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Evidentialism is a popular theory of epistemicjustification, yet, as early proponents of the theory Earl Conee and Richard Feldman admit, there are many elements that must be developed before Evidentialism can provide a full account of epistemicjustification, or well-founded belief. It is the aim of this book to provide the details that are lacking; here McCain moves past Evidentialism as a mere schema by putting forward and defending a full-fledged theory of epistemicjustification. In this (...) book McCain offers novel approaches to several elements of well-founded belief. Key among these are an original account of what it takes to have information as evidence, an account of epistemic support in terms of explanation, and a causal account of the basing relation that is far superior to previous accounts. The result is a fully developed Evidentialist account of well-founded belief. (shrink)

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This paper describes a formal measure of epistemicjustification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemicjustification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I (...) argue that any measure of epistemicjustification is also a measure of incremental confirmation. However, the degree of epistemicjustification must meet an additional condition, and all known measures of incremental confirmation fail to meet it. I describe this additional condition as well as a measure that meets it. The paper then applies the measure to the conjunction fallacy and proposes an explanation of the fallacy. (shrink)

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This paper advances our understanding of the norms of assertion in two ways. First, I evaluate recent studies claiming to discredit an important earlier finding which supports the hypothesis that assertion has a factive norm. In particular, I evaluate whether it was due to stimuli mentioning that a speaker’s evidence was fallible. Second, I evaluate the hypothesis that assertion has a truth-insensitive standard ofjustification. In particular, I evaluate the claim that switching an assertion from true to false, while (...) holding all else objectively constant, is irrelevant to attributions ofjustification. Two pre-registered experiments provide decisive evidence against each claim. In the first experiment, switching from mentioning to not mentioning fallibility made no difference to assertability attributions, thereby disproving the criticism concerning fallibility. By contrast, switching an assertion from true to false decreased the rate of assertability attribution from over 90% to less than 20%, thereby replicating and vindicating the original finding supporting a factive norm. In the second experiment, switching an assertion from true to false decreased the rate ofjustification attribution from over 80 to 10%, thereby undermining the hypothesis that assertion’s standard ofjustification is truth-insensitive. The second experiment also demonstrates that perspective-taking influences attributions ofjustification, and it provides initial evidence that the standard ofjustification for assertion is stricter than the standard for belief. (shrink)

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I evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductivejustification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmaticjustification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice. My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actualjustification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge. The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument (...) does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having ajustification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality. (shrink)

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Many of us care about the existence of ethical facts because they appear crucial to making sense of our practical lives. On one tempting line of thought, this idea can also play a central role in justifying our belief in those facts. David Enoch has developed this thought into a formidable new proposal in moral epistemology: that the deliberative indispensability of ethical facts gives us epistemicjustification for believing in such facts. This chapter argues that Enoch’s proposal fails because (...) it conflicts with a central fact about epistemicjustification: that the norms of epistemicjustification have the content that they do in part because of some positive connection between those norms and the truth of the beliefs that these norms govern. Alternatives to Enoch’s attempt to defend the idea that deliberative indispensability confers epistemicjustification fail for parallel reasons. The chapter concludes that deliberative indispensability does not provide epistemicjustification. (shrink)

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So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure ofjustification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; (...) in particular we give an example in which the effect occurs in a larger domain, according to Shogenjijustification, than Carnap’s measure of confirmation would have led one to expect. (shrink)

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In the present paper we propose a system of propositional logic for reasoning aboutjustification, truthmaking, and the connection between justifiers and truthmakers. The logic ofjustification and truthmaking is developed according to the fundamental ideas introduced by Artemov. Justifiers and truthmakers are treated in a similar way, exploiting the intuition that justifiers provide epistemic grounds for propositions to be considered true, while truthmakers provide ontological grounds for propositions to be true. This system of logic is then applied (...) both for interpreting the notorious definition of knowledge as justified true belief and for advancing a new solution to Gettier counterexamples to this standard definition. (shrink)

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According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further (...) plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasiblejustification for empirical belief, and that suchjustification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp. (shrink)

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In this paper, I argue that there are two kinds of epistemicjustification: one is objective and the other, subjective. Internalists are interested in the subjective variety ofjustification. Externalists are interested in the objective notion ofjustification. A paper by Stewart Cohen fails to distinguish these two varieties of epistemicjustification and, as a result, criticizes externalists for failing to address the internalist, subjective notion of epistemicjustification. But, since that notion is not the (...) one that externallists care about, I argue that his evil demon example fails to be a counterexample against externalists. (shrink)

