his phenomenology. The four volumes are arranged as follows: Volume I Classic essays from Husserl's assistants, students and earlier interlocutors. Including (...) a selection of papers from such figures as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Ricoeur and Levinas. Volume II Classic commentaries on Husserl's published works. Covering the Logical Investigations , Ideas I , Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness , and Formal andTranscendental Logic . Volumes III and IV Papers concentrating on particular aspects of Husserl's theory including: Husserl's account of mathematics and logic, his theory of science, the nature of phenomenological reduction, his account of perception and language, the theory of space and time, his phenomenology of imagination andempathy, the concept of the life-world and his epistemology. (shrink)

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In a late manuscript, Husserl explicitly addresses the problem of depersonalization. Depersonalization is described as a rupture in a certain layer of experience, which, however, does not touch the fundamental unity of the underlying genesis. After a brief recapitulation of historical approaches to depersonalization, I’ll come to comment on this passage. To assess Husserl’s contribution to the clinical understanding, and more specifically to the phenomenology of depersonalization, it is essential to understand his concept of personhood. In Husserl’s account of personhood, (...) we can identify a tension between the unity and continuity of thetranscendental genesis of the personal ego and the self-alienation and de-presentation at play in this genesis. Drawing on the French reception of Husserl’s phenomenology and Eugen Fink’s notion of de-presentation, I suggest thattranscendental temporalization not only cannot function as a fail-safe in the case of depersonalization but may even be at the core of the loss of the sense of personhood. To account for the fact of personalization, one must re-evaluate the notion ofempathy in the relation of the self to itself. (shrink)

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Resumen: Husserl propone una teoría sobre la intersubjetividad que parte de la conciencia trascendental como inserta en el mundo de la vida donde están los otros y donde la comunidad se construye bajo una estructura de esencias que garantiza la comunalidad. El mundo de la vida es dado y compartido por todas las conciencias intencionales y trascendentales, es condición para intuiciones empíricas y eidéticas, la epoché y las reducciones eidética y trascendental. Cada momento del método fenomenológico se basa en la (...) existencia de un mundo de la vida independiente de la subjetividad. En este mundo, hay objetos reales y, entre estos, los otros, reconocidos por analogía a través de la empatía. Desde una perspectiva metodológico-epistemológico, el yo es anterior al mundo y a los otros yos. El yo constituye, en sentido fenomenológico, la realidad. La conciencia es el lugar de evidenciación de la realidad. No obstante, en la perspectiva ontológica, es lo contrario. El mundo de la vida es anterior a la conciencia individual. El mundo de la vida está ahí, disponible, existente, independiente del sujeto, funcionando con su propio orden, con sus leyes y reglas. Es el yo el que esta insertado en el mundo de la vida y que se esfuerza por desvendarlo. La realidad se impone y el yo es, sobre todo, miembro de una comunidad de otros yos. Aun así, ¿cómo compartir las experiencias? Las vivencias pueden ser diferentes, pero hay un límite en las variaciones, un límite dado por la esencia del objeto vivido y por las leyes que rigen las relaciones de tal objeto. Así, la constitución del mundo y de sus objetos está permanentemente en progreso. Es posible donarles nuevos sentidos, en los límites de su esencia. Para Husserl, la constitución comunal del mundo es la condición de posibilidad para la existencia de sujetos separados unos de los otros, y este entendimiento recíproco solo es posible a través de la constitución trascendental de la objetividad. Así, no hay una separación entre la intersubjetividad y la constitución del mundo, es la comunidad de yos la que dona sentidos a las objetividades. En el mundo de la vida con los otros en comunidad. -/- Abstract: Husserl proposes a theory on intersubjectivity that starts fromtranscendental consciousness as inserted in the lifeworld where the others and where the community are built under a structure of essences that guarantees communality. The lifeworld is given and shared by all intentional andtranscendental consciousnesses, it is a condition for empirical and eidetic intuitions, the epoché and the eidetic andtranscendental reductions. Every moment of the phenomenological method is based on the existence of a lifeworld independent of subjectivity. In this world, there are real objects and, among these, the others, recognized by analogy throughempathy. From a methodologicalepistemological perspective, the self is prior to the world and the other selves. The self constitutes, in a phenomenological sense, reality. Consciousness is the locus of evidence of reality. However, from the ontological perspective, it is the opposite. The lifeworld is prior to individual consciousness. The lifeworld is there, available, existing, independent of subjectivity, functioning with its own order, with its laws and rules. It is the self that is inserted in the lifeworld and that strives to unveil it. Reality prevails and the self is, above all, a member of a community of other selves. Even so, how to share the experiences? The experiences can be different, but there is a limit in variations, a limit given by the essence of the lived object and by the laws that govern the relation of the object. Thus, the constitution of the world and its objects is permanently in progress. It is possible to give them new meanings, within the limits of their essence. For Husserl, the communal constitution of the world is the condition of possibility for the existence of subjects separated from each other, and this reciprocal understanding is only possible through thetranscendental constitution of objectivity. therefore, there is no separation between intersubjectivity and the constitution of the world, it is the community of selves that gives meaning to objectivities. (shrink)

