Movatterモバイル変換

Ever since the introduction ofreflectiveequilibrium in ethics, it has been argued thatreflectiveequilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms,reflectiveequilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method ofreflectiveequilibrium against these objections. Defenders of (...) class='Hi'>reflectiveequilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that eitherreflectiveequilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations ofreflectiveequilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue thatreflectiveequilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents ofreflectiveequilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   14 citations  

ABSTRACT In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form ofReflectiveEquilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of (...) the moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   23 citations  

Over the last twenty years, John Rawls has developed an approach to political philosophy which appeals to the notion ofreflectiveequilibrium. This notion has proven suggestive to those attracted to coherence approaches to justification, in ethics and in other domains as well. In this paper, I explore the question whether Rawls’s approach provides a model for a coherentist account of justification, concluding that although the discussion ofreflectiveequilibrium has provided helpful insights it has not (...) produced a coherentist model of justification. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   21 citations  

As Helen Longino's overview of Hypatia's engagement with feminist epistemology suggests, the last twenty-five years’ contributions to this field reveal a strong focus on the topic of knowledge. In her short outline, Longino questions this narrow focus on knowledge in epistemological inquiry. The main purpose of this article is to provide a framework for systematically taking up the questions raised by Longino, one that prevents us from running the risk of becoming unreflectively involved in sexist, racist, or otherwise problematic inquiry. (...) I argue that a specific form of the method ofReflectiveEquilibrium, as it is widely discussed in moral epistemology, logic, and theories of rationality, enables us to cope with the problems of traditional epistemology, which feminist theorizers such as Sally Haslanger have pointed to. With the account ofReflectiveEquilibrium I am offering—drawing in many respects on the model provided by Catherine Z. Elgin—we have an ameliorative method that allows us to rethink epistemological values, goals, and standards in a systematic way, and that largely avoids implicit and explicit biases in epistemology. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   6 citations  

Carson Strong has recently argued that widereflectiveequilibrium (WRE) is an unacceptable method of justification in bioethics. In its place, Strong recommends a methodology in which certain foundational moral judgments play a central role in the justification of moral beliefs, and coherence plays a limited justificatory role in that the rest of our judgments are made to cohere with these foundational judgments. In this paper, I argue that Strong’s chief criticisms of WRE are unsuccessful and that his (...) proposed alternative is in fact just another version of WRE. In the course of doing so, I specify which theses are central to WRE and which are not, and thus, provide a response to an additional objection, advanced by Peter Singer, that WRE is vacuous. I conclude by arguing that there may be better prospects for advancing the debate regarding methodology in bioethics if we focus on restricted epistemic and methodological theses rather than broad approaches, such as WRE, that come in many different varieties. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   11 citations  

Soft regulatory measures are often promoted as an alternative for existing regulatory regimes for nanotechnologies. The call for new regulatory approaches stems from several challenges that traditional approaches have difficulties dealing with. These challenges relate to general problems of governability, tensions between public interests, but also (and maybe particularly) to almost complete lack of certainty about the implications of nanotechnologies. At the same time, the field of nanotechnology can be characterized by a high level of diversity. In this paper, we (...) discuss and compare two models for framing public policy in relation to technology regulation: the first is a deliberative model based on foresight knowledge and the second the widereflectiveequilibrium model, developed by political philosopher John Rawls. In both models, the aim is to find consensus on (a framework for) policy measures and regulation. On the basis of a critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both models, some tentative conclusions are drawn for effective policy making and implementation based on soft law. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   8 citations  

In this paper, we investigate how data about public preferences may be used to inform policy around the use of controversial novel technologies, using public preferences about autonomous vehicles (AVs) as a case study. We first summarize the recent ‘Moral Machine’ study, which generated preference data from millions of people regarding how they think AVs should respond to emergency situations. We argue that while such preferences cannot be used to directly inform policy, they should not be disregarded. We defend an (...) approach that we call ‘CollectiveReflectiveEquilibrium in Practice’ (CREP). In CREP, data on public attitudes function as an input into a deliberative process that looks for coherence between attitudes, behaviours and competing ethical principles. We argue that in cases of reasonable moral disagreement, data on public attitudes should play a much greater role in shaping policies than in areas of ethical consensus. We apply CREP to some of the global preferences about AVs uncovered by the Moral Machines study. We intend this discussion both as a substantive contribution to the debate about the programming of ethical AVs, and as an illustration of how CREP works. We argue that CREP provides a principled way of using some public preferences as an input for policy, while justifiably disregarding others. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   23 citations  

