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For many years, researchers and practitioners have sought out meaningful indicators of sales performance. Yet, as the concept of performance has broadened, the understanding of what makes up a successful seller, has become far more complicated. The complexity of buyer–seller relationships has changed therefore as the definition of sales performance has expanded, cultivating a growing interest in ethical/unethical actions since they could potentially have impacts on sales performance. Given this environment, the purpose of this study is to explore the impact (...) ofmoraljudgment on sales performance and sellers engaging in a customer-oriented selling approach. Specifically, by utilizing a sample of 345 business-to-business salespeople, this study examines the relationships betweenmoraljudgment, customer-oriented selling, and outcome and behavior based performance. Results, managerial implications, and opportunities for future research are provided. (shrink)

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In this essay I argue thatmoraljudgment is a natural kind by developing an empirically grounded theory of the distinctive conceptual content ofmoral judgments. Psychological research on themoral/conventional distinction suggests that inmoral judgments right and wrong, good and bad, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, etc. are conceptualized as serious, general, authority-independent, and objective. After laying out the theory and the empirical evidence that supports it, I address recent empirical and conceptual objections. Finally, I (...) suggest that the theory uniquely accounts for the possibility of genuinemoral agreement and disagreement. (shrink)

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It is widely acknowledged thatmoral principles are not sufficient to guidemoral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity formoral judgement alone? Why domoral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-calledmoral particularists argue that we can, and should, makemoral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, (...) the person ofmoral judgement is a person of empathy, sensibility and virtue, rather than a person of principle. In this paper I argue that this is a false dichotomy. The person of goodmoral judgement is a person of principle. I propose that we think ofmoral principles as internalised long-term commitments that form ourmoral character and sensitivity, and, as such, are constitutive ofmoral judgement. (shrink)

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Gains inmoral judgement, as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT), correlate strongly with advancing education. Curricula that are strongly biblically based may not promote, and students with a strong fundamentalist orientation may not demonstrate, suchmoral growth. Students at an interdenominational, but very conservative seminary, completed the DIT before and after ethics courses conducted in three different formats. Those students who spent 30 hours in small‐group discussions of ethical dilemmas improved theirmoral reasoning scores, while (...) those who had fewer hours of discussion or lectures did not. It would appear that small group discussions, shown to improvemoral reasoning scores in other educational settings, are also successful in a strongly biblical environment. (shrink)

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Originally published in 1955, this book covers most of the problems ofmoral philosophy but concentrates on two of them: the criterion of right action and the nature ofmoraljudgment. Rejecting Utilitarianism, it shows how principles ofmoral obligation may be unified under Kant's formula of treating people as ends-in-themselves. This formula is interpreted in terms of a new, naturalistic theory ofmoral obligation. Throughout the book the social reference of ethics is emphasized and (...)moral obligation is discussed in relation to rights, justice, liberty and equality. (shrink)

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In this study, we examine the relationship between appeal to self-perceptions ofmoral identity, included in the teaching of ethics, and the strengthening ofmoraljudgment among postgraduate business students. As appeal tomoral identity emphasizes personal engagement in the appraisal of an ethically charged situation, it addresses critiques of abstract rule application and principle transfer leveled at traditional business ethics teaching. Eighty-one participants completed a series of reflective writing exercises throughout a twelve-week business ethics unit. (...) Based on an instrument completed at the beginning and end of the education process, our results indicate a positive shift inmoral judgement intensity. We, therefore, recommend appeal tomoral identity as a leverage strategy to be employed in business ethics education in order to strengthen students’moraljudgment. (shrink)

