Movatterモバイル変換

The just-war framework neatly distinguishes between jus adbellum, the criteria that address political leaders’ decisions for waging war, and jus in bello, the criteria that address soldiers’ condu...

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

In the preface of the 2006 edition ofJust and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, “measures short of war,” such as imposing no-fly zones, pinpoint air/missile strikes, and CIA operations, and on the other, “actual warfare,” typified by a ground invasion or a large-scale bombing campaign. Even if the former are, technically speaking, acts of war according to international law, he proffers that “it is common sense to recognize that they are very different (...) from war.” While they all involve “the use of force,” Walzer distinguishes between the level of force used: the former, being more limited in scope, lack the “unpredictable and often catastrophic consequences” of a “full-scale attack.” Walzer calls the ethical framework governing these measuresjus ad vim, and he applies it to state-sponsored uses of force against both state and nonstate actors outside a state's territory that fall short of the quantum and duration associated with traditional warfare. Compared to acts of war,jus ad vimactions present diminished risk to one's own troops, have a destructive outcome that is more predictable and smaller in scale, severely curtail the risk of civilian casualties, and entail a lower economic and military burden. These factors makejus ad vimactions nominally easier for statesmen to justify compared to conventional warfare, though this does not necessarily mean these actions are morally legitimate or that they do not have potentially nefarious consequences. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   20 citations  

In its classic form the doctrine of the just war, whether enunciated by theological or secular theorists, had two main components: the jus adbellum, which defined the morally acceptable limits within which a sovereign could and even should go to war, and the jus in bello, which set limits to the conduct of war. By contrast, today the problem of just limitation of war is addressed almost entirely by legal and theoretical attempts to refine the jus in bello, (...) while there exists only a morally truncated and politically ineffective jus adbellum. What is the contemporary status of the jus adbellum and what makes it politically and morally inadequate are the issues I wish to address directly in this paper. Indirectly, however, I wish to speak to more fundamental questions: what are the ingredients of a moral doctrine limiting resort to war, and what is required for this to be politically workable as well? The final goal, which is far beyond the scope of this paper, is to reconstruct for our own time a doctrine on the just limitation of war which would restore the dual thrust of just war doctrine in its classic form. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and what challenges (...) such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus adbellum conditions. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

In this article, we focus on the scholarly and policy debate on autonomous weapon systems and particularly on the objections to the use of these weapons which rest on jus adbellum principles of proportionality and last resort. Both objections rest on the idea that AWS may increase the incidence of war by reducing the costs for going to war or by providing a propagandistic value. We argue that whilst these objections offer pressing concerns in their own right, they (...) suffer from important limitations: they overlook the difficulties of calculating adbellum proportionality; confuse the concept of proportionality of effects with the precision of weapon systems; disregard the ever-changing nature of war and of its ethical implications; mistake the moral obligation imposed by the principle of last resort with the impact that AWS may have on political decision to resort to war. Our analysis does not entail that AWS are acceptable or justifiable, but it shows that adbellum principles are not the best set of ethical principles for tackling the ethical problems raised by AWS; and that developing adequate understanding of the transformations that the use of AWS poses to the nature of war itself is a necessary, preliminary requirement to any ethical analysis of the use of these weapons. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

In this contribution, I defend the standard list of jus adbellum principles. In The Ethics of War and the Force of Law: A Modern Just War Theory, Uwe Steinhoff endorses only three principles of jus adbellum (right intention, just cause, and proportionality) and claims that the others are redundant. I argue that, although fundamentally all jus adbellum principles can be reduced to proportionality, in practice it is vital to retain the main jus ad (...) class='Hi'>bellum criteria as separate principles. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

L ’ histoire du droit de la guerre est marquée par trois temps principaux.Ainsi, de la période antique jusqu ’ au XIX e siècle se déploie la doctrine du justumbellum,visant à moraliser la guerre. Ensuite, au XIX e siècle, l ’ affirmation des souverainetésouvre la porte à la liberté d ’ user de la guerre comme instrument de politique internationale. Enfin, au terme de la Première Guerre mondiale, la volonté d ’ apporter une réponsenormative au recours à la (...) force s ’ est fait jour, donnant naissance au jus adbellum. Cetteévolution juridique fut accompagnée d ’ une évolution sémantique qui, au XXI e siècle,conduira à une curieuse inversion conceptuelle. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