This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing "the laws of (...) thought". In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so calledreflectiveequilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as "inferential landscapes" and logicians as "geographers" who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   15 citations  

This article examines the method ofreflectiveequilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of (...) intuitions in philosophy. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   32 citations  

I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, the (...) problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem andthereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show thatreflectiveequilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   19 citations  

This open access book provides the first explicit case study for an application of the method ofreflectiveequilibrium (RE), using it to develop and defend a precautionary principle. It thereby makes an important and original contribution to questions of philosophical method and methodology. The book shows step-by-step how RE is applied, and develops a methodological framework which will be useful for everyone who wishes to usereflectiveequilibrium. With respect to precautionary principles, the book demonstrates (...) how a rights-based precautionary principle can be constructed and defended. The case study succeeds in demonstrating that RE can be successfully applied and puts real constraints on the justification process. This is all the more remarkable as the case study was designed as an open-ended process, without presupposing any specific results. This book will be highly relevant both to people interested in philosophical methodology and epistemology, as well as to researchers who are interested in using philosophical methods and tools and applying them to practical problems. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   6 citations  

Elgin has presented an extensive defence ofreflectiveequilibrium embedded in an epistemology which focuses on objectual understanding rather than ordinary propositional knowledge. This paper has two goals: to suggest an account ofreflectiveequilibrium which is sympathetic to Elgin’s but includes a range of further developments, and to analyse its role in an account of understanding. We first address the structure ofreflectiveequilibrium as a target state and argue thatreflective (...) class='Hi'>equilibrium requires more than anequilibrium in the sense of a coherent position. On the one hand, the position also needs to be stable between a ‘conservative’ pull of input commitments and a ‘progressive’ pull of epistemic goals; on the other hand,reflectiveequilibrium requires that enough of the resulting commitments have some credibility independent of the coherence of the position. We then turn to the dynamics ofreflectiveequilibrium, the process of mutual adjustment of commitments and theories. Here, the most pressing internal challenges for defenders ofreflectiveequilibrium arise: to characterize this process more exactly and to explain its status in relation toreflectiveequilibrium as a target state. Finally, we investigate the role ofreflectiveequilibrium in Elgin’s account of understanding and argue that objectual understanding cannot be explained in terms ofreflectiveequilibrium alone. An epistemic agent who understands a subject matter by means of a theory also needs to be able to use this theory and the theory needs to meet some external rightness condition. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   13 citations  

In moral epistemology, the method ofreflectiveequilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis ofreflectiveequilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic.Reflectiveequilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of (...) developing areflectiveequilibrium and, if the process is successful, be justified. Since the method ofreflectiveequilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   33 citations  

An explanation and defense of the use ofreflectiveequilibrium in ethics.

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

This article brings together two different topics:reflectiveequilibrium (RE) and belief revision theory (BRT). RE is a popular method of justification in many areas of philosophy, it involves a process of mutual adjustments striving for a state of coherence, but it lacks formally rigorous elaborations and faces severe criticism. To elucidate core elements of RE and provide a solid basis to address objections, a formal model of RE within BRT is presented. A fruitful starting point to the (...) formalization of RE is Olsson’s coherentist interpretation of semi-revision, but it does not come with a comparative notion of stability. This paper develops an account of comparative stability in an RE setting for belief changing operations. The operations are useful to characterize RE states as well as processes, and they are shown to satisfy postulates of rational belief change. (shrink)