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Recent, well-publicized accounting scandals have shown that the penalties outsiders impose on those found culpable of earnings management can be severe. However, less is known about how colleagues within internal labor markets respond when they believe fellow managers have managed earnings. Designers of responsibility accounting systems need to understand the reputational costs managers impose on one another within internal labor markets. In an experimental study, 159 evening MBA students were asked to assume the role of a manager in a company (...) and respond to a scenario in which another manager (the target manager) has the opportunity to engage in earnings management. Participants provided causal attributions, assessed the morality of the target manager, and indicated whether they would change their judgments about the target manager's reputation. The study manipulated three between-subjects factors: (1) whether the target manager chose to engage in earnings management, (2) whether the company's budgetary control system was rigid or flexible, and (3) whether the target manager's work history was average or above average. We found that causal attributions are affected more by the budgetary systems when the target did not manage earnings than when the manager did. We also found that morality judgments were significantly associated with the target manager's behavior, but not with the budgetary system. In addition, participants' judgments about the target manager's reputation were more strongly associated with morality judgments than with causal attributions. We discuss implications of the role of reputation in management control systems design. (shrink)

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Let cognitivism be the view thatmoral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue formoraljudgment pluralism: somemoral judgments are cognitive states and some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my pluralism some judgments aremoral because they carry amoral content (e.g., that genocide is wrong) and some aremoral because they employ amoral attitude (e.g., indignation, (...) or guilt); the former are the cognitivemoral judgments and the latter the noncognitive ones. After explaining and motivating the view, I argue that this kind of pluralism handles quite elegantly several of the core issues that have structured the debate on cognitivism vs. noncognitivism. (shrink)

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Consider orthodox motivationaljudgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sinceremoraljudgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who rendersmoral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations betweenmoraljudgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures (...) are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory ofmoral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According tomoraljudgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose ofmoral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not amoraljudgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates. (shrink)

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We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility thatmoraljudgment constitutes a distinctive category ofjudgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that allmoral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes (...) give rise to what we refer to as “moral judgments”, then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity ofmoraljudgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics. (shrink)

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We propose a revised set ofmoral dilemmas for studies onmoraljudgment. We selected a total of 46moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influencemoraljudgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing (...) that emotional arousal in response tomoral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people'smoraljudgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account ofmoraljudgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality inmoraljudgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in humanmoral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set. (shrink)

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Wider possibilities formoral thought -- Objectivity revisited: a lesson from the work of J.L. Austin -- Ethics, inheriting from Wittgenstein --Moral thought beyondmoraljudgment: the case of literature -- Reclaimingmoraljudgment: the case of feminist thought -- Moralism as a centralmoral problem.

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The imminent deployment of autonomous vehicles requires algorithms capable of makingmoral decisions in relevant traffic situations. Some scholars in the ethics of autonomous vehicles hope to align such intelligent systems with humanmoraljudgment. For this purpose, studies like theMoral Machine Experiment have collected data about human decision-making in trolley-like traffic dilemmas. This paper first argues that the trolley dilemma is an inadequate experimental paradigm for investigating trafficmoral judgments because it does not (...) include agents’ character-based considerations and is incapable of facilitating the investigation of low-stakes mundane traffic scenarios. In light of the limitations of the trolley paradigm, this paper presents an alternative experimental framework that addresses these issues. The proposed solution combines the creation of mundane trafficmoral scenarios using virtual reality and the Agent-Deed-Consequences (ADC) model ofmoraljudgment as amoral-psychological framework. This paradigm shift potentially increases the ecological validity of future studies by providing more realism and incorporating character considerations into traffic actions. (shrink)

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Smithian (supposedly) irregular feelings reveal the internal structure ofmoral judgements by showing that they consist of two distinct elements. These elements belong to different dynamisms of human nature, are triggered by different causes, and produce different reactions in the agent. In the case of resentment, I call them animal resentment andmoral resentment, respectively. Animal resentment closely resembles Hume's account of resentment and follows his theory of the passions.Moral resentment is different, for it is not (...) caused directly by pain, but by the recognition of the evil intention of the aggressor. Finally, plainmoral resentment – or resentment caused by an unjust action and approved of by the impartial spectator – blends these elements into a unity articulated by Hume’s theory of the passions. (shrink)