In “Religion, Violence, and Human Rights: Protection of Human Rights as Justification for the Use of Armed Force,” James Johnson discusses an important dilemma for contemporary society: when should transnational military force be permitted to protect human rights? Professor Johnson uses the relatively recent doctrine of a “responsibility to protect” as the centerpiece of his paper, characterizing it as a reaction to legal concepts that emerged in the “Westphalian system.” Yet the doctrine, at least as it relates to the use (...) of military force, is not a reaction to that system but, rather, to the relatively recent system of the UN Charter, particularly its relegation to the Security Council of the exclusive authority to determine when military force should be used for purposes other than self-defense. When the Cold War ended and the Security Council failed to act to protect human rights, the doctrine was born. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

The conduct of hostilities is very bad for the environment, yet relatively little attention has been focused on environmental military ethics by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. Contemporary ecological concerns pose significant challenges to jus in bello. I begin by briefly surveying existing literature on environmental justice during wartime. While these jus in bello environmental issues have been addressed only sparsely by just war theorists, environmental jus adbellum has rarely been tackled within JWT or the (...) morality of war. In line with the theme of this special issue, I focus my discussion of war and the natural environment primarily on the jus adbellum level. I set out with the presumption against the use of force, and its possible exceptions. The principal question raised is whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war. Beyond just cause, I consider what might be a proportionate response to “environmental aggression,” or negligent harm to nature. The use of force is clearly justified in response to military attacks, against the natural environment or otherwise. Where harm to nature or its inhabitants are not caused by military aggression, just war theory criteria point in favor of responding via measures short of war. Finally, I suggest that responding by means that are not themselves harmful to nature serves to fulfill the further jus adbellum criterion of “right intention.”. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus adbellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war....

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

An examination of the applicability of conventional and revisionist just war principles to the global war on terror.

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Although jus in bello violations create transgressive acts that cause moral injury, the primary consideration in thinking about moral injury should be jus adbellum. If one is fighting in an adbellum just war, then transgressive acts can be rationalized in a way that allows for consolation. But for morally sensitive combatants engaged in an adbellum unjust war, consolation is more difficult since there is no way to justify or rationalize morally problematic deeds committed in (...) defense of an unjust cause. Morally serious combatants should consider the question of jus adbellum as they struggle to deal with moral injury, along with other values such as obedience and loyalty. Such an inquiry can produce further trauma when the justness of the war is called into question. The paper examines moral injury and justice in war, grounding the discussion in concrete examples: the Second World War, the Vietnam War, and the U.S. war in Iraq. It concludes that in a democracy, ordinary citizens should demonstrate solidarity with combatants suffering moral injury, since those combatants serve in wars—even unjust wars—authorized by us and fought in our names. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element of jus adbellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict.

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

War is bad for the environment, yet the environmental ramifications of warfare have not been widely addressed by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. The law and legal scholars have paid more attention to protecting nature during armed conflict. But because the law focuses invariably on rules mitigating the conduct of hostilities rather than on objective justice of cause, environmental jus adbellum has been explored even less extensively than environmental ethics in war. Setting out with the (...) presumption against the use of force and its exceptions, this article considers whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war, at whose behest, and what might be a proportionate response to aggressive or negligent harm to nature. Force is clearly justified against military attacks. Where environmental harm is not caused by military aggression, proportionality points towards a response short of war. Full‐scale warfare will likely be counterproductive in protecting nature. This is less true if war is fought by drones destroying specific targets, or by cyber‐war, or by alternatives (or supplements) to war such as boycotts, ‘lawfare’, and ‘information/media warfare’. Responding in ways that minimize harm to nature also helps demonstrate ‘right intention’. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and what challenges (...) such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus adbellum conditions. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

According to most accounts of just war theory, jus adbellum is concerned with the morality of initiating war. This gives jus adbellum a temporal dimension, making it a set of principles that are applied to judge belligerents’ actions at the outset of a war, but that cannot be revisited after a war begins. I challenge this synchronic conception of jus adbellum by arguing that the considerations the principles of jus adbellum are meant (...) to judge can, and often do, change substantially over the course of wars. It is inappropriate to determine the adbellum justice of a war solely based on how the principles of jus adbellum are satisfied at a war’s outset. Because of the mercurial nature of war, jus adbellum principles should be applied diachronically, as moral norms that can be used to guide or to judge belligerents even after a war has been initiated. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