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

How can we figure out what’s right or wrong, if moral truths are neither self-evident nor something we can perceive? Very roughly, the method ofreflectiveequilibrium (RE) says that we should begin moral inquiry from what we already confidently think, seeking to find a a match between our initial convictions and general principles that are well-supported by background theories, mutually adjusting both until we reach a coherent outlook in which our beliefs are in harmony (theequilibrium (...) part) and we know why and how they support each other (thereflective part). It has been central to the self-understanding of normative ethics and other branches of philosophy in the last half a century. In this chapter, we examine the history of the idea of RE and introduce a schema for generating 256 variants. We explain why RE is subject to serious objections insofar as it purports to yield epistemic justification in virtue of achieving coherence. However, we also develop a new argument to the effect that RE is the best feasible method for us to achieve moral understanding and the ability to justify our judgments to others. It may thus be crucial for responsible moral inquiry, even if coherence among considered judgments and principles is neither sufficient nor necessary for justified moral belief. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

The paper explores whether the method ofreflectiveequilibrium (RE) in ethics and political philosophy should be individual or public in character. I defend a modestly public conception of RE, in which public opinion is used specifically as a source of considered judgments about cases. Public opinion is superior to philosophical opinion in delivering judgments that are untainted by principled commitments. A case-based approach also mitigates the methodological problems that commonly confront efforts to integrate philosophy with the investigation (...) of popular attitudes. This conception of RE is situated in relation to alternative accounts, including those of Daniels, Rawls, and Wolff and de-Shalit. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   10 citations  

Reflectiveequilibrium ("RE", for short) is a method of justification which works roughly as follows: We start with our pre-theoretical judgements (about, e.g. moral issues) and try to explain them by a systematic theory. This leads to a process in which judgements and principles are mutually adjusted to each other until a state ofequilibrium is reached. For more than half a century, RE has been very popular, as well as controversial, among philosophers of many persuasions. Given (...) how frequently the method is mentioned, embraced and attacked, it is surprising that only very few attempts have been made at analysing and developing RE in detail. This topical collection brings together papers that develop RE on a conceptual level, analyse it using formal methods or investigate applications of RE. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion ofreflectiveequilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent's attitudes are inreflectiveequilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent's credences, on the one hand, and what the agent accepts, on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely,reflectiveequilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or being prepared to accept, all (...) and only claims that follow from a maximally comprehensive theory that is more probable than any other such theory. Drawing on previous work, the paper shows that when an agent is inreflectiveequilibrium in this sense, the set of claims they accept or are prepared to accept is bound to be logically consistent and closed under logical implication. The paper also argues that this account can explain various features of philosophical argumentation in which the notion ofreflectiveequilibrium features centrally, such as the emphasis on evaluating philosophical theories holistically rather than in a piecemeal fashion. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is thereflectiveequilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I (...) will argue that the prospect of having to reject their standard methodology is one epistemologists have to take very seriously; and I will do this by arguing that some current rival theories of epistemic justification are in fact inreflectiveequilibrium with our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief. That is, I will argue that intuition underdetermines theory choice in epistemology, in much the way that observation underdetermines theory choices in empirical sciences. Ifreflectiveequilibrium leads to the underdetermination problem I say it leads to, then it cannot satisfy the aims of contemporary epistemology, and so cannot serve as its standard methodology. (shrink)

Direct download(7 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

The paper clarifies what is at stake in the theory/antitheory debate in ethics and articulates the distinctive core of the method ofreflectiveequilibrium which distinguishes it from a generic coherence constraint. I call this distinctive core 'maieutic reflection'. The paper then argues that if she accepts constructivist views in metaethics, a proponent of the method ofreflectiveequilibrium will be committed to the existence of a moral theory.

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   15 citations  

In the essay “Justice and Rights” of his book Taking Rights Seriously Ronald Dworkin puts forward an account ofreflectiveequilibrium which has become an orthodoxy in interpreting John Rawls' theory of justice. My purpose here is to challenge this account, on the grounds that it presupposes an untenable view of the relation between belief and choice.