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In this paper, I present the difficulty in the phenomenology of explaining the constitution of objectivities in consciousness. In the context of phenomenological reduction, constitution has to be understood as unveiling the universal and necessary essences. Recognized by Husserl in Ideas I and named as functional problems, the constitution of objectivities refers at first to individual consciousness, and then to an intersubjective one. In Ideas II, the phenomenologist explains how the constitution of nature, psyche, and spirit occurs. This process begins (...) by assuming three premises: the ontological realism, the regularity of nature, and thetranscendental idealism. In this process, the ego, apart from constituting objects (the body, the psyche, and the others), constitutes itself. The objects of material reality are constituted through aesthetic synthesis which unifies singularities and contextualizes the lived experience. The body, as a perceptive organ, perceives the exterior, and the location of the sensory stimulus is the soul. The soul is a real and transcendent object, which is linked to physical things that are constituted in a solipsistic way or intersubjectively.Empathy allows the subject to recognize the consciousness of the alter ego as capable of spontaneous movements and actions, a co-presence sharing the same horizons. Thus, through the theoretical attitude, the physical world is perceived, and through the spiritual attitude the spiritual world is perceived, a living world shared by free intelligent beings. For this, intersubjectivity fulfills a fundamental role, because only in the relationship with the other does the identity of the objects, of the other, and of the self become evident. (shrink)

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The purpose of this paper is threefold: To show the basic contours oftranscendental subjectivity in the later work of Edmund Husserl, especially the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, and in the strictly phenomenological work of Michel Henry, especially Material Phenomenology; to highlight Henry’s radical critique of Husserlian intersubjectivity and show that such critique, while valuable in its intention, is ultimately misguided because it neglects the important contribution Husserl’s complicated vocabulary of lifeworld makes to the study of intersubjectivity; and (...) to point toward a phenomenological conception of intersubjective practice we may call the realm of we-synthesis that prioritizes the first-person perspective rooted inempathy, which enables meaningful engagement with the second-person perspective. Working in conjunction with Husserl and Henry on the phenomenological conception of shared life enables the recuperation of the fragile line between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

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In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one’s sense of bodily self and emerging from a web of intercorporeal, social, cultural, and political relations. In the first section, we review and critique some conceptual accounts of pain. Then, we explore how pain is involved in complex ways with (...) modalities of pleasure and displeasure, enacted personal meaning, and contexts ofempathy or shame. We aim to show why a phenomenology of pain must acknowledge the richness and diversity of peculiar painful experiences. The second section then weaves these critical insights into Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment, sensation, and localisation. We introduce the distinction between Body-Object and Lived-Body to show how pain presents intersubjectively. Furthermore, we stress that, while pain seems to take a marginal position in Husserl’s whole corpus, its role is central in thetranscendental constitution of the Lived-Body, interacting with the personal, interpersonal, and intersubjective levels of experiential constitution. Taking a critical-phenomenological perspective, we then concretely explore how some people may experience structural conditions which may make their experiences more or less painful. (shrink)

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Husserl’s phenomenology entails the absolute thesis that there could not be a world without a subject. My intention in this paper is to show that the consistent development of a phenomenological approach can establish that such atranscendental subject must be defined as a fundamental open intersubjectivity and more radically as interanimality. I intend to demonstrate that anthropomorphism cannot be a serious threat and that Einfühlung [empathy] is a valid method for studying animality. In this regard, I will (...) contrast a Husserlian-inspired and a Merleau-Pontian approach with Heidegger’s reflections on animals. This method will allow me to study the intertwinement between humans and other animals. On the one hand I will show that we necessarily find animality within us, in the latent multiplicity of a body which is built through introjections and projections. On the other hand I will wonder if it is possible to decenter ourselves into other living beings so as to sense what they think and to build a world with them. It will then appear, through a reflection on Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible as well as on recent ethological studies, that openness to the other and to indeterminacy is an essential characteristic of animals in general. (shrink)

