Results for ' naturalistic metaphysics'
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- OnNaturalisticMetaphysics.Thomas M. Crisp -2015 - In Kelly James Clark,The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 61–74.I raise an epistemic objection tonaturalisticmetaphysics – the attempt to understand the nature and structure of reality in terms of natural entities, forces, and processes – arguing that we should not expect evolution to have crafted cognitive faculties reliable with respect to recondite metaphysical speculation, and that this gives practitioners ofnaturalisticmetaphysics reason to doubt the deliverances of their work. I conclude by considering some main objections to this kind of skeptical argument.No categories
- ModeratelyNaturalisticMetaphysics.Matteo Morganti &Tuomas E. Tahko -2017 -Synthese 194 (7):2557-2580.The present paper discusses different approaches tometaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from thenaturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science andmetaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy ofmetaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.
- NaturalisticMetaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn’t Lead to Realism aboutMetaphysics.Raoni Arroyo &Matteo Morganti -forthcoming -Synthese.In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context ofnaturalisticmetaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science andmetaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists aboutmetaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists aboutmetaphysics. We call this the ‘parity thesis’. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically (...) inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery’s. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery’s specific inference from scientific realism to realism aboutmetaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science andmetaphysics within thenaturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular. (shrink)
- Naturalisticmetaphysics and the two evolutions of man.Gardner Williams -1953 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (2):221-227.
- Non‐NaturalisticMetaphysics.Hud Hudson -2015 - In Kelly James Clark,The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 168–181.First, I pair and critically discuss a methodological naturalism (construed as a research program heavily inspired by epistemological naturalism) with the kind of work that is currently being practiced under the heading “contemporary analyticmetaphysics.” Second, I pair and critically discuss an ontological naturalism with the kind of work that could be described under the heading “theistically informedmetaphysics.” Each pairing provides a window on the sort of confrontation to be had between naturalism and non‐naturalizedmetaphysics. Along (...) the way, I offer some reflections about the resilience and even the inescapability ofmetaphysics, despite threats from naturalism to diminish its scope and significance. (shrink)No categories
- (1 other version)Globally and locally appliednaturalisticmetaphysics.Cristian Soto -2017 -Manuscrito 40 (3):33-50.ABSTRACT This article addresses the prospects of appliednaturalisticmetaphysics from both a global and a local perspective. Adopting a broad Sellarsian approach, I look into whethermetaphysics has a place and role in the overall scientific image and assess whether it has its own subject matter as a first- or second- order discipline. After outlining the general argument in section 1, section 2 examines our construal of science andmetaphysics, drawing some considerations for restating the (...) question about the viability ofnaturalisticmetaphysics. Sections 3 and 4, in turn, suggest two styles ofnaturalisticmetaphysics that can be respectively applied on a global and on a local basis. I briefly outline their respective goals, problems and categories. I argue, in particular, that globally appliednaturalisticmetaphysics deals with issues about the fundamental structure of reality, whereas locally appliednaturalisticmetaphysics tackles riddles arising from the examination of specific unobservable posits in the frontiers of scientific ontology. Section 5 closes with concluding remarks that putmetaphysics within the scientific image. (shrink)No categories
- NaturalisticMetaphysics at Sea.Matthew Haug -2018 -Philosophical Inquiries 6 (1):95-122.In this paper I return to the mid-20th-century debate between Quine and Carnap on the status ofmetaphysics questions with an eye toward advancing contemporary debates about whether naturalists can coherently undertake substantive metaphysical inquiry. Following Huw Price, I take the debate between Quine and Carnap to hinge, in part, on whether human inquiry is functionally unified. However, unlike Price, I suggest that this question is not best understood as a question about the function(s) of descriptive discourse. This goes (...) along with rejecting a “linguistic conception” of the starting point of metaphysical inquiry, which, although shared by Quine and Carnap, Price gives us no good reason to think is mandatory for naturalists. I sketch two reasons naturalists have to reject a particular manifestation of this linguistic conception in Quine’s work—his criterion of ontological commitment. Finally, I show how these reasons can help us identify the grains of truth in some recent critiques of “mainstreammetaphysics of mind.”. (shrink)
- Dewey'snaturalisticmetaphysics.George Santayana -1925 -Journal of Philosophy 22 (25):673-688.