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Abstract In The Rational and the Social James Brown argues against the use of the method ofreflectiveequilibrium in attempting to justify methodological norms. For, according to Brown, this would involve a circularity for that method presupposes an account of good scientific practice. In this paper it is argued that the method can be sustained without such a presupposition using either conherentism, reliabilism or defeasible foundationalism. That being so there is no circularity in applying it within normative (...) methodology of science. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflectiveequilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Whyreflectiveequilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method ofreflectiveequilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own (...) suggests that his concept of “reflectiveequilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls'sreflectiveequilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls introduces and employs the concept of “reflectiveequilibrium” as a method of testing which of rival moral theories is to be preferred. The introduction of this concept is plainly a significant event for moral philosophy. The criterion by which we decide to reject, say, utilitarianism in favour of a contractual theory of justice is, if anything, even more fundamental than the choice of theory itself, since our choice of moral (...) theory may well be determined by the criterion we use. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   143 citations  

In this paper, we focus on one controversial element of the method ofreflectiveequilibrium, namely Rawls’s idea that the commitments that enter the justificatory procedure should be pre-selected or filtered: According to him, only considered judgements should be taken into account in moral philosophy. There are two camps of critics of this filtering process: 1) Critics ofreflectiveequilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too weak and seek a more reliable one, which would (...) actually constitute a distinct epistemic method. 2) Proponents ofreflectiveequilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too exclusionary. We defend RE against its critics, arguing that the method can secure reasonable commitments without depending on a strong external filtering process. However, we side with the critical proponents ofreflectiveequilibrium and argue that without the Rawlsian weak filtering process, RE is more plausible both as a general method as well as in the context of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

As a procedure,reflectiveequilibrium is simply a familiar kind of standard scientific method with a new name. A theory is constructed to account for a set of observations. Recalcitrant data may be rejected as noise or explained away as the effects of interference of some sort. Recalcitrant data that cannot be plausibly dismissed force emendations in theory. What counts as a plausible dismissal depends, among other things, on the going theory, as well as on background theory and (...) on knowledge that may be relevant to under-standing the experimental design that is generating the observations, including knowledge of the apparatus and observation conditions. This sort of mutual adjustment between theory and data is a familiar feature of scientific practice. Whatever authority RE seems to have comes, I think, from a tacit or explicit recognition that it has the same form as this familiar sort of scientific inference. One way to see the rationale underlying this procedure in science is to focus on prediction. Think of prediction as a matter of projecting what is known onto uncharted territory. To do this, you need a vehicle—a theory—that captures some invariant or pattern in what is known so that you can project it onto the unknown. How convincing the projection is depends on two factors: how sure one is of the observational base, and how sure one is that the theory gets the invariants right. The two factors are not independent, of course. One's confidence in the observational base will be affected by how persuasively the theory identifies and dismisses noise; one's confidence in the theory, on the other hand, will depend on one's confidence in the observations it takes seriously. Prediction is important as a test of theory precisely because verified predictions seem to show that the theory has correctly captured the general in the particular, that it has got the drift of the observational evidence in which our confidence is ultimately grounded. (shrink)

Export citation   Bookmark   146 citations  

Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method ofreflectiveequilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and areflective (...) class='Hi'>equilibrium methodology. Here, for example, is David Lewis on philosophy: Our “intuitions” are simply opinions: our philosophical theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular; some general; some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them intoequilibrium. Our common task it to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of them… Once the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. Is that to say that there is no truth to be had? Or that the truth is of our own making, and different ones of us can make it differently? Not at all! If you say flatly that there is no god, and I say that there are countless gods but none of them are our worldmates, then it may be that neither of us is making any mistake of method. We may each be bringing our opinions toequilibrium in the most careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments, distinctions, and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake of fact. Which one is wrong depends on what there is (1983: x-xi). In addition to philosophy in general, the method ofreflectiveequilibrium has also been endorsed as the appropriate procedure for investigating various other subject.. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   63 citations  

I address the worry thatreflectiveequilibrium is too weak as an account of justification because it fails to let differing views converge. I take up informal aspects of convergence and operationalise them in a formal model ofreflectiveequilibrium. This allows for exploration by the means of computer simulation. Findings show that the formal model does not yield unique outputs, but still boosts agreement. I conclude from this thatreflectiveequilibrium is best seen (...) as a pluralist account of justification that cannot be accused of resulting in an “anything goes” relativism. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