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In a late manuscript, Husserl explicitly addresses the problem of depersonalization. Depersonalization is described as a rupture in a certain layer of experience, which, however, does not touch the fundamental unity of the underlying genesis. After a brief recapitulation of historical approaches to depersonalization, I’ll come to comment on this passage. To assess Husserl’s contribution to the clinical understanding, and more specifically to the phenomenology of depersonalization, it is essential to understand his concept of personhood. In Husserl’s account of personhood, (...) we can identify a tension between the unity and continuity of thetranscendental genesis of the personal _ego_ and the self-alienation and de-presentation at play in this genesis. Drawing on the French reception of Husserl’s phenomenology and Eugen Fink’s notion of de-presentation, I suggest thattranscendental temporalization not only cannot function as a fail-safe in the case of depersonalization but may even be at the core of the loss of the sense of personhood. To account for the fact of personalization, one must re-evaluate the notion ofempathy in the relation of the self to itself. (shrink)

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In this paper, I present the difficulty in the phenomenology of explaining the constitution of objectivities in consciousness. In the context of phenomenological reduction, constitution has to be understood as unveiling the universal and necessary essences. Recognized by Husserl in Ideas I and named as functional problems, the constitution of objectivities refers at first to individual consciousness, and then to an intersubjective one. In Ideas II, the phenomenologist explains how the constitution of nature, psyche, and spirit occurs. This process begins (...) by assuming three premises: the ontological realism, the regularity of nature, and thetranscendental idealism. In this process, the ego, apart from constituting objects (the body, the psyche, and the others), constitutes itself. The objects of material reality are constituted through aesthetic synthesis which unifies singularities and contextualizes the lived experience. The body, as a perceptive organ, perceives the exterior, and the location of the sensory stimulus is the soul. The soul is a real and transcendent object, which is linked to physical things that are constituted in a solipsistic way or intersubjectively.Empathy allows the subject to recognize the consciousness of the alter ego as capable of spontaneous movements and actions, a co-presence sharing the same horizons. Thus, through the theoretical attitude, the physical world is perceived, and through the spiritual attitude the spiritual world is perceived, a living world shared by free intelligent beings. For this, intersubjectivity fulfills a fundamental role, because only in the relationship with the other does the identity of the objects, of the other, and of the self become evident. (shrink)

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This paper continues to explore the relationship between the imagination and learning. It has been claimed by Maxine Greene, amongst others, that imagination is the most important of the cognitive capacities for learning; the reason being that ‘it permits us to give credence to alternative realities’. However little work has been done on what constitutes this capacity for the imagination. This paper draws on Husserl and Wittgenstein to frame a model of imagination that derives from the perspective of the ‘ (...) class='Hi'>transcendental phenomenology’ of Husserl. The claim is made that by learning to be in the world in certain ways we must be able to construct imagined worlds with their own logics and presentations. This claim is supported by a discussion of the parameters required for owning and accepting to the self sensory and cognitive perceptions and beliefs. Imagination is also a necessary condition for the understanding ofempathy; of grasping what it is like be another person. In this sense imagination can be better grasped through the category of ontology rather than epistemology. It can also, on the basis of ontology, be argued that understanding and acknowledging other cultures is a matter of being, imaginatively, in the other world. Some implications for approaches to teaching and learning are outlined. (shrink)

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One of the key insights of Scheler’s approach to the topic intersubjectivity is to recognise that the problem of intersubjectivity is in fact several problems. In The Nature of Sympathy, Scheler lays out an order of precedence in which these problems need to be addressed. One of his major criticisms against analogical arguments and theories ofempathy is that they violate this order. Specifically, they provide accounts of what the Other is thinking, but treat this as a solution to (...) how we recognise the Other as Other. In responding to Scheler, Schutz takes up this order of precedence but then makes the signifi cantly bolder claim that intersubjectivity as possibility is not problematic and does not require a solution. The purpose of this paper is to show that Schutz’s argument relies on a Husserlian reading of Scheler’s use of “transcendental psychology” and that rather than sidestepping the problem Schutz in fact tacitly presupposes a solution in the form of the human prejudice. Significantly, this solution radically overturns the aims of Scheler’s phenomenology and even that of the broader Phenomenological Movement. (shrink)

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This article adopts Husserl’stranscendental phenomenology to explore the complex relationship between patients and physicians. It delves into the coexistence of two distinct voices in the realm of medicine and health: the “voice of medicine” and the “voice of life-world.” Divided into three sections, the article emphasizes the importance of shifting from a scientific-medical attitude to a more personalistic approach in physician–patient interactions. This shift aims to prevent depersonalization and desubjectification. Additionally, it highlights the equal and irreducible nature of (...) patients while acknowledging the vital role physicians hold in the realm of illness. The article stresses the need for a balanced and equitable relationship between both parties, rooted in the shared life-world. Moreover,empathy is underscored as a crucial element in fostering meaningful dialogue, wherein understanding diverse perspectives and attitudes towards illness is paramount. The article argues that differences between patients and physicians are necessary forempathy, while shared similarities form its foundation. Ultimately, a harmonious relationship facilitatesempathy and enables the constitution of a new sense of life for both patients and physicians. (shrink)