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Recently, a number of philosophers and psychologists have drawn on neuroscientific and psychological research on the role of affective processes inmoral thinking to provide support formoral sentimentalism. Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett criticize such ‘neurosentimentalist’ accounts on the grounds that they focus only on synchronic processes occurring at the time ofmoral judgement. As a result, these accounts face a dilemma: either they fail to accommodate the connection betweenmoral judgement and agency or they (...) are committed to implausible claims about themoral agency of individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. I respond to this criticism, arguing that Gerrans and Kennett fail to appreciate the diachronic aspects of affective mechanisms and that they misinterpret the empirical literature on the vmPFC. I argue that neurosentimentalism does have the resources to explain the connection betweenmoral judgement and agency. (shrink)

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Linda Zagzebski’s recent account of the role of emotion in the structure ofmoral judgments aims to reconcile the role of affect in these judgments withmoral cognitivism. The account is implausible because it is based on a problematic analysis of what it is to express amoral attitude and because it makes making amoraljudgment unduly difficult. I suggest a way to reconcile Zagzebski’s intuitions aboutmoral judgments that does not encounter these (...) two problems. (shrink)

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ALTHOUGH I shall be attempting to examine the function ofjudgment, or what Aristotle called φρόνησις, inmoral deliberation, I shall begin by discussing some previous opinions about what kind of importance examples have inmoral experience. This strategy is only apparently circuitous. The role which one assigns to examples is symptomatic of the conception one has ofjudgment inmoral decision-making, because the use of examples forms one way in whichjudgment is exercised. (...) Indirectly, then, I shall be trying to rehabilitate the significance of examples inmoral deliberation. But the chief aim of this paper will be to determine both what is the function ofjudgment inmoral deliberation and how we are to understand the activity of exercising it. (shrink)

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This paper compares and contrasts two distinct techniques for measuringmoraljudgment: TheMoralJudgment Interview and the Defining Issues Test. The theoretical foundations, accompanying advantages and limitations, as well as appropriate usage of these methodologies are discussed. Adaptation and use of the instruments for business ethics research is given special attention.

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A cross-sectional study explored themoral judgement competence andmoral attitudes of 310 Czech and Slovak and 70 foreign national students at the Medical Faculty of Charles University in Hradec Králové, Czech Republic. Lind'sMoral Judgement Test was used to evaluatemoral judgement competence andmoral attitudes depending on factors such as age, number of semesters of study, sex, nationality and religion.Moral judgement competence decreased significantly in the Czech and Slovak medical students as (...) they grew older; in medical students from other countries it did not significantly increase. The influence of other factors (sex, nationality and religion) onmoral judgement competence was not proven in either the Czech and Slovak or the foreign national medical students.Moral attitudes do not change; the Czech and Slovak as well as the foreign students preferred the post-conventional levels ofmoral judgement (Kohlberg's 5th and 6th stages). The fact that the Czech and Slovak students'moral judgement competence decreased with age and number of semesters of study completed is not an optimistic sign: medical students who had undergone a lower number of semesters of study were morally more competent. (shrink)

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The past decade has seen a renewed interest inmoral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or overlapping phenomena. This review focuses onmoral judgments and is written from the perspective of cognitive psychologists interested in theories of the cognitive and affective processes underlying judgments inmoral domains. The review will (...) first present and discuss a variety of different theoretical and empirical approaches, including both behavioral and neuroscientific studies. We will then show how these theories can be applied to a selected number of specific research topics that have attracted particular interest in recent years, including the distinction betweenmoral and conventional rules,moral dilemmas, the role of intention, and sacred/protected values. One overarching question we will address throughout the chapter is whethermoral cognitions are distinct and special, or whether they can be subsumed under more domain-general mechanisms. (shrink)