I propose that a logical formalization of a natural language text may be regarded as adequate if the following three groups of beliefs can be integrated into a widereflectiveequilibrium: our initial, spontaneous beliefs about the structure and logical quality of the text; our beliefs about its structure and logical quality as reflected in the proposed formalization, and our background beliefs about the original text’s author, his thought and other contextually relevant factors. Unlike a good part of (...) the literature, I stress the indispensable role of initial beliefs in achieving such a widereflectiveequilibrium. In the final sections I show that my approach does not succumb to undue subjectivism or the mere perpetuation of prejudice. The examples I use to illustrate my claims are chiefly taken from Anselm’s Proslogion 2–3 and the various attempts to formalize these texts. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

The method ofreflectiveequilibrium focuses on the relationship between principles and judgments. Principles are relatively general rules for comprehending the area of enquiry. Judgments are our intuitions or commitments, ‘at all levels of generality’ (Rawls 1975: 8), regarding the subject matter. The basic idea ofreflectiveequilibrium is to bring principles and judgments into accord. This can be achieved by revising the principles and/or the judgments. -/- I first look at normative political judgments (Section 2) (...) before considering the role of principles, arguments, devices of representation and background theory in widereflectiveequilibrium (Section 3). I then consider two of the main challenges to the method (Section 4), and show how to use it to deliberate about substantive political principles (Section 5). I conclude with an extended example of the method in action (Section 6). (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   14 citations  

Reflectiveequilibrium —the idea that we have to justify our judgments and principles through a process of mutual adjustment—is taken to be a central method in philosophy. Nonetheless, conceptions of RE often stay sketchy, and there is a striking lack of explicit and traceable applications of it. This paper presents an explicit case study for the application of an elaborate RE conception. RE is used to reconstruct the arguments from Thomson’s paper “Turning the Trolley” for why a bystander (...) must not divert a runaway trolley from five workmen onto one. Analyzing Thomson’s resulting position with the RE-criteria has two main results: Firstly, the adjustment of one of her commitments can be defended. Secondly, no justified position in RE was reached. With respect to RE as a method, the main results from this application are: There is at least one conception of RE that is sufficiently specified to be applicable; the RE criteria put real constraints on the process of justification; and an explicit application of RE has benefits in terms of clarity while at the same time providing guidance for how the justificatory process could be continued. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

The lingering mystery of John Rawls’sreflectiveequilibrium is that its nature is unclear. Rawls at times suggests he is merely describing people’s conceptions of justice, whereas at other times he implies that hisreflectiveequilibrium is a way to justify his conception of justice. Faced with seemingly conflictual passages, most scholars privilege the justificatory ones. However, I argue that this is not an effective strategy because understanding how the descriptive and justificatory aspects ofreflective (...)equilibrium fit together is the key to unlocking its nature and actual force. This paper compares Rawls’s method to the philosophical method of later Wittgenstein in his so-called private language argument to argue how the descriptive and justificatory aspects of Rawls’sreflectiveequilibrium fit together. In my view, both philosophers’ methods are descriptive clarifications of our unclear conceptions. However, their clarification is not just descriptive; they also aim at their readers achieving enlightenment. Importantly, I argue, that enlightenment offers us justification of the conception resulting from their clarification. Hence, their methods are justificatory as well. Finally, I claim that this way of understandingreflectiveequilibrium makes us realise how Rawls could respond to a prominent objection to it. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

How should we proceed when searching for justified answers to normative questions? A prominent proposal is to use the method ofreflectiveequilibrium (RE). Its basic Idea—that we should start from our existing judgments about relevant cases and bring them intoequilibrium with systematic principles—is readily recited, but beyond that, conceptions of RE often stay sketchy. RE is seldom explicitly implemented, which makes it difficult to critically evaluate the method and to assess its potential. In my dissertation, (...) I present the first explicit and detailed case study for an application of RE, using it to develop and defend a precautionary principle. -/- The dissertation is divided in two parts, a theoretical and an applied part. In part I, I introduce and operationalize a specific conception of RE. I first describe the central elements of RE by drawing on the most elaborate and fleshed-out conceptions of RE that can be found in the literature. Then, I survey and analyze previous applications of RE in order to both learn from them and identify desiderata for my own case study. Based on a small-scale, exploratory case study, the method is further concretized and operationalized for the implementation in my main case study on the justification of a precautionary principle. -/- In part II, this operationalization is tested in a complex case study that aims at justifying a precautionary principle which is applicable to problems arising from global climate change. In order to be able to select relevant commitments about central problems concerning precautionary principles (PPs), I start with a literature survey. The survey gives an overview on existing proposals for PPs, on which grounds they are defended, and the main objections against them. On this basis, I develop and describe the initial setup for the case study, which is conducted in three main steps and allows to examine different aspects of a RE-application. Thereby, I show that RE can be applied successfully to real problems. I go on to discuss a number of points that are not given sufficient attention in the RE literature so far. With respect to precautionary principles, I show how the commonly discussed principles fail to do justice to ethical considerations, and argue that the application of such principles should instead be triggered by threats of rights violations. (shrink)