What one is ultimately interested in with regard to ‘just cause’ is whether a specific war, actual or potential, is justified. I call this ‘the applied question’. Answering this question requires knowing the empirical facts on the ground. However, an answer to the applied question regarding a specific war requires a prior answer to some more general questions, both descriptive and normative. These questions are: What kind of thing is a ‘just cause’ for war (an aim, an injury or wrong (...) suffered, or something different altogether)? I call this ‘the formal question’. Then there is what I call the ‘the general substantive question’. Depending on the previous answer to the formal question, the general substantive question can be formulated as: ‘Which causes are just?’ or as ‘Under what conditions is there a just cause?’ A final question, which has recently elicited increased interest, is what I call ‘the question of timing’: does the ‘just cause’ criterion only apply to the initiation of a war or also to the continuation of a war, that is, can a war that had a just cause at the beginning lose it at some point in its course (and vice versa)? I argue that a just cause is a state of affairs. Moreover, the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jus adbellum criteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied; and this account has certain theoretical and practical advantages. As regards the general substantive question, I argue that all kinds of aims can, in principle, be legitimately pursued by means of war, even aims that might sound dubious at first, like vengeance or the search for glory. Thus, the pursuit of such aims does not make the war disproportionate or deprive it of just cause. As regards the question of timing, I argue that the criteria of jus adbellum apply throughout the war, not only at the point of its initiation. While starting a war at t1 might be justified, continuing it at time t2 might be unjustified (and vice versa), and this insight does not require an addition to jus adbellum but is already contained in it. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

ABSTRACTThis article provides a normative appraisal of the law of military occupation by looking into occupation courts and their legitimacy. It focuses on two cornerstones of the current regulation of war: the principle of equality of belligerents, that is, the potential relevance ofjus ad bellumconsiderations on thein bellorights of occupants, and the normative force of the traditional distinction between states and non-state armed groups, specially in conflicts not of an international character. Against the currently predominant neoclassical position in just war (...) theory, it argues in favor of the moral equality of just and unjust occupants. Against the orthodox position in international law, it advocates the symmetrical treatment of states and non-state actors fighting internal armed conflicts, at least in terms of the rights they may claim on the territories under their control. It concludes by appraising the way in which this moral landscape should be translated into legal norms. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

The relationship between jus adbellum and jus in bello has been characterized differently throughout European history. There have been three main positions exemplified by Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf and Emer de Vattel. They are, first, both the cause and the conduct of warfare must be just; second, the cause must be just, but the conduct of the war is unconstrained in order to achieve the goal of peace; and, third, we must assume justice on both sides, and (...) concentrate on ensuring just conduct in armed conflict. Each attempted to distil customary practices, which they saw in some relation to Natural Law, the ultimate source of moral obligation. Customary international law now serves the function of Natural Law in that even if treatises in which it is articulated lapse the customary constraining precepts remain, and are equally obligatory. It is contended that the relationship between just war and just conduct in war during the 20th and 21st centuries has mirrored the three classic positions, and since 9/11, with the advent of new dimensions to warfare in the war against terror, the relationship is in flux. Since 9/11 there has been a growing emphasis on jus adbellum and a relative silence on the principles of jus in bello. Implicitly, there is an informal acceptance of something like Pufendorf’s position in which outlaw combatants are deemed to place themselves outside of the protection of customary law. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Traditional just war theory maintains that the two types of rules that govern justice in times of war, jus adbellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), are logically independent of one another. Call this the independence thesis. According to this thesis, a war that satisfies the adbellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello rules will be satisfied; and a war that violates the adbellum rules does not guarantee that (...) the in bello rules will be violated. A controversial implication of this is that it’s possible for soldiers to undergo acts that are instrumental in bringing about victory in an unjust war and yet do nothing morally wrong. Some authors – call them purists – claim that this cannot be correct. Participating in an unjust war is by itself morally wrong. Yitzhak Benbaji has given what is to my mind the strongest defense of the independence thesis. In this paper I critically examine Benbaji’s argument and conclude that it is not persuasive. My argument against Benbaji incorporates the concept of honor in the military. I seek to show, in part, that if the recent literature is correct concerning both the nature of honor and the importance of instilling it in soldiers, then Benbaji hasn’t given the purist a compelling reason to give up her view. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