- NaturalistMetaphysics.Jessica M. Wilson -2003 -Michigan Philosophy News:xx-xx.This newsletter contribution advances Wilson'snaturalistic approach to the doing ofmetaphysics.
- Horgan’snaturalisticmetaphysics of mind.Jaegwon Kim -2002 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.Terry Horgan has made impressive and highly important contributions to numerous fields of philosophy ?metaphysics, philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and value theory, to mention the most prominent ones. What gives Horgan's work a powerful and clarifying unity is his deep and unflagging commitment to philosophical naturalism. In fact, Horgan himself has often invoked naturalism to motivate his positions and arguments on a number of philosophical issues. In this talk, I will discuss (...) some questions concerning Horgan's naturalism and his philosophy of mind.Among them are such questions as these: What exactly is the naturalism that drives Horgan's philosophical thinking? Is it a reasonable and plausible form of naturalism? Exactly how does his naturalism lead to the conclusions and arguments he defends? Should "proper" naturalists follow Horgan's lead? I will discuss these questions in relation to Horgan's work on mind-body supervenience, the autonomy of psychological explanation, reductionism, mental causation, and related issues. (shrink)
- A Plea forNaturalisticMetaphysics: Why AnalyticMetaphysics is Not Enough.Ulrich Steinvorth -2021 - Springer Verlag.In this small book, Ulrich Steinvorth describes the reasons why analytic philosophy, which started as an anti-metaphysical project, has become a strong advocate ofmetaphysics, and why it must become synthetic, normative, andnaturalistic. Steinvorth argues that self-regulation is the common property of all being, that we can talk of an increase or escalation of self-regulation in the evolution of being, and that self-regulation becomes self-determination in man. Considering objections to this view related to questions of free will, (...) consciousness, thenaturalistic fallacy, and teleology, he draws on cybernetics, dual process theory, physical cosmology, and Leibniz’s idea of measuring the goodness of a world by the number of possibilities opened up by the world. To test his approach and show its political relevance, he applies it to political liberalism. (shrink)No categories
- Toward a Pragmatically NaturalistMetaphysics of the Fact-Value Entanglement.Sami Pihlström -2010 -Journal of Philosophical Research 35:323-352.This paper examines the metaphysical status of the fact-value entanglement. According to Hilary Putnam, among others, this is a major theme in both classical and recent pragmatism, but its relevance obviously extends beyond pragmatism scholarship. The pragmatic naturalist must make sense of the entanglement thesis within a broadly non-reductively naturalist account of reality. Two rival options for suchmetaphysics are discussed: values may be claimed to emerge from facts (or normativity from factuality), or fact and value may be considered (...) continuous. Thus, pragmatic naturalism about fact and value may be based on either emergentism or Peircean synechism. This is a crucial tension not only in pragmatist philosophy of value but in pragmatically naturalistmetaphysics generally. (shrink)
- Dewey'sNaturalisticMetaphysics: Expostulations and Replies.Randy L. Friedman -2011 -Education and Culture 27 (2):48-73.Critics of Dewey’smetaphysics point to his dismissal of any philosophy which locates ideals in a realm beyond experience. However, Dewey’s sustained critique of dualistic philosophies is but a first step in his reconstruction and recovery of the function of the metaphysical. Detaching the discussion of values from inquiry, whether scientific, philosophical or educational, produces the same end as relegating values to a transcendent realm that is beyond ordinary human discourse. Dewey’snaturalisticmetaphysics supports his progressive educational (...) philosophy. The duty of education is grounded in its service to democracy; it must help students develop the ability to express, discuss, and develop their moral reasoning through experiential and experimental learning. (shrink)
- Towards aNaturalisticMetaphysics of Temporality: A Synthesis of John Dewey's Later Thought.Gary Calore -1989 -Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3 (1):12 - 25.