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This 'empirical turn' is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form ofReflectiveEquilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the (...) moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self-justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Reflectiveequilibrium is overdue a twenty-first century update. Despite its apparent popularity, there is scant evidence that theorists ever thoroughly implement the method, and fewer still openly and transparently publish their attempts to do so in print—stymying its supposed justificatory value. This paper proposes digitisingreflectiveequilibrium as a solution. Inspired by the global open science movement, it advocates for coupling a novel, digital implementation of the equilibrating process with new publication norms that can capitalise on (...) the inherent reproducibility of digital data. The argument is structured around three main claims: that digitising will make it easier to (a) methodically construct, (b) widely disseminate, and (c) thoroughly critiquereflective equilibria. Practical guidance is also provided throughout. Altogether, it is argued that digitisation will not only help theorists to better realisereflectiveequilibrium’s latent theoretical potential, but also greatly extend its value as a justificatory device in contemporary academic discourses. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

I argue against the claim that it is trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of widereflectiveequilibrium. This claim is based on what could be called the Triviality Charge, which is pressed against the method of widereflectiveequilibrium by Peter Singer. According to this charge, there is no alternative to using the method if it is interpreted as involving all relevant philosophical background arguments. The main argument against the Triviality Charge is that (...) although the method of widereflectiveequilibrium is compatible with coherentism (understood as a form of weak foundationalism) as well as moderate foundationalism, it is not compatible with strong foundationalism. Hence, the claim that a philosopher uses the method of widereflectiveequilibrium is informative. In particular, this is true with regard to Sidgwick. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

This paper proposes a Rawlsian conception of moral justification as a social activity. Through a close reading, Rawls’ view of ethical justification is shown to be significantly more dialogical and deliberative than is commonly appreciated. The result is a view that emphasizes the social nature of ethical justification and identifies information sharing between persons as the crux of justification in metaethics, in contrast to normative ethics. I call it Rawlsianreflectiveequilibrium to distinguish it from other varieties.

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Among the areas of knowledge that the method ofreflectiveequilibrium (RE) has been applied to is that of logical validity. According to RE in logic, we come to be justified in believing a (deductive) logical theory in virtue of establishing some state ofequilibrium between our initial judgements over the validity of specific (natural language) arguments and the logical principles which constitute our logical theory. Unfortunately, however, while relatively popular, RE with regards to logical theorizing is (...) underspecified. In particular, it’s unclear what constitute: (1) the relevant logical “data”, (2) logical theories, so that they can be suitably tested, and (3) the mechanisms under which such theories are tested. Considering the various options for how to interpret the position, we argue that in order to be workable the advocate of RE about logic must embrace what we call an _operationalised_, _wide_ and _communal_ version of RE with a _rich_ understanding of logical theories. Fortunately for the advocate of RE, there is an available account of logic’s epistemology which possesses just these properties, _logical predictivism_. However, equally unfortunately, logical predictivism commits the advocate of RE to certain further claims that they have historically been weary of holding. Consequently, it is unclear whether RE about logic itself is a viable proposal, or rather a similar but distinct epistemology of logic. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

Reflectiveequilibrium, as a methodology for the "formation of logics," fails on the *fringe*, where intricate details can make or break a logical theory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically governed by anything likereflectiveequilibrium. When logical theorising gets tricky, there is nothing on the pre-theoretical side on which our theoretical claims can reflect of---at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed, the fringe is exclusively the domain of theoretical negotiations and (...) the methodological power ofreflectiveequilibrium is merely nominal. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

A critique of inferences from 'is' to 'ought' plays a central role in Elqayam and Evans' defense of descriptivism. However, thereflectiveequilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced by Rawls, Cohen and many others poses an important challenge to that critique. Dual system theories may help respond to that challenge.