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We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility ofmoral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over theirmoral judgments formoral progress to occur.Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving theirmoral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people can (...) exert over theirmoral cognition tends to be significantly overestimated, the prospects ofmoral progress face a formidable problem, the force of which has thus far been underappreciated. In the paper, we will provide both conceptual and empirical arguments for this thesis, and explain its most important implications. (shrink)

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First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

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It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher-order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of goodmoraljudgment and decision-making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate (...) alone in forming ourmoral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make badmoral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of goodmoraljudgment and decision-making. If I am right, the idea that goodmoraljudgment and decision-making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases ofmoral decision-making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automaticmoraljudgment and decision-making might begin to take shape. (shrink)

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It has long been known that people’s causal judgments can have an impact on theirmoral judgments. To take a simple example, if people conclude that a behavior caused the death of ten innocent children, they will therefore be inclined to regard the behavior itself as morally wrong. So far, none of this should come as any surprise. But recent experimental work points to the existence of a second, and more surprising, aspect of the relationship between causaljudgment (...) andmoraljudgment. It appears that the relationship can sometimes go in the opposite direction. That is, it appears that ourmoral judgments can sometimes impact our causal judgments. (Hence, we might first determine that a behavior is morally wrong and then, on that basis, arrive at the conclusion that it was the cause of various outcomes.). (shrink)

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Ordinary people often makemoral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns ofjudgment produced by mechanisms specific to themoral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions (...) affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role inmoraljudgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affectsmoraljudgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side-effect distinction affectsmoraljudgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in ourmoral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution. (shrink)

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This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works onmoral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make goodmoral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue,moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it (...) is by identifying the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities (e.g., friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. Yet, Aristotle and Kant also remind us that doing so requires the acquisition ofmoral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations. (shrink)

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In relation to the Kantian theory thatmoral judgments are imaginarily grounded, this contribution explores howmoral agents experience and make use of this imaginary groundedness. Drawing from a strand of aesthetics that conceives of imagination as make-believe, the imaginary ground ofmoraljudgment is theorized to stem from the interaction between active participants who pretend that their claims are grounded, and passive participants who are invited to go along. Based on this reconstruction, the experience of (...) themoral imaginary is argued to stem from a divided mind. It allowsmoral agents to be partly devoted to the mental and communicative attitude fitting the fictional world of groundedness, and partly to generating personal responses tomoral claims. Using the experience of artistic fiction as an example, the actual experience of morality’s imaginary ground is finally located in the interplay between those two spheres. (shrink)

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Ethical theory examines human action in general terms, whereasmoraljudgment takes place in particular situations. These situations often cannot be subsumed easily under general norms and call for a delicate balance of norms and circumstances. I describe situations where opposing courses of action seem morally reasonable and I call them states of deliberative equilibrium. I review Aristotle’s and Kant’s conceptions ofmoraljudgment and I offer a rule for stepping from deliberation tojudgment in (...) many situations of equilibrium. (shrink)

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This study characterizes Kant's understanding of the relation between aesthetic andmoraljudgment by examining the concept of sublimity in three of Kant's texts: the Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen , the Bemerkungen in den " Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen" , and the Kritik der Urteilskraft . Part I examines aesthetic andmoraljudgment in the Observations and the Remarks; Part II characterizes Kant's account in the later or critical (...) period; and Part III contains my English translation of the Remarks . (shrink)

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Ethics is central to leadership because of the impact leaders have on establishing organizational values and engaging followers to accomplish mutual goals. The ethical concerns of leaders may influence ethical decision-making of their followers. This paper attempts to investigate the relationship between leaders and followers onmoraljudgment, and make a comparison between China and Taiwan on the leader–followermoraljudgment relationship. Data were collected through a questionnaire survey on purchasing professionals in China and Taiwan. The (...) development ofmoraljudgment was measured using the defining issues test. Research findings indicate that followers exhibit higher level ofmoraljudgment while their leaders have higher level ofmoraljudgment. A positivemoraljudgment relationship exists between leaders and followers. The comparative study between China and Taiwan reveals that Chinese purchasing professionals are more easily influenced by their workplace leaders than their Taiwanese counterparts. Power distance would strengthen the leader–followermoraljudgment relationship. The present research makes contributions toward the ethics literature by providing empirical insight into the relationship between leadermoraljudgment and followermoraljudgment. This paper also suggests implications and opportunities for future research. (shrink)