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Prior to engaging in the process of fully realizing the notion of speculative philosophy in Hegelrsquo;s system, the thinker must arrive at the appropriate reflective standpoint via two preliminary justificatory cycles. This paper examines the phenomenological and logical cycles ofjustification undertaken respectively in the emPhenomenology of Spirit/em and the Doctrines of Being and Essence of the emScience of Logic/em in order to offer an account of the meaning and demands of speculativejustification. We argue that as enactments (...) of the self-determination characterizing speculative thinking, these justificatory cycles must be understood in terms of the role and position that the thinker occupies in Science. (shrink)

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Rainer Forst’s constructivism argues that a right tojustification provides a reasonably non-rejectable foundation of justice. With an exemplary focus on his attempt to ground human rights, I argue that this right cannot provide such a foundation. To accord to others such a right is to include them in the scope of discursive respect. But it is reasonably contested whether we should accord to others equal discursive respect. It follows that Forst’s constructivism cannot ground human rights, or justice, categorically. (...) At best, it can ground them hypothetically. This opens the door wide for ethical foundations of human rights. (shrink)

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In this essay, I present two thought experiments that respectively cast doubt on the adequacy of the coherentist and the reliabilist approaches to epistemicjustification. Next, I propose an account of justified belief that accommodates coherentist and reliabilist intuitions and avoids both difficulties. Finally, I test this account by measuring its verdicts against my intuitions concerning wishful thinking and induction and answer three objections to this account.

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The aim of this paper is to shed light on Leibniz’sjustification of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It approaches this issue through a close textual analysis of the correspondence with Samuel Clarke and a more abstruse and lesser-known writing, ‘Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream’.

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This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Schopenhauerian Challenge “Justification” The Extension of “Aesthetic Phenomenon” The Aestheticization of Suffering Concluding Remarks: The Ethics of AestheticJustification.

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This thesis aims to answer this question: What role is morality to play in life? The answer is an inclusive view of the right life: segments of a right life is either morally justified or justified to oneself. The thesis begins with one of Bernard Williams' argument against morality, appearing in his often misunderstood article "Moral Luck." According to my interpretation, Williams' argument against the supreme authority of morality invokes a rather unfamiliar normative notion, i.e., the notion of self-justification: (...) a morally offensive choice can be justified, overall speaking, by virtue of the fact that the agent is able to justify it to himself. Williams implies that an agent's self-justification carries normative weight with us in the sense that it not just expresses the agent's own attitude toward herself but also has the power to compel our overall attitude toward her. The argument hinges upon a plausible account of self-justification, which is to answer what counts as a self-justification and why it carries any normative weight with us. ;To complete Williams' argument against morality's supreme role in life, I discuss his analysis of two particular cases of self-evaluation: the cases of Gauguin and Anna Karenina. Then, I develop a general conception of self-justification, which takes an agent's self-justification as a result of an authentic way of living. In this conception, an agent can justify a choice to herself if and only if the agent can affirm the choice in light of a personal ideal which she creates and highly confirms, i.e., an ideal expressive of her true self. Thus, an agent who attains self-justification lives up to his true self, or put differently, leads an authentic way of life. ;As to the role of morality in life, my conclusion is that morality does not have supreme authority, but rather should be complemented by each individual's striving for authenticity. In a word, the right life is sought in the interplay between authenticity and morality. (shrink)

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Does John Henri Newman also suffer from the ‘anti-trinitarian fearfulness’ Karl Rahner sees as a characteristic feature of western theology? Rahner refers with that disqualification to a tendency in theology to prefer the gifts of the Spirit to the gift of the Spirit and to the metaphorical interpretation of texts about indwelling. Two texts by Newman are analysed: a Pentecost sermon on indwelling and his Lectures onJustification. In the sermon there is no sign of that anti-trinitarian fearfulness. But (...) since that sermon could be viewed as an occasional piece, the more wide ranging Lectures are also analysed. In these Lectures Newman argues that both the protestant and catholic theologians are too quickly satisfied in their discussions ofjustification, since they are pointing either to faith or to spiritual renovation, since they take not into consideration the basis of both faith and renovation: the presence of the Spirit. Moreover, he argues explicitly for a literal understanding of the biblical text about indwelling. Newman is often seen as the invisible peritus of the Second Vatican Council. On the basis of the texts analysed one can argue that he can be considered a forerunner for the current renaissance of the theology of the Trinity as well, be it that more research needs to be done to give this conclusion a broader basis. (shrink)