This chapter considers how the adoption of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) may affect jus adbellum principles of warfare. In particular, it focuses on the use of AWS in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). Given the proliferation of NIAC, the development and use of AWS will most likely be attuned to this specific theater of war. As warfare waged by modernized liberal democracies (those most likely to develop and employ AWS at present) increasingly moves toward a model of individualized warfare, (...) how, if at all, will the principles by which we measure the justness of the commencement of such hostilities be affected by the introduction of AWS, and how will such hostilities stack up to current legal agreements surrounding their more traditional engagement? This chapter claims that such considerations give us reason to question the moral and legal necessity of adbellum proper authority. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

James Turner Johnson has played a pivotal role in bringing just war thinking to the fore in international relations. This has brought with it increased interest in the relationship between the just war tradition and the laws of war. Whilst Johnson maintains that the legal rules relating to the conduct of war correspond with the requirements of jus in bello, he is more critical of the legal regime relating to recourse to force and has occasionally argued in favour of the (...) superiority of just war thinking to international law in this area. This article discusses Johnson's thinking on the relationship between ethics and law on recourse to force. It begins by outlining Johnson's approach before suggesting that it is overly critical of the post-1945 order. The paper concludes by calling for reconciliation between law and ethics. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

In a recent article in this journal, Uchena Okeja, inspired by sources in African philosophy and military ethics, argued that war by agreement is the only morally justified war. The present piece is a response to Okeja's contention that agreement is both necessary and sufficient for waging war. Contrasting with Okeja, I contend that agreement is neither necessary nor sufficient for initiating a war. Regarding necessity, I contend that there may be overriding values at risk in a conflict and protecting (...) these values may require engaging in war without agreement. Further, I contend that in cases of self-defense, it is not necessary to have consensus for defending oneself from an attacker. With respect to sufficiency, I uphold that Okeja's perspective fails because his model does not provide just cause, conditions for meaningful consent, or the tools with which to avoid exclusion, elitism, and manipulation in deliberative settings. I conclude that Okeja's arguments are indeed valuable and provide inspirational ideas for how to avoid war, but overall, they do not hold up as a full-fledged theory. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

This paper raises some questions about Biggar’s accounts of the just cause and proportionality criteria for a just war. With respect to just cause, it argues that Biggar is committed to a broader range of justifications for war than one might think. Regarding proportionality, it claims that his account thereof invites reflection on the morality of conscription, and, more important still, given the book’s main aim—to refute Christian pacifism—in fact should lead him to embrace pacifism.

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

In this paper I focus on duties we owe refugees from conflict zones. I argue that it is important to distinguish between two types of duties one might have with respect to refugees from conflict zones. Belligerents from wars that resulted in excess numbers of refugees, I argue, have a stringent duty to remedy past harms and provide for resulting refugees. Other states have a duty to aid which is context-dependent and can be in some cases as stringent as the (...) duty to remedy past harms. I argue that making a distinction between the grounds and types of duties different actors have with respect to refugees from conflict zones has significant consequences both for just war theory, but also for practical questions about how best to discharge our duties to refugees from conflict zones. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

This article explores the issue of jus contrabellum as a particular development within just war thought. At its heart, the jus contrabellum amounts to an attempt to apply the principles of jus in bello (discrimination and proportionality) in order to negate the jus adbellum. This approach was rather prevalent throughout the Cold War era, as concerns over the prospective use of nuclear weapons facilitated an increasingly sceptical attitude towards the use of force. Whereas the (...) vast majority of just war thinkers have tended to overlook this phenomenon, James Turner Johnson has adeptly recognised the perils of jus contrabellum, and its rather disastrous implications for just war thought. In this respect, Johnson's analysis of this issue constitutes one of his most significant contributions to the tradition. However, as this article will suggest, his assessment of this approach, and consequent efforts to counter it, do not go far enough. As will be noted, the roots of the jus contrabellum can be traced to the prevailing structure of just war thought – a structure which has been consistently championed by virtually every just war thinker. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

RESUMO:Nosso objetivo no presente artigo é apresentar algumas das principais críticas dirigidas por Rousseau às ideias acerca do direito “da” e principalmente “na” guerra, tal como aparecem na obra de Hugo Grotius. Rousseau insiste para que seus leitores não esqueçam “de jeito nenhum” que ele não procura “[...] o que torna a guerra vantajosa àquele que o faz, mas o que a torna legítima.” E lembra que “[...] sempre há um custo em ser justo”, mas que isso não é motivo (...) para nos dispensarmos de sê-lo. É preciso estabelecer regras que rejam as ações empreendidas, mesmo no seio dos combates, para que se distingam as guerras das simples pilhagens. ABSTRACT:This paper presents some of Rousseau’s main criticisms of the right “of ” and, principally, “in” war, as they appear in the works of Hugo Grotius. Rousseau asks his readers not to forget, “by any means”, that he doesn’t seek to discover “[...] what makes war advantageous to those who make it, but what makes it legitimate”. He also reminds us that “[...] there is always a cost to being fair”, but that this is not a reason for us to give up being so. It is necessary to establish rules for actions undertaken, even in the middle of combat, in order to distinguish war from mere pillaging. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