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Superman has incredible powers and, luckily for us, he chooses to use them for good. But good intentions are not enough to actually do good with his powers—he must know what to do with them as well. The need forjudgment is what brings all superheroes down to Earth, and what ultimately makes them relatable to their fans despite their fantastic abilities.Moral philosophy (or ethics) is the area of philosophy dealing with what we should do, what kind (...) of people we should be, and what kind of lives we should live. Despite his superpowers, Superman still confronts ethical dilemmas and still needs to usejudgment to solve them. For him, however, the stakes are usually much higher than those the average person deals with. The weight of Superman’s choices is often like that of world leaders’ choices, potentially affecting millions of lives and the future of nations. (shrink)

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In this paper, my aim is to bring together contemporary psychological literature on emotion regulation and the classical sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith to arrive at a plausible account of empathy's role in explaining patterns ofmoraljudgment. Along the way, I criticize related arguments by Michael Slote, Jesse Prinz, and others.

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The Foreign-Language effect (FLe) on morality describes how late bilinguals make different decisions onmoral judgements, when presented in either their native or foreign language. However the relevance of this phenomenon to early bilinguals, where a language's “nativeness” is less distinct, is unknown. This study aims to verify the effect of early bilinguals' languages on theirmoral decisions and examine how language experience may influence these decisions. Eighty-six early English-Chinese bilinguals were asked to perform amoral dilemmas (...) task consisting of personal and impersonal dilemmas, in either English or Mandarin Chinese. Information on language experience factors were also collected from the participants. Findings suggest that early bilinguals do show evidence of a language effect on theirmoral decisions, which is dependent on how dominant they are in the language. Particularly, the more dominant participants were in their tested language, the larger the difference between their personal and impersonal dilemma response choice. In light of these findings, the study discusses the need to re-examine how we conceptualize the FLe phenomenon and its implications on bilinguals'moral judgement. It also addresses the importance of treating bilingualism as multidimensional, rather than a unitary variable. (shrink)

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An increasing number of scholars argue thatmoral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness ofmoral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis thatmoral (...) judgements are adaptations has been advocated in various different specificities and scopes, and on various different levels. Second, the three kinds of evidence that have most often been appealed to by discussants of this hypothesis require additional arguments. And third, there is significant reasonable disagreement about whatmoral judgements essentially are. (shrink)

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What is it to make amoral judgement? There are two standard views, cognitivist and non-cognitivist, plus hybrid options according to whichmoral judgements have cognitivist and non-cognitivist components. In this context, cognitivism is typically defined as the theory thatmoral judgements are beliefs. This chapter aims to clarify what it means for amoral judgement to be a belief. It begins by identifying a tension between three claims: cognitivism, an account of belief, and an account (...) ofmoral judgement. All three claims are plausible, but the question is whether they can be reconciled. In order to do so, the chapter distinguishes between broad and narrow belief. It gives an example of a mental state that is a broad belief but not a narrow belief, amoral ‘ulief’. The chapter sets out new definitions of cognitivism and non-cognitivism and draws out some further implications of the argument. (shrink)

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Moraljudgment – even the type discussed by Knobe – necessarily relies on substantial information about an agent's mental states, especially regarding beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, the effects described by Knobe can be attributed to norm violations in general, rather thanmoral concerns in particular. Consequently, Knobe's account overstates the influence ofmoraljudgment on assessments of mental states and causality.