- John Dewey’s Theoretical Framework from 1903–1916: Prefigurations of aNaturalisticMetaphysics.Paul Benjamin Cherlin -2017 -The Pluralist 12 (2):57-77.The 1925 publication of Experience and Nature marks a new period in John Dewey's thought: he had become interested in developing anaturalisticmetaphysics. Despite his new metaphysical orientation, Dewey's mature philosophy is compatible with and builds upon works that fall within his Middle Period, from 1903–1924.1 While this is usually accepted as true, my more substantial claim is that we cannot get a clear picture of Dewey'smetaphysics apart from what came before. More than simply showing (...) that Dewey's characterization of specific topics, such as "logic," or specific terms, such as "belief," are compatible with his later discussions, this article will demonstrate that the broader dynamics, themes, and... (shrink)
- Probabilism, Emergentism, and Pluralism: ANaturalisticMetaphysics of Radical Materialism.Donald A. Crosby -2016 -American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 37 (3):217-227.William James and Alfred North Whitehead strongly rejected materialism as a metaphysical option. While James lived and wrote only up to the beginning of the revolution in physics that brought to the fore fundamentally different theories such as quantum theory and the special and general theories of relativity, Whitehead, as an accomplished mathematician, was readily conversant with these new developments. Since their respective times, however, much innovation and refinement of theories in physics and other natural sciences has taken place. With (...) these later developments, conceptions of matter and its capabilities have undergone far-reaching explicit and implicit changes. A consequence of these... (shrink)
- Quine: Underdetermination andNaturalisticMetaphysics.Gary Kemp -2015 -Philosophical Topics 43 (1-2):179-188.Quine’s naturalism has no room for a point of view outside science from which one might criticize science, or a transcendental point of view from which one could ask questions about the adequacy of science with respect to reality (‘as it is in itself ’). Adrian Moore sniffs out some genuine tensions in this, arguing in effect that Quine is forced by his own views to admit those sorts of questions as legitimate. I venture that Quine, even if he would (...) grant that the posing of such questions is an inevitable feature of reason in some sense, would take such curiosity to be strictly speaking a mistake, something like that of thinking there must be a single truth-predicate for all levels of Tarski’s hierarchy. (shrink)
- Metaphysics matters:Metaphysics and soteriology in Jerome stone's and Donald Crosby's varieties of religious naturalism.Stefani Ruper -2014 -Zygon 49 (2):308-322.Religious naturalism is distinct from supernatural religion largely because of metaphysical minimalism. Certain varieties of religious naturalism are more minimalist than others, however, and some even eschewmetaphysics altogether. But is anything lost in that process? To determinemetaphysics’ degree of relevance to religious function, I compare the soteriology of the “ontologically reticent” Minimalist Vision of Jerome Stone to that of the ontologically rich Religion of Nature of Donald Crosby. I demonstrate that for these varieties of religious naturalism: (...) (1)metaphysics influences soteriology; (2) metaphysical minimalism limits soteriological potential; and (3)metaphysics enhances soteriological potential. These conclusions lead me to assert the relevance ofmetaphysics to religious function, specifically for these varieties of religious naturalism, as well as to urge investigation into religious experience and quality as they may relate tometaphysics. (shrink)
- Metaphysics Within Science: Against Radical Naturalism.Fredrik Andersen &Jonas R. Becker Arenhart -2016 -Metaphilosophy 47 (2):159-180.In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version ofnaturalisticmetaphysics and propose that contemporary analyticmetaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether science andmetaphysics are separable, intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics (...) is that successful scientific research presupposesmetaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common tometaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories. (shrink)
- Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things.Patrick Gamez -2018 -Open Philosophy 1 (1):191-212.In this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framework for doing justice to some of the motivations behind the recent revival ofmetaphysics in Continental philosophy, in particular its ecological-ethical motivations. In the second section of the paper, I demonstrate how ecological-ethical issues motivate (...) new metaphysicians like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and Graham Harman to impute to objects real features of agency. I also try to show how their commitments lead to deep ambiguities in their metaphysical projects. In the final section, I outline a type of scientific naturalism in Continental philosophy that parallels the sort of naturalism championed by Quine, both conceptually and historically, and suggest that it might serve our ecological-ethical purposes better. (shrink)No categories
- Naturalism and themetaphysics of perception.Zoe Drayson -2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson,Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-233.How does the philosophical debate between naive realism and intentionalism relate to the psychological debate between ecological theories and constructivist theories? The participants in each debate take themselves to be doing something distinctive, but I show that characterizing the distinction is difficult: the theories in both debates use inference to the best explanation to draw contingent conclusions about the constitutive nature of perception. I argue that both debates concern themetaphysics of perception, and that philosophers of perception are wrong (...) to think that constructivist and ecological theories are engaged in a distinct and non-metaphysical task. (shrink)