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A number of prominent moral philosophers and political theorists have recently called for a recovery of love. But what do we mean when we speak of love today? Love's Enlightenment examines four key conceptions of other-directedness that transformed the meaning of love and helped to shape the way we understand love today: Hume's theory of humanity, Rousseau's theory of pity, Smith's theory of sympathy, and Kant's theory of love. It argues that these four Enlightenment theories are united by a shared (...) effort to develop a moral psychology that can provide both justificatory and motivational grounds for concern for others in the absence of recourse to theological ortranscendental categories. In this sense, each theory represents an effort to redefine the love of others that used to be known as caritas or agape - a redefinition that came with benefits and costs that have yet to be fully appreciated. (shrink)

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Iain Thomson proposes that Heidegger’s notion of “being as such” should be regarded as the core concept of ecophenomenology. Here, we attempt to tease out further nuances of this concept by juxtaposing Thomas Sheehan’s interpretation of “being as such” with that of Ian Thomson. We demonstrate that Sheehan’s reading of “being as such” as the intrinsic-hidden-clearing aligns with Thomson’s interpretation, and further adds a nuanced hermeneutic-phenomenological understanding of the concept in Heidegger scholarship. We suggest that this reconciliation—which portrays that “being (...) as such” qua ex-sistence qua the intrinsic-hidden-clearing denotes the same transcen­dental realm—is imperative to guide ecophenomenology to proceed further towards attaining its core philosophy of “back to the thing itself.” This reconciliation helps us go beyond safeguarding a particular thing or an ecosystem. Alternatively, it emphasizes the manner in which a respectful awareness of the “being as such” can buildempathy toward the excess that a thing always possesses in our relation to it. This could give rise to an ethic of relationship. (shrink)

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Husserl’s phenomenology entails the absolute thesis that there could not be a world without a subject. My intention in this paper is to show that the consistent development of a phenomenological approach can establish that such atranscendental subject must be defined as a fundamental open intersubjectivity and more radically as interanimality. I intend to demonstrate that anthropomorphism cannot be a serious threat and that Einfühlung [empathy] is a valid method for studying animality. In this regard, I will (...) contrast a Husserlian-inspired and a Merleau-Pontian approach with Heidegger’s reflections on animals. This method will allow me to study the intertwinement between humans and other animals. On the one hand I will show that we necessarily find animality within us, in the latent multiplicity of a body which is built through introjections and projections. On the other hand I will wonder if it is possible to decenter ourselves into other living beings so as to sense what they think and to build a world with them. It will then appear, through a reflection on Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible as well as on recent ethological studies, that openness to the other and to indeterminacy is an essential characteristic of animals in general. (shrink)

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Phenomenology is not the simple description of a fact, but rather the description of an intentional immanent moment, and it presents itself as a science of essences, and not of matter of facts. The Leib, the lived body of the phenomenological tradition, is not a generic corporeal reality, but rather an intentional subject, atranscendental reference point, on the base of which the connections between physical body and psychic body should be grasped. So, the reduction ofempathy to (...) mirror neurons amounts to an “objectivisation”, with the consequent absolutisation of a process that is a function of the Leib as intentional subject, not as a physical reality. The main task of the philosophical research, bracketed by the new “neuro” researches, thus emphasizing their theoretical limits as soon as they depart from experimental enquiries, is then to understand the conditions of possibility of cognitive procedures, that is to say, in other words, the genesis of consciousness, that in aesthetics becomes “the genesis of aesthetic consciousness”. Interdisciplinarity is already an ancient and out of fashion word, now it is the time of “dialogue”, being aware however that the “logoi” not always require synthesis, and that the unity of the corporeal reality implies, as Husserl emphasizes, very different descriptive behaviours. (shrink)

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This paper explores some connections between the philosophically central topic of intersubjectivity highlighted in John Ziman's article and the notion of collective consciousness, which has received very little formal attention in mainstream philosophy. The deconstruction of the Cartesian model of isolated spheres of consciousness which the intersubjective viewpoint brings about is supported by considerations from Kant's critical account oftranscendental psychology. The phenomenon ofempathy, an essential component in the achievement of intersubjective consensus, is related to the possibility (...) of shared experiences, i.e. of two or more individuals participating in the same conscious experience. The use of mental concept-words applied to collectives of persons is interpreted as more than a mere metaphor; this interpretation is supported by comparison with complex collective behaviours in other social species. It is necessary to say that this paper very much represents work in progress-- other commitments have prevented the author from supporting many of the points made with references or further analysis at this stage, and it is hoped merely that this exploratory essay will provide useful ideas for further research. (shrink)

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