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Background: Research Ethics Committees (RECs) or their equivalent review applications for prospective research with human participants. Reviewers use universally agreed principles i to make decisions about whether prospective health and social care research is ethical. Close attention to understanding how reviewers go about their decision-making work and consider principles in practice is limited. Objective: The study aimed to understand how reviewers made decisions in the contexts of meetings and to understand more about how reviewers approach their work. The purpose of (...) this article is to draw on data and findings and to show howreflectiveequilibrium as a theoretical frame can (1) deepen understanding of ethics review and (2) permit a reflexive examination of the habitual processes of review. Design and participants: Methods captured the day-to-day work of the RECs. Seventeen applications were heard during eight observations. There were 12 formal interviews with reviewers (n = 12) and with researchers (n = 8) which are not reported on in this article. Ethical considerations: Organisational permission for the study was given by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) whose functions became part of the Health Research Authority (HRA) during the study. The study was given favourable opinion by the University of Salford's REC (Reference HSCR11/17). Findings: Data were analysed using constructed grounded theory resulting in eight themes which revealed attention to procedure and engagement with applications.Reflectiveequilibrium was used as a qualitative frame to interpret themes distilling them into three processes at work in review: emotion and intuition; imagination and creative thinking; and intuition and trust. Discussion: Reviewers went back and forth between universal principles and considered these in the contexts of each application using the above processes. Conclusions:Reflectiveequilibrium offers a coherent and grounded account of review work. Reflexivity in training for reviewers is essential for improving practices. The challenges reflexivity presents can be assisted by usingreflectiveequilibrium as a tool to illuminate tacit review processes. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

John Rawls’ method ofreflectiveequilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics.This paper argues that this influence is undeserved, for two reasons. First,reflectiveequilibrium fails to accomplish two tasks that give us reason to care about methodology. On the one hand, it fails to explain how (or whether) moral knowledge is possible.This is because the method is explicitly oriented towards the distinct (and less interesting) task of characterizing our moral sensibilities. On the other (...) hand, the method fails to provide an informative way of adjudicating central methodological debates in ethics. Second, where Rawls’ method –and the background methodology he uses to motivate it –do have substance, that substance is implausible. The role of dispositions in the method entails that it endorses obviously irrational inferences. Further, the method makes substantively implausible distinctions between the dispositions that are allowed to play a methodological role. Rawls' background methodology appeals to the idea of a psychology in ‘widereflectiveequilibrium’. However, both formal and empirical path-dependence considerations strongly suggest that there is nothing even minimally determinate that is someone’s psychology in ‘widereflectiveequilibrium’. I close by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit ofreflectiveequilibrium by abandoning elements of Rawls’ approach. I argue that none of these attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method ofreflectiveequilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological questions in ethics. In a slogan,reflectiveequilibrium is methodologically irrelevant. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   16 citations  

The problems of defining and measuring freedom are not separable. One cannot first define freedom and then ask about its measurability, because the implications of a definition of freedom in terms of degrees of overall freedom affect the plausibility of that definition. Defining freedom is instead part of a “reflectiveequilibrium” process that takes into account the demands on our powers of measurement implied by our principles of justice, our intuitions about specific freedoms, and our intuitions about overall (...) freedom. This application of thereflectiveequilibrium method to the definition of overall freedom can be usefully contrasted with that proposed by Christine Swanton. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call DirectedReflectiveEquilibrium. DirectedReflectiveEquilibrium is based on a taxonomy that distinguishes between a number of different functions of hypothetical cases, including two dimensions that we call representation and elicitation. Like its predecessor, DirectedReflectiveEquilibrium accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought (...) intoequilibrium. However, it also offers guidance about how different types of cases ought to be sequenced to achieve this result. We argue that this ‘directional’ approach improves, in various ways, upon the non-directional approach of traditionalReflectiveEquilibrium. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   17 citations  