- Innate ideas as anaturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.Steve Stewart-Williams -2005 -Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):791-814.This article starts from the assumption that there are various innate contributions to our view of the world and explores the epistemological implications that follow from this. Specifically, it explores the idea that if certain components of our worldview have an evolutionary origin, this implies that these aspects accurately depict the world. The simple version of the argument for this conclusion is that if an aspect of mind is innate, it must be useful, and the most parsimonious explanation for its (...) usefulness is that it accurately depicts the world. There are a number of important criticisms of this argument. These include the idea that evolutionary justifications are circular, that evolved mental content and principles are not necessarily accurate, and that, if the argument is taken seriously, it has some highly dubious consequences. These criticisms necessitate various qualifications to the initial argument. Nonetheless, it is argued that, in some cases, important conclusions can be drawn about the world from an analysis of evolved contributions to our view of the world. An evolutionary approach cannot provide an ultimate justification for any belief; however, in certain circumstances, it supports the conclusion that a given belief is a reasonable first approximation. To the extent that innate content and principles pertain to topics inmetaphysics, they can be viewed as anaturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)
- Themetaphysics science needs: Deleuze's naturalism.George Webster -2024 -European Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):820-846.This article is aimed at those interested in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the sciences—and this includes philosophers of science working out of the analytic tradition. Deleuze's writings are riddled with references to science and mathematics. And yet, the relation between these references and his philosophical thought is not well understood. In this essay, I investigate the nature of this relation—and I do so by asking whether it isnaturalistic. Importantly, I draw on insights from contemporary philosophy of (...) science to contribute to a proper understanding of this issue. I show that and how commentators are hamstrung by their lack of engagement with the philosophy of science; I present an interpretation of Deleuze's philosophical project as attempting to articulate an immanent and primitive form of objective modality; I draw together parts of Deleuze's corpus that are relevant to his treatment of the sciences but are nonetheless rarely studied in conjunction (including his and Guattari's distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’ science and his under-scrutinized statement of interest in ‘themetaphysics science needs’); and I propose anaturalistic interpretation of his engagements with science. (shrink)
- Experience and existence in Dewey'snaturalisticmetaphysics.Sholom J. Kahn -1948 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (2):316-321.
- Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism.Terry Horgan &Mark Timmons -1993 -Philosophical Issues 4:180 - 204.
- Plantinga, Metaphysical Naturalism and Proper Function.Peter Markie -1999 -Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):65-72.
- Themetaphysics of self in Praśastapāda's differential naturalism.Shalini Sinha -unknownIn A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovativemetaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for (...) all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’smetaphysics of self is the idea that ethics ismetaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice. (shrink)
- Methodological Naturalists Need Not Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht -2023 -Scientia et Fides 11 (1):45-61.In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try to show that the correct answer to the question that the title of their paper poses is positive. They argue that methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, namely evidentialism. Causal closure and evidentialism imply metaphysical naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who believes in methodological naturalism should also endorse causal closure, evidentialism, and metaphysical naturalism as a result. In this paper, (...) I criticize their argument and argue that it is deficient in (at least) two different ways. First, what they consider to be methodological naturalism is in fact a strawman: that is another – more radical – thesis that may be called methodological anti-supernaturalism. Second, and most importantly, even methodological anti-supernaturalism does not in essence need causal closure for its justification. Then, methodological naturalists are not required to adhere to causal closure or metaphysical naturalism. (shrink)
- TheMetaphysics of Halakha: Halakhic Naturalism vs. Halakhic Non-Naturalism.Israel J. Cohen -forthcoming - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Daniel Rynolds,The Routledge Companion to Jewish Philosophy. Routledge.In this paper I discuss the nature of halakhic facts and I frame the discussion in a broader meta-ethical context. Most of the existing literature on the philosophy of halakha has focused on the contrast between ‘Halakhic Realism’ and ‘Halakhic Nominalism’. This theoretical contrast is vague and includes a wide range of theories. Inspired by the meta-ethical literature, I propose to focus the discussion on views that can be called ‘Halakhic Naturalism’ and ‘Halakhic Non-naturalism’. I present, develop and distinguish between (...) different meanings of 'naturalism' and consider arguments for and against 'Halakhic Naturalism'. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present and demonstrate the fruitful encounter between meta-ethics and the philosophy of halakha. Second, to present, evaluate and promote the substantive discussion ofnaturalistic and non-naturalistic views. (shrink)No categories
- Metaphysical Naturalism and Some Moral Realisms.Matthew Carey Jordan -2011 -Philo 14 (1):5-24.One central question of metaethics concerns whether there are any moral facts. I argue that morality as such is characterized by a number of distinctive features, and that metaphysical naturalists should believe that there are moral facts only if there is a plausiblenaturalistic explanation of the existence of facts which exemplify those features. I survey three prominent (and very different)naturalistic moral theories—the reductive naturalism of Peter Railton, Frank Jackson’s analytic descriptivism, and Christine Korsgaard’s Kantianism—and argue that (...) none of them has the resources to explain the existence of genuine moral facts. (shrink)
- Epistemology &metaphysics: Life's perspectives / Ken Gemes ; Nietzsche's naturalism reconsidered / Brian Leiter ; Nietzsche's philosophical aestheticism / Sebastian Gardner ; Being, becoming, and time in Nietzsche / Robin Small ; Eternal recurrence.Paul S. Loeb -2013 - In Ken Gemes & John Richardson,The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. New York: Oxford University Press.