The category of jus postbellum is a welcome addition to discussions of the justice of war. But, despite its handy Latin label, we will argue that it cannot be properly understood merely as a set of corollaries from jus adbellum and jus in bello. Instead, an acceptable theory of justice in the postwar period will have to draw on a broader set of normative ideas than those that have been the focus of the just war tradition. (...) In this paper, we will argue that norms of political reconciliation provide some of the resources we need to address postwar justice. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

This presentation discusses why just war theory is in need of just military preparedness (jus antebellum) as a new category of just war thinking and it articulates six principles of just military preparedness. The paper concludes that the United States fails to satisfy any of these principles and addresses how this bears on the application of jus adbellum, jus in bello, and jus postbellum norms to possible future American military interventions.

No categories

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

This paper explores Brian Orend's contribution to the just war tradition, specifically his proposed jus postbellum criteria and his idea of pre-commitment to jus in bello and jus postbellum as part of an expanded jus adbellum criterion of right intention. The latter is based on his interpretation of Kant's work: that as part of the original decision to begin a war, a state should commit itself to certain rules of conduct and appropriate war termination, (...) and if it cannot so commit, it should not continue further down the path to using force. Orend's revised right intention brings jus postbellum ?into the fold? of the just war tradition, requiring that state obligations go beyond correct conduct in war. The article argues that whatever the nature of the just cause, there is a compelling argument for committing to jus in bello and jus postbellum as part of jus adbellum right intention. The justness of the cause in the contemporary era requires strictness rather than leniency in the conduct and termination of war for a state to remain legitimate in the eyes of the world. In the context of Orend's proposals, this would require that states ?do their homework? and ?tie themselves to the mast?; this includes providing proof that the situation on the ground is understood, conducting a feasibility test on the proposed intervention and publicly identifying and committing to their obligations and responsibilities during and after war. Recognising the practical and political obstacles to adopting this idealistic revision of the just war tradition, the paper nevertheless concludes that Orend's contribution is significant and worthy of exploration: it offers a kernel of hope for counteracting pressures to lower the threshold of resort to force, delivering greater justice for the innocent victims of war and providing greater probability of durable peace post-war. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