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Originally published in 1969 this book analyzes the development ofmoral judgement in children and adolescents. Interviews were held with 360 children aged 7 to 17, with equal numbers of either sex. Original visual devices were planned to elicit judgements inmoral areas known to be of universal significance, such as the value of life, cheating, stealing and lying. In addition, analyses of concepts of reciprocity, of the development of conscience and of specificity inmoral judgement were (...) derived from the tests. The book inlcudes a critical survey of previous work in this field and places the research in its wider philosophical, psychological and sociological context. (shrink)

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A traditional idea is thatmoraljudgment involves more than calculating the consequences of actions; it also requires an assessment of the agent's intentions, the act's nature, and whether the agent uses another person as a means to her ends. I survey experimental developments suggesting that ordinary people often tacitly reason in terms of such deontological rules. It's now unclear whether we should posit a traditional form of the doctrine of double effect. However, further research suggests that a (...) range of non-consequentialist factors influencemoraljudgment, including intentions, commissions, personal harm, and agent-centered commitments. Many, if not all, such factors appear to affect how involved the agent is in bringing about an outcome. (shrink)

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In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis ofmoral cognition supports a form of (moderate)moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of ourmoral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neithermoral expertise, normoral learning, nor the possibility ofmoral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form ofmoral (...) abolitionism, according to which we should make fewermoral judgments much more carefully. (shrink)

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The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguishmoral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish (...) class='Hi'>moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-basedmoral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriatemoral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent’s intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in consciousmoral reasoning. (shrink)

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Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been “moral colorblindness” or an inability to formmoral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying thismoral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of “moral colorblindness” to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to makemoral judgments is because their research is (...) premised on the assumption that there is a specificmoral faculty of the brain, or specific “moral” emotions, and that this faculty or set of emotions can become “impaired”. I review recent research and argue that we have good reason to think that there is no such distinct capacity formoraljudgment, and that, as a result, it is impossible for someone’s “moraljudgment faculty” to become selectively disabled. I then discuss the implications of such a position on psychopathy research, the coherence of the disorder, and themoral responsibility of psychopaths. (shrink)

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We propose that the prevalentmoral aversion to AWS is supported by a pair of compelling objections. First, we argue that even a sophisticated robot is not the kind of thing that is capable of replicating humanmoraljudgment. This conclusion follows if humanmoraljudgment is not codifiable, i.e., it cannot be captured by a list of rules.Moraljudgment requires either the ability to engage in wide reflective equilibrium, the ability to (...) perceive certain facts asmoral considerations,moral imagination, or the ability to havemoral experiences with a particular phenomenological character. Robots cannot in principle possess these abilities, so robots cannot in principle replicate humanmoraljudgment. If robots cannot in principle replicate humanmoraljudgment then it is morally problematic to deploy AWS with that aim in mind. Second, we then argue that even if it is possible for a sufficiently sophisticated robot to make ‘moral decisions’ that are extensionally indistinguishable from (or better than) humanmoral decisions, these ‘decisions’ could not be made for the right reasons. This means that the ‘moral decisions’ made by AWS are bound to be morally deficient in at least one respect even if they are extensionally indistinguishable from human ones. Our objections to AWS support the prevalent aversion to the employment of AWS in war. They also enjoy several significant advantages over the most common objections to AWS in the literature. (shrink)

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A two stage model was developed and tested to explain how ethical leadership relates to followers’ ethicaljudgment in an organizational context. Drawing on social learning theory, ethical leadership was hypothesized to promote followers’ self-leadership focused on ethics. It was found that followers’ perceived accountability fully accounts for this relationship. In stage two, the relationship between self-leadership focused on ethics andmoraljudgment in a dual decision-making system was described and tested. Self-leadership focused on ethics was only (...) related tomoraljudgment when followers use activejudgment as opposed to their intuition. This provides support that a deliberate application of self-leadership focused on ethics leads to highermoraljudgment. Theoretical and practical implications as well as future research opportunities are discussed. (shrink)

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