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According to an epistemically optimistic view of empathy – understood as the simulation of another person’s state – agents learn (1) in which state the target is and (2) what it is like for her to be in this state. Assuming the necessity ofjustification for knowledge, this view faces the challenge of how imagination can justify beliefs. Constraining simulation to match the target’s state seems to be a solution. Because of the abundance of plausible psychological reactions towards a (...) specific situation, however, we need to know how the target reacts in order to simulate the correct mental state. According to narrativists, we gain this knowledge by means of testimony, which makes simulation superfluous. For those who accept that (2) has epistemic value, the paper presents a solution to the problem ofjustification that assigns a central role to both testimony and imagination. (shrink)

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Abstract: In this article the author develops the view, held by some, that political constructivism is best interpreted as a pragmatic enterprise aiming to solve political problems. He argues that this interpretation's structure ofjustification is best conceived in terms of two separate investigations—one develops a normative solution to a particular political problem by working up into a coherent whole certain moral conceptions of persons and society; and the other is an empirically based analysis of the political problem. The (...) author argues that the empirically based analysis can generate criteria for assessing whether the normative theory successfully works out a solution, thereby developing a functionalist structure ofjustification. He further argues that this interpretation overcomes a longstanding criticism of constructivism, namely, that the use of substantive moral concepts in the hypothetical choice procedure biases the defense of principles in a particular direction and therefore begs important philosophical questions. (shrink)

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In his recent work, Jürgen Habermas signals the abandonment of his earlier claims to justify human rights and universalist morality. This paper explains the above shift, arguing that it is the inescapable result of his attempts in recent years to accommodate pluralism. The paper demonstrates how Habermas’s universal pragmaticjustification of modern normative standards was inextricably tied to his consensus theory of validity. He was compelled by the structure of that argument to count on the current or future availability (...) of a unified framework within which all can potentially articulate their needs and interests. With his abandonment of thejustification Habermas has rid discourse theory of this controversial assumption. In weakening its defense of human rights and universalist morality against the charge of ethnocentrism, he has strengthened his theory’s foothold in the lived pluralist world. Key Words: argumentation • ethnocentrism • Habermas • human rights •justification • legitimacy • pluralism • rational consensus • Rehg. (shrink)

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Many studies written about the Jewish-Christian relationship are primarily historical overviews that focus on the Jewish background of Christianity, the separation of Christianity from Judiasm, or the medieval disputations between the two faiths. This book is one of the first studies to examine the relationship from a philosophical and theological viewpoint. Carefully drawing on Jewish classical sources, Novak argues that there is actualjustification for the new relationship between Judaism and Christianity from within Jewish religious tradition. He demonstrates that (...) this new relationship is possible between religiously committed Jews and Christians without the two major impediments to dialogue: triumphalism and relativism. One of the very few books on this topic written by a Jewish theologian who speaks specifically to modern Christian concerns, it will provide the groundwork for a more serious development of Jewish-Christian dialogue in our day. (shrink)

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The article discusses the status and role of politics — in its various facets — in the pragmatic sociology of critique. We focus on a number of different dimensions of politics — politics-as-justification, politics-as-distribution, politics-as-constitution, and politics-as-defiance — that can said to be of importance for a pragmatic sociology of critique, but that have not all been taken up equally in this approach. We situate pragmatic sociology in a tradition of thought that views politics as emerging in the settlement (...) of disputes over differences without resorting to violence. However, we argue that pragmatic sociology tends to ignore questions of the constitution of politics, and suggest that one way of bringing the foundational aspect upfront is by conceptualizing and studying defiance, including forms of explicit (dissent) and implicit critique (resistance) of the existing order. (shrink)

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Among psychiatric conditions, delusions have received significant attention in the philosophical literature. This is partly due to the fact that many delusions are bizarre, and their contents interesting in and of themselves. But the disproportionate attention is also due to the notion that by studying what happens when perception, cognition, and belief go wrong, we can better understand what happens when these go right. In this paper, I attend to delusions for the second reason—by evaluating the epistemology of delusions, we (...) can better understand the epistemology of ordinary belief. More specifically, given recent advancements in our understanding of how delusions are formed, the epistemology of delusions motivates a proper functionalist account of thejustification of belief. Proper functionalist accounts of thejustification of belief hold that whether a belief is justified is partly determined by whether the system that produces the belief is functioning properly. Whatever pathology is responsible for delusion formation, restoring it to its proper function resolves the epistemic condition, an effect which motivates proper functionalism. (shrink)

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In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-basedjustification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose thisjustification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-basedjustification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-basedjustification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easyjustification problems.