- On Characterizing Metaphysical Naturalism.Lok-Chi Chan -2021 -Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:232-260.The disciplinary characterisation (DC) is the most popular approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and physicalism. It defines metaphysical naturalism with reference to scientific theories and defines physicalism with reference to physical theories, and suggests that every entity that exists is a posited entity of these theories. DC has been criticised for its inability to solve Hempel’s dilemma and a list of problems alike. In this paper, I propose and defend a novel version of DC that can be called a historical (...) paths approach. The idea is (roughly) that metaphysical naturalism can be defined with reference to the historical ideas that current scientific ideas descend from. I argue that it is not rendered implausible by the above problems, and hence that DC is more defensible and attractive than it may first appear. I then argue that the approach also provides a useful framework for the naturalisation of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology. (shrink)
- Metaphysical naturalism, semantic normativity, and meta-semantic irrealism.Terence E. Horgan &Mark Timmons -1996 - In Enrique Villanueva,Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. pp. 180-204.
- Analysis, naturalism andmetaphysics in the philosophy of mind.Magne Dybvig -2008 -Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43 (1):33-51.No categories
- Search for aNaturalistic Worldview, Volume 2: Natural Science andMetaphysics.Abner Shimony -1993 - Cambridge University Press.Table of Contents: Acknowledgements; Preface; 1. Integral epistemology; 2. Reality, causality and closing the circle; 3. Search for a world view that can accommodate our knowledge of microphysics; 4. Perception from an evolutionary point of view; 5. Is observation theory-laden? A problem innaturalistic epistemology; 6. Coherence and the axioms of confirmation; 7. An adamite derivation of the principles of the calculus of probability; 8. The status of the principle of maximum entropy; 9. Scientific inference; 10. Reconsiderations on inductive (...) logic; 11. Comments on two epistemological these of Thomas Kuhn; 12. Comment on Martin Eger's A Tale of Two Controversies; Index. (shrink)
- Finite beings, finite goods: The semantics,metaphysics and ethics of naturalist consequentialism, part I.Richard Boyd -2003 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):505–553.0.0. Theistic Ethics as a Challenge and a Diagnostic Tool.Naturalistic conceptions in metaethics come in many varieties. Many philosophers who have sought to situate moral reasoning in anaturalistic metaphysical conception have thought it necessary to adopt non-cognitivist, prescriptivist, projectivist, relativist, or otherwise deflationary conceptions. Recently there has been a revival of interest in non-deflationary moral realist approaches to ethical naturalism. Many non-deflationary approaches have exploited the resources of non-empiricist “causal” or “naturalistic” conceptions of reference and (...) of kind definitions in service of the “naturalistic” metaphilosophical conception that substantive moral questions, and questions about themetaphysics of morals, are broadly a posteriori questions, somewhat analogous to scientific questions, and are not amenable to a priori resolution by “conceptual analysis.”. (shrink)
- Naturalism, notation, and themetaphysics of mathematics.Madeline M. Muntersbjorn -1999 -Philosophia Mathematica 7 (2):178-199.The instability inherent in the historical inventory of mathematical objects challenges philosophers. Naturalism suggests we can construct enduring answers to ontological questions through an investigation of the processes whereby mathematical objects come into existence. Patterns of historical development suggest that mathematical objects undergo an intelligible process of reification in tandem with notational innovation. Investigating changes in mathematical languages is a necessary first step towards a viable ontology. For this reason, scholars should not modernize historical texts without caution, as the use (...) of anachronistic notation tends to impede, rather than enhance, our ability to recognize the emergent nature of mathematical objects. (shrink)
- From metaphysical to substantive naturalism: A case study.J. L. Dowell -2004 -Synthese 138 (2):149-173.This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...) realist and naturalist position more plausible than its irrealist and non-naturalist rivals? The answer here focuses again on theories of content and is wholly negative. I argue that the standard array of arguments offered in support of realist and naturalist theories in fact provide equal support for a host of irrealist and non-naturalist ones. Taken together, these considerations reveal an important gap in the recent philosophical literature on content. The challenge to proponents of putatively realist and naturalist theories is to insure that those theories so much as state distinctively realist and naturalist positions and then to identify arguments that support what is distinctively realist and naturalist about them. (shrink)