La 4e de couv. indique : "La guerre peut-elle être juste? Peut-elle s'affubler d'un qualificatif juste sans injustice? Les récits cosmogoniques sont la merveilleuse monstration que les hommes se sont toujours fait la guerre. L'attitude belliqueuse de certains souverains et les atrocités des champs de bataille ont amené des analystes à définir des critères stricts pour limiter la souffrance humaine. Désormais, tout Etat qui n'observerait pas scrupuleusement les linéaments de cet édit risque d'être déclaré Hostis humani generis. Dans sa conception (...) traditionnelle in stricto sensu, la théorie de la guerre dite juste comporte, d'une part, le jus adbellum (droit à la guerre) ou droit de faire la guerre et, d'autre part, le jus in bello qui règlemente la conduite de la guerre. Qu'en est-il de l'après-guerre et du jus postbellum? Cet ouvrage, importante contribution au débat sur la théorie de la guerre juste, répond justement à ce questionnement.". (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Jus postBellum is, like Jus adBellum and Jus in Bello, a part of just war theory. Jus postBellum is distinguished from the other parts of just war theory by being primarily concerned with the principles necessary for securing a just and lasting peace after the end of a war. Traditionally, jus postbellum has focused primarily on three goals: [1] compensating those who have been the victims of unjust aggression, while respecting the rights (...) of the aggressors, [2] punishing and rehabilitating those guilty of war crimes and other violations of the principles of Jus adBellum and Jus in Bello and [3] developing measures that will prevent future war and violence (Orend 2000 and May 2012). In this chapter, I outline an account of political forgiveness and explain the role that political forgiveness can have in promoting the goals of jus postbellum. My conception of political forgiveness requires some unpacking. Let me begin with individual forgiveness, which I understand along familiar Butlerian lines as the renunciation of resentment (Butler, Sermon IX in McNaughton 2017: 75-83), though with a bit of a twist. More exactly, ● An individual, I, forgives J for doing F if and only if I renounces all her own warrant for resenting J for doing F. Resentment is a judgment-sensitive attitude, and, therefore, it tends to track judgments concerning its warrant (Scanlon 1998: 20 and Smith 2015). In cases of perfect forgiveness, I’s renunciation causes her to cease feeling resentment toward J for doing F, though, of course, less perfect cases are possible. I reject the idea that there is a sharp discontinuity between individual and political forgiveness, a position argued for by, e.g., Peter Digeser (1998 and 2001). By contrast, I understand political forgiveness as the renunciation of resentment by the relevant political body in question. With greater precision, ● A sovereign political body, P, forgives J for doing F if and only if P renounces all warrant that its citizens have for resenting, as part of their public lives, J for doing F. A little more explanation is in order. Sovereign political bodies, such as national governments, claim degrees of control over the lives of their citizens, in both their public and their private aspects, though the claims with respect to the former tend to be considerably more expansive than the claims with respect to the latter. I assume here that, at least in the case of legitimate governments, these claims of control are often valid. Such governments may reasonably renounce certain grounds for motivating action in the public sphere. For example, governments may renounce all warrant that its citizens have, as part of their public lives, for hating members of marginalized groups. In practice, this means that, while citizens might continue to act in their private lives out of hatred for members of these groups, their appeal to this hatred is seen by the state as irrelevant to matters of law and public policy as well as being wholly out-of-place in public discourse. Political forgiveness toward J for doing F, as I understand it, involves an analogous rejection of resentment, on the part of citizens in their public lives, toward J for doing F. I turn now to the matter of how political forgiveness supports securing a just and lasting peace between former belligerents. With respect to the first goal of jus postbellum, political forgiveness helps to balance compensation for victims and respect for the rights of defeated aggressors by countering the all-too-human tendency to overvalue harms done to oneself and to members of one’s group. As regards the second goal, political forgiveness plays a similar role but also provides a model for rehabilitation by exemplifying among the victorious the behavior to be emulated by the vanquished. Finally, political forgiveness promotes the third goal of jus postbellum by providing a space for nations to meet as moral equals rather than allowing one nation to have the moral high ground over the other. None of this, of course, means that political forgiveness should be unearned or that it should be confused with condonation (Kolnai 1973 and Pettigrove 2004). However, the question of what is required to put oneself in a position to be forgiven as part of jus postbellum is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

In this essay, I reflect on the divergent arguments about limited force made by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Samuel Moyn in their respective monographs. Arguing that their positions can be reconciled, I agree with Brunstetter that limited force has a role to play in establishing and maintaining a just world order. At the same time, however, I am mindful of Moyn's warning that limited force may lead to perpetual war. The way to ensure that limited force both works toward justice (...) and does not result in perpetual war, I argue, is to focus more on considerations of jus antebellum (right before war) and jus postbellum (right after war), the so-called “growing edges of just war theory.” I hold that the responsible use of statecraft, which just war thinking seeks to inform, accepts that limited force constitutes a legitimate tool to facilitate order, justice, and peace. However, any justifiable use of force must be restrained and limited and aim for a just peace. The embrace of limited force should thus be complemented with an effort by state leaders to bolster the edges of just war in order to facilitate a security environment that requires the use of limited force less frequently. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

The jus adbellum requirement of the probability of success can be perceived as an unjust requirement which prohibits the weaker side of a potential or actual military conflict from committing itself to organized violence, even to defend and protect its own survival. This view of the probability of success as an unjust requirement, however, need only be held if: (1) the goal of the weaker state is survival itself. In cases when (1) is true, the requirement should be (...) considered void. On the other hand, if: (2) survival is not considered an overriding factor, then the requirement stands. This paper explores the latter position using the example of the famous Melian Dialogue from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, and applies it to the question of Ukraine’s right to war and their government’s possible moral obligation to negotiate in their current defensive war against Russia. ---------------------------------------- Received: 26/04/2024. Reviewed: 12/06/2024. Accepted: 5/11/2024. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Many argue that the problems encountered in and after today’s armed conflicts demonstrate the need for norms to govern the aftermath of war. Therefore,jus post bellumis welcomed as a ‘new’ branch of just war theory, complementing the theory’s two traditional branches—jus ad bellumandjus in bello.Jus post bellumis meant to function as moral compass, offering the needed guidance in the aftermath of war. While many agree on the importance of a third branch, an important question is often overlooked: After war, how (...) should we distribute post war duties? This question deserves more attention, because uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised thatjus post bellumis in fact merely empty rhetoric. Two specific questions need answering. First: Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: How to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors? This article directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after war, using David Miller’s and H.L.A. Hart’s theories on responsibility, with an eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete situations. Only with such a system in place is there a realistic prospect thatjus post bellumfunctions as a useful tool in the creation of a just and stable peace. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