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This paper examines the philosophicaljustification for World Rugby’s ban of trans women athletes from the ‘Women’s’ category at elite level. It is argued that Pike’s lexical priority argument in support of this ban is flawed; that Burke’s partially concessive response to Pike leads Burke to endorse an incoherent position; and that by rejecting Pike’s lexical priority argument, Burke’s view can both be made consistent and can be defended against the two criticisms levelled to it by Imbrišević. A stronger (...)justification for WR’s ban is identified and discussed, and a diagnosis for the debate’s intractability is proposed. (shrink)

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English summary: This ambitious study proposes an analysis of intuition that will allow us to understand it cognitive role in thejustification of our beliefs and philosophical and mathematical reasoning. The book first demonstrates that the cognitive function of intuition passes through a semiotic system before situating the semantic treatment of intuition in the context of classic problems in philosophy, logic, and mathematics. French description: Proposer une symptomatique de l'intuition nous permettant de comprendre son fonctionnement cognitif dans la (...) class='Hi'>justification de nos croyances et de nos raisonnements philosophiques et mathematiques, tel est le defi releve dans ce livre. La premiere partie montre que la fonction cognitive de l'intuition dans la comprehension et lajustification passe par l'utilisation d'un systeme semiotique. Un tel systeme est utilise intuitivement si, dans une action situee, les aspects significatifs et representatifs sont interdependants. Une demande de legitimation de ce qui est represente ne se place pas au meme niveau de reflexion que celui de l'intuition. Qu'elle puisse etre a la fois evidente et faillible n'a des lors rien de paradoxal. La deuxieme partie montre qu'envisager l'intuition dans une symptomatologie ne nous eloigne pas de la tradition philosophique. Au contraire, le traitement semantique de la question de l'intuition eclaire certains problemes classiques en philosophie, en logique et en mathematiques; et il permet de relire a nouveaux frais aussi bien Aristote, Descartes ou Kant, que Helmholtz, Poincare, Brouwer, Weyl, Beth et Cavailles. (shrink)

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The general theme of this article is the actual practice of how definitions are justified and formulated in mathematics. The theoretical insights of this article are based on a case study of topological definitions of chaos. After introducing this case study, I identify the three kinds ofjustification which are important for topological definitions of chaos: natural-world-justification, condition-justification and redundancy-justification. To my knowledge, the latter two have not been identified before. I argue that these three kinds (...) ofjustification are widespread in mathematics. After that, I first discuss the state of the art in the literature about thejustification of definitions in the light of actual mathematical practice. I then go on to criticize Lakatos’s account of proof-generated definitions—the main account in the literature on this issue—as being limited and also misguided: as for topological definitions of chaos, in nearly all mathematical fields various kinds ofjustification are found and are also reasonable. (shrink)

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The paper relates evidence andjustification logics, both philosophically and technically. On the philosophical side, it is suggested that the difference between the approaches to evidence in the two families of logics can be explained as a result of their focusing on two different notions of support provided by evidence. On the technical side, ajustification logic with operators pertaining to both kinds of support is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a special class of (...) awareness models. In addition, a realization theorem with respect to K is shown to hold for the logic. (shrink)

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We will be in a better position to evaluate some important skeptical theses if we first investigate two questions about justified suspended judgment. One question is this: when, if ever, does one justified suspension conferjustification on another suspension? and the other is this: what is the structure of justified suspension? the goal of this essay is to make headway at answering these questions. After surveying the four main views about the non-normative nature of suspended judgment and offering a (...) taxonomy of the epistemic principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified, I will isolate five important principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified. I will call these suspension-to-suspension principles. I will then evaluate these principles by the lights of each of the four views about what suspensions are. I close by drawing some conclusions about the prospects for skepticism, the structure of justified suspended judgment, and the importance of theorizing about justified suspended judgment. (shrink)