- Themetaphysics of naturalism.Sterling Power Lamprecht -1967 - New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Beyond Naturalism, Spiritualism and Finite Idealism: Hegel on the Relationship Between Metaphysical Truth, Nature and Mind.Sebastian Stein -2023 - In Luca Corti & Johannes-Georg Schuelein,Life, Organisms, and Human Nature: New Perspectives on Classical German Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 321-341.Despite his commitment to universal explicability, a case can be made that Hegel is better labelled an idealist than a naturalist. As an analysis of his three syllogisms of philosophy reveals, he strictly differentiates between the domains of nature and Geist, suggesting in sequence that Geist replaces nature, Geist comprehends nature and that Geist and nature are comprehended as forms of the metaphysical idea and determine and mediate each other. Since Hegel grounds his accounts of the metaphysical idea and its (...) forms nature and Geist in concept-metaphysics and these include a supernatural notion of undetermined, self-positing universality, Hegel’s entire ontological edifice is ultimately supernatural. This stands in stark contrast to themetaphysics of naturalism, which are based on categories Hegel associates with the logics of being and essence or which fail to sufficiently emancipate universality from its immediate connection to particularity. (shrink)
- (2 other versions)Ground, Essence, and theMetaphysics of Metanormative Non-Naturalism.Tristram McPherson &David Plunkett -2022 -Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (26):674-701.The past few decades have witnessed an extraordinary revival of interest in metanormative non-naturalism. Despite this interest, it is still unclear how to understand the distinctive metaphysical commitments of this view. We illustrate the relevant difficulties by examining what is arguably the most prominent class of contemporary attempts to formulate non-naturalism’s metaphysical commitments. This class of proposals, exemplified in work by Gideon Rosen and Stephanie Leary, characterizes the distinctive metaphysical commitments of non-naturalism in terms of metaphysical grounding and essence. We (...) argue that these proposals overgeneralize: they either misclassify intuitivelynaturalistic hypotheses about themetaphysics of normativity as “non-naturalist”, or misclassify hypotheses in other areas ofmetaphysics. We argue that this problem stems from features of grounding itself. We suggest a more promising alternative for formulating non-naturalism, which revolves around the notion of objective similarity between classes of properties. We conclude by drawing some general lessons for inquiry about themetaphysics of normativity, and aboutmetaphysics in general. (shrink)No categories
- A peculiar enterprise. The fate ofmetaphysics in a naturalist climate.Michiel Meijer -2017 -International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79 (1-2):1-17.In this paper, I examine the divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ approaches tometaphysics by reconstructing a three-cornered debate between naturalists, hermeneutists, and pragmatists on the issue of how to understand the relationship between ethics and ontology. Taking my cue from the dominantnaturalistic debates in Anglo-American ethics, I continue to discuss in more detail the positions of Hilary Putnam and Charles Taylor in the light of these debates. More particularly, I investigate Putnam’s wholesale rejection of Ontology with (...) a capital ‘O’, while also exploring Taylor’s retrieval of ontological thinking for Ethics with a capital ‘E’. Drawing attention to the deep metaphysical uncertainties in all of these approaches, I ultimately seek to develop a well-defined perspective from which to evaluate the peculiar status ofmetaphysics in contemporary philosophy, reflecting on its fate beyond the analytic-continental split. (shrink)No categories
- Metaphysics and Naturalism.Michele Marsonet -2010 -Philosophical News 1.In the 1950’s Quine rejected the analytic/synthetic distinction insisting, instead,on language conceived of as a tool created by mankind for practical purposes, and this move allowed him to overcome the strictures of a purely analytic conception of language by resorting, instead, to the pragmatist tradition represented by thinkers like James, Peirce and Dewey and C.I. Lewis. In the subsequent phases of his philosophical development, however, his commitment to pragmatism became looser, maybe because Dewey and the other main fi gures of (...) American classical pragmatism always stress the practical side of the scientifi c enterprise, thus not giving too much importance to the construction of artificial languages. What kind ofmetaphysics, if any, cana pragmatically oriented philosopher consistently endorse? All we have to do is to envision a more modest concept ofmetaphysics. A pragmatistmetaphysics can indeed be construed, provided we recall thatmetaphysics – just like science – evolves with the passing of time. An author like Rescher follows this path. Nowhere he presents his own system as giving the “final” answer to all metaphysical, epistemic or ethical interrogatives. After all, if science is no longer held to give the ultimate answers, why should such a burden be put on the philosopher’s shoulders? (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - (1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and theMetaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson -2012 -Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7.It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter (...) defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against non-naturalism from supervenience is alive and well. (shrink)
- TheMetaphysics of Naturalism.John Herman Randall &Sterling P. Lamprecht -1970 -Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):17.
- Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining the Necessary Connections between the Natural and the Normative.Teemu Toppinen -2018 -Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.Non-naturalism—roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis—may be combined either with cognitivism or with non-cognitivism. The chapter starts by explaining how the metaphysically necessary connections between the natural and the normative raise an explanatory challenge for realist non-naturalism, and how it is not at all obvious that quasi-realism offers a way of escaping the challenge. Having briefly explored different kinds of accounts of what it is to have thoughts concerning metaphysical necessity, it then proceeds to argue (...) that once we understand the explanatory challenge in the light of a quasi-realist take on normative judgments, this challenge takes the shape of a first-order normative issue, and will be answerable by the quasi-realists’ lights. When it comes to explaining the necessary connections between the normative and the natural, all will be fine, it seems, if non-naturalists just go a little quasi. (shrink)
- TheMetaphysics of a Naturalist: Philosophical and Psychological Fragments. [REVIEW]DeWitt H. Parker -1910 -Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (24):665-666.No categories
- Dispositionalism, Categoricalism, and Metaphysical Naturalism.Travis Dumsday -2014 -Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 88:101-112.In contemporary analyticmetaphysics there are five theories concerning the reality of dispositional and categorical properties and their relationship: mixed view dispositionalism, pan-dispositionalism, categoricalism, identity theory, and neutral monism. Here I outline briefly a novel argument against metaphysical naturalism, one based on the idea that none of these five theories is compatible with it.No categories
- The Implications of Evolution forMetaphysics: Theism, Idealism, and Naturalism.David H. Gordon -2023 - Lanham: Lexington Books.It is a central claim of the New Atheists that evolutionary theory disproves theism and demonstrates the truth of metaphysical naturalism. This book examines this claim and explores the implications of evolutionary theory formetaphysics.
- Hegel’sMetaphysics as Speculative Naturalism.Paul Giladi -2016 - In Allegra De Laurentiis,Hegel and Metaphysics: On Logic and Ontology in the System. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 149-162.The aim of this paper is to (i) reject the notion that one can ascribe no metaphysical commitments to Hegel; and (ii) argue that the kind ofmetaphysics one ought to ascribe to Hegel is a robust yet immanent/naturalist variety. I begin by exploring two reasons why one may think Hegel’s philosophical system has no metaphysical commitments. I argue that one of these reasons is based on a particular understanding of Hegel as a post-Kantian philosopher, whereas the second reason (...) is centred on a particular understanding of the philosophical viability ofmetaphysics as a form of enquiry simpliciter. My discussion of these ways of seeing the motivation for regarding Hegel in an anti-metaphysical way concludes with a rejection of the interpretation of conceiving Hegelianism withoutmetaphysics. I then move on to address what I take to be the more pertinent and serious issue of what kind of metaphysician Hegel was. To this end, I argue that the best way of understanding Hegelianmetaphysics is by conceiving of it as a combination of Aristotelian first philosophy and Kantian critique. To put this in the form of a slogan, I interpret Hegel’smetaphysics as a form of speculative naturalism. (shrink)
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