Recent years have seen a rekindling of interest in the method ofreflectiveequilibrium. Most of this attention has been suspicious, however. Critics have alleged that the method is nothing more than a high-minded brand of navel-gazing, that it suffers from all the classic problems of inward-looking coherence theories, and that it overestimates the usefulness of self-scrutiny. In this paper I argue that these criticisms miss their mark because they labor under crucial misconceptions about the method of (...) class='Hi'>reflectiveequilibrium. In defendingreflectiveequilibrium I put forward a handful of theses about the nature of inquiry (or, more generally, norm-governed enterprises) that form the backdrop to the method. The critics’ objections fall short, I argue, because they do not recognizereflectiveequilibrium’s embrace of these theses. Confronting these objections and understanding why they fail brings us to a better understanding what, exactly, the method ofreflectiveequilibrium is. The answer I come to in the final section of the paper is that the method ofreflectiveequilibrium is not, exactly, anything. It is a mistake to try to give a positive characterization of the view, to identify it with a concern with a particular species of data, particular procedures and methods, or even a particular conception of normative success. Instead, it should be understood as the denial of essentialism about just these matters—as a form of anti-essentialism about our epistemic inputs, methods, and goals. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   20 citations  

In this article, we develop an approach for the moral assessment of research and development networks on the basis of thereflectiveequilibrium approach proposed by Rawls and Daniels. Thereflectiveequilibrium approach aims at coherence between moral judgments, principles, and background theories. We use this approach because it takes seriously the moral judgments of the actors involved in R & D, whereas it also leaves room for critical reflection about these judgments. It is shown that (...) two norms, namelyreflective learning and openness and inclusiveness, which are used in the literature on policy and technological networks, contribute to achieving a justified overlapping consensus. We apply the approach to a case study about the development of an innovative sewage treatment technology and show how in this case the two norms are or could be instrumental in achieving a justified overlapping consensus on relevant moral issues. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   13 citations  

It is more than a half-century since Nelson Goodman [1955] applied what we call theReflectiveEquilibrium model of justification to the problem of justifying induction, and more than three decades since Rawls [1971] and Daniels [1979] applied celebrated extensions of this model to the problem of justifying principles of social justice. The resulting WideReflectiveEquilibrium model (WRE) is generally thought to capture an acceptable way to reconcile inconsistency between an intuitively plausible general principle and (...) an intuitively plausible judgment about a particular case. Recently a different model for reconciling moral inconsistency has emerged: Moral Consistency Reasoning [Campbell and Kumar 2012, 2013a; Kumar and Campbell 2012; Campbell 2009: 86?7; Campbell and Woodrow 2003; Wong 2002]. MCR applies when two moral judgments give opposing assessments of (what appear to be) relevantly similar particular cases. Though WRE and MCR are strikingly different, each arguably captures a rationally acceptable method for reconciling moral inconsistency. Moreover, as will be shown, they function in complementary ways. Are they parts of a more comprehensive model of moral reasoning in the face of inconsistency that would explain the attractions of each? This essay first spells out the relevant differences between the models and then formulates a more general model of moral reasoning in the face of inconsistency. ?1 reviews the emergence of Goodman's model that he offers in the spirit of epistemology naturalized, almost a decade before Quine coined the term [1969a]. ?2 analyses six salient features of WRE to be compared with six contrasting features of MCR in ?3. ?4 presents the general model. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   12 citations  

Carnap and Goodman developed methods of conceptual re-engineering known respectively as explication andreflectiveequilibrium. These methods aim at advancing theories by developing concepts that are simultaneously guided by pre-existing concepts and intended to replace these concepts. This paper shows that Carnap’s and Goodman’s methods are historically closely related, analyses their structural interconnections, and argues that there is great systematic potential in interpreting them as aspects of one method, which ultimately must be conceived as a component of theory (...) development. The main results are: an adequate method of conceptual re-engineering must focus not on individual concepts but on systems of concepts and theories; the linear structure of Carnapian explication must be replaced by a process of mutual adjustments as described by Goodman; Carnap’s condition of similarity can be analysed into two components, one securing a relation to the specific extensions of the pre-existing concepts, one regulating the transition to the new system of concepts; these two criteria of adequacy can be built into Goodman’s account ofreflectiveequilibrium to ensure that the resulting concepts promote theoretical virtues while being sufficiently similar to the concepts we started out with. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   38 citations