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Ethicists of care have objected to traditional moral philosophy's reliance upon abstract universal principles. They claim that the use of abstraction renders traditional theories incapable of capturing morally relevant, particular features of situations. I argue that this objection sometimes conflates two different levels of moral thinking: the level ofjustification and the level of deliberation. Specifically, I claim that abstraction or attention to context at the level ofjustification does not entail, as some critics seem to think, a (...) commitment to abstraction or attention to context at the level of deliberation. It follows that critics who reject a theory's use of abstraction at the level ofjustification have not shown that the theory recommends abstraction at the level of deliberation and that it, therefore, compels the deliberating agent to overlook morally salient details. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 562-564 [Access article in PDF] Louis E. Loeb. Stability andJustification in Hume's Treatise. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi + 280. Cloth, $42.50. As is well known, in the last year of his life, Hume repudiated his Treatise of Human Nature in an Advertisement that he had placed at the front of the volume of his writings (...) containing his mature philosophical works. He asked that only the two Enquiries and other later philosophical writings be regarded as the source of "his philosophical sentiments and principles." But not leaving it at that, he admitted that there were "negligences in his... reasoning" and in his manner of expressing himself in the Treatise. More than twenty years earlier, Hume had admitted that publishing the Treatise in its imperfect state in his youth constituted "a very great Mistake in Conduct." But he did not have sufficient foresight to see that the admission he made in his old age constituted at least as bad an indiscretion of the same kind. Acknowledging mistakes in reasoning and in expression for a philosopher [End Page 562] is like waving a red flag in front of a bull. Two bulls in fact: the philosopher and the "reconstructive" historian of philosophy. The former is given ample work in correcting the older philosopher's mistakes; the latter in devising an interpretation of a text that apparently leaves itself open to many. Hence the immense popularity that Hume's Treatise of Human Nature has enjoyed in the two and a half centuries since he asked that it be disregarded. Who cares about "his philosophical sentiments and principles" anyway?Louis Loeb's study of epistemology in Hume's Treatise is both an exercise in "reconstructive history of philosophy" and a philosophical emendation of Hume's (reconstructed) "philosophical system." The first task is pursued in the first five chapters of the book; the second in the last two. "Reconstructive history" as practiced by Loeb does not try to provide "a balanced commentary" but rather "an illuminating and fruitful interpretive perspective" (viii) on what a philosopher has written. Loeb's perspective on Hume's epistemology is derived from details of Hume's psychology of the imagination developed mainly in sections 9-13 of part 3 of book 1, details which Hume himself considered "unnecessary" to the exposition of his mature epistemology in the first Enquiry. Loeb's philosophical emendations derive from his claim that Hume made certain mistakes which led him to despair of the success of his project and settle for sceptical conclusions in part 4. In the last two chapters of the book Loeb seeks to save Hume from his own sceptical conclusions.Loeb regards his account as a development and correction of the kind of naturalistic interpretation of Hume's epistemology that was originally developed by Norman Kemp Smith (21). A naturalistic theory ofjustification, according to Loeb, is one that grounds beliefs that one already considers to be justified in the psychological mechanisms that generate them. Whereas Kemp Smith argued thatjustification depends on the "irresistibility" or "inevitability" of the beliefs, Loeb holds thatjustification depends upon what he calls the "stability" of the belief generating mechanisms. A belief forming mechanism is stable just in case it produces a consistent set of beliefs that will stand up even under "reflection." For example, in part 3 of book 1 (81, 159, 238), Hume presents beliefs based on cause and effect as stable in this sense, and contrasts them with "unphilosophical" belief forming mechanisms such as indoctrination (education). Unlike the former, the latter mechanism generates beliefs that "are frequently contrary... to themselves in different times and places and is never on that account recognized by philosophers" (Treatise117). Furthermore, we have a positive motivation to accept stable mechanisms in that they produce ease or relief from psychological tension. Loeb links this goal both with the ancient Pyrrhonian quest for ataraxia (6-9) and with Hume's moral theory, where he seeks a general point of view as a relief from... (shrink)

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It is often claimed that science should be "value-free in that ethical, political, and social values have no legitimate role in thejustification of scientific theories. Although such values may influence which hypotheses are pursued, or whether some application of scientific theories is desirable, they play no legitimate role in scientific reasoning. ;I argue against the view that all science ought to be value-free. Examining a range of cases from biology, epidemiology, pathology, and atmospheric sciences I show that ethical (...) and political values can operate in cases widely agreed to be "good science." Drawing on recent work by Helen Longino and Phillip Kitcher, I argue that in many research contexts the goals of scientific research cannot be separated from ethical and political interests. As a result, there are at least four ways ethical and political value judgments can play a legitimate role in thejustification of scientific theories. First, in certain research contexts, ethical and political values help justify and apply criteria for theory choice . Second, ethical and political aims of inquiry can give scientists reason to adopt conceptual frameworks that contain ethical or political normative content. In these contexts, ethical and political value judgments play a legitimate role as auxiliary hypotheses in generating evidential relations. Third, when scientific research has implications for public policy, scientists must weigh ethical values in determining which risks are "acceptable" in classifying data. Finally, ethical and political considerations can be relevant to evaluating whether an interpretation of data is biased. ;A consequence of my view is that, in some contexts, "value-free" science is not only impossible, but also epistemologically irresponsible. Good science will sometimes require scientists to weigh the ethical and political values at stake in their research. As a result, scientists should be trained to think critically about the ethical and political dimensions of their work. (shrink)