ABSTRACTThe jus adbellum criterion of right intention is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if (...) it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, wh... (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

In spite all the efforts made by pundits and policy-makers nowadays, the article intends to show how the concepts of jus in bello and jus adbellum have been misjudged and misinterpreted along its own consolidation in our juridical thought. We also believe they deserve a new approach opened by Foucault´s point of view. In doing so, the issues of sovereignty, war and peace are all reviewed before a genealogical approach which opens us a different window to access the (...) new themes of political agenda, such as responsibility to protect, non-intervention and self-determination. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Abstract Finding the western just war criterion of reasonable chance of success to be a contribution to ethical decision making about armed conflict requires dealing with a number of critiques. Specifying ?probability? rather than the alternatives ?hope? or ?chance?, and raising standards of evidence involved, makes the term less vague. Expanding the concept of ?success? to include morally defensible aims that can be achieved without military victory enriches the understanding of the moral relationship between ends and means in armed conflict. (...) Asking decision makers to accept moral responsibility for the costs of possible failure is a unique contribution to the just war criteria. The enriched concept of reasonable probability of success thus offers morally significant insights to prewar jus adbellum decisions, and can benefit ethical decision-making about whether to continue once fighting has begun. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

The traditional theory of the just war comprises two sets of principles, one governing the resort to war ( jus adbellum) and the other governing the conduct of war ( jus in bello). The two sets of principles are regarded, in Michael Walzer’s words, as “logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules.”1 Let us say that those who (...) fight in a just war are “just combatants,” while those who fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause are “unjust combatants.” (A just cause is an aim that can contribute to the justification for war and that may permissibly be pursued by means of war.)2 The most important implication of the idea that jus in bello is independent of jus adbellum is that.. (shrink)

Direct download(9 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   125 citations  

Recent just war thought has tended to prioritize just cause among the moral criteria to be satisfied for resort to armed force, reducing the requirement of sovereign authority to a secondary, supporting role: such authority is to act in response to the establishment of just cause. By contrast, Aquinas and Luther, two benchmark figures in the development of Christian thought on just war, unambiguously gave priority to the requirement of sovereign authority as instituted by God to carry out the responsibilities (...) of ensuring a just and peaceful order in the world. On this conception it is the sovereign, in deciding whether to resort to armed force, who must make sure to satisfy the other moral requirements of the jus adbellum. This paper examines Aquinas and Luther on sovereign authority for use of armed force. Recapturing the importance of this conception is important both for the proper understanding of just war tradition and for working out its implications for such contemporary issues as humanitarian intervention and "regime change.". (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

Selective conscientious objection, a refusal to participate in a specific war due to reasons of conscience, has recently gained attention. A combatant confronted with such a decision needs guidance to help decide whether and how to object. Furthermore, those judging a combatant’s objection or failure to object need guidance. After introducing the prima facie duty override criteria, I will apply the criteria to the case of selective conscientious objection. Ultimately, I argue that the jus adbellum criteria rebranded as (...) the prima facie duty override criteria can help provide guidance regarding selective conscientious objection. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Much work in the ethics of war is structured around the distinction between jus adbellum and jus in bello. This distinction has two key roles. It distinguishes two evaluative objects—the war ‘as a whole’, and the conduct of combatants during the war—and identifies different moral principles as relevant to each. I argue that we should be sceptical of this framework. I suggest that a single set of principles determines the justness of actions that cause nonconsensual harm. If so, (...) there are no distinctive adbellum or in bello principles. I also reject the view that whilst the justness of, for example, adbellum proportionality rests on all the goods and harms produced by the war, the justness of combatants’ conduct in war is determined by a comparatively limited set of goods and harms in a way that supports the adbellum–in bello distinction. (shrink)

Export citation   Bookmark