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?Hegel? and?human rights? are rarely conjoined, and the designation?human rights? appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its (...) value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant?s Critical methodology and explicating the social character of rationaljustification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right tojustification - both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rationaljustification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of Hegel?s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rationaljustification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning. nema. (shrink)

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Responding to the paradox of inference and the related problems in philosophy of logic, this paper argues for the necessity of distinguishing between two different objects ofjustification: logica utens and logica docens. Then, equipped with Peirce’s critical common-sensist conception of logica utens and his classification of sciences, I propose a diagnosis of and a solution to the problem ofjustification of logic. I argue that this alternative approach successfully avoids circularity in which most attempts in philosophy of (...) logic have been inescapably trapped. I also anticipate and respond to possible objections to taking a Peircean turn in justifying logic. (shrink)

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This article has three interrelated aims. The first is to analyze the concept of grief; the second is to argue for the putative rationality of grief (against Donald Gustafson’s contention to the contrary); and the third is to offer a moraljustification of grief along broadly Aristotelian lines as an intrinsically valuable trait of character—a virtue. With regard to this third and ultimate aim, I argue not only that grief plays an unappreciated positive role in our moral experiences but (...) flesh out a case for what exactly that positive moral role is. More precisely, I argue that grief is best justified as an Aristotelian desert-based emotional trait, incorporating two distinct desert-motivated desires, one specifically directed at the memory of the dead person as deserving of homage, the other more cosmically focusing on the general undeservingness of good people passing away. The argument goes against the grain of most previous instrumental justifications of grief and palpably violates David Konstan’s contention that grief involves “no reference to desert.”. (shrink)

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Basing its understanding on the two uses of the notion of violence in Honneth’s theory of recognition, this paper aims at developing a framework for the analysis of the thesis of the moraljustification of political violence, whenever forms of political violence can be defined as legitimate struggles of recognition. Its contention is that the requalification of some forms of collective violence as recognition conflicts makes it possible to establish a hierarchy ofjustification for forms of violence which (...) cannot be constructed through a priori criteria, but should rather be the result of a descriptive social philosophy enquiry. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is to examine the idea of metamathematical deduction in Hilbert’s program showing its dependence of epistemological notions, specially the notion of intuitive knowledge. It will be argued that two levels of foundations of deduction can be found in the last stages (in the 1920s) of Hilbert’s Program. The first level is related to the reduction – in a particular sense – of mathematics to formal systems, which are ‘metamathematically’ justified in terms of symbolic manipulation. The (...) second level of foundation consists in warranting epistemologically the validity of the combinatory processes underlying the symbolic manipulation in metamathematics. In this level thejustification was carried out with the aid of notions from modern epistemology, particularly the notion of intuition. Finally, some problems concerning Hilbert’s use of this notion will be shown and it will be compared with Brouwer’s. (shrink)

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“Having a moral right” in private and public debates probably is one of the most important arguments to bring some foundation to one’s claims. Within international law and politics, for example, one easily falls back on universal “human rights”, especially if neither a more subtle moral argument nor prudential reasons find a hold. But in some contrast to this agreement on the strong practical relevance of rights, both the conceptual analysis and normativejustification of rights are rather controversial in (...) moral philosophy. There is, perhaps, a consensus on a constructivist understanding of rights, that is that rights have to be constructed from a basis of more “elementary parts” of morality. There is no agreement, however, on the exact character of these parts and their normative import within an overall construction of rights. It seems to be clear somehow that rights have to secure and promote interests — of a human and animal kind. Not so clear is the kind of foundation rights can be given within the sphere of interests, especially if this is understood in a reductive sense. Nevertheless, because the function of rights is to secure interests, the construction of rights from an understanding of interests seems to suggest itself. It is in the interest of all beings to have their interests secured and furthered by rights. Therefore, an “interest theory of rights” provides itself as a primary option — meaning thereby the justificatory, and not the directive side of rights. (shrink)

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