Are viruses a source of new protein folds for organisms? – Virosphere structure space andevolution.Aare Abroi &Julian Gough -2011 -Bioessays 33 (8):626-635.detailsA crucially important part of the biosphere – the virosphere – is too often overlooked. Inclusion of the virosphere into the global picture of protein structure space reveals that 63 protein domain superfamilies in viruses do not have any structural and evolutionary relatives in modern cellular organisms. More than half of these have functions which are not virus‐specific and thus might be a source of new folds and functions for cellular life. The number of viruses on the planet exceeds that (...) of cells by an order of magnitude and viruses evolve up to six orders of magnitude faster. As a result, cellular species are subject to a constitutive ‘flow‐through’ of new viral genetic material. Due to this and the relaxed evolutionary constraints in viruses, the transfer of domains between host‐to‐virus could be a mechanism for accelerated proteinevolution. The virosphere could be an engine for the genesis of protein structures, and may even have been so before the last universal common ancestor of cellular life. (shrink)
Biological and culturalevolution: Similar but different.Alex Mesoudi -2007 -Biological Theory 2 (2):119-123.detailsEver since The Origin of Species, but increasingly in recent years, parallels and analogies have been drawn between biological and culturalevolution, and methods, concepts, and theories that have been developed in evolutionary biology have been used to explain aspects of human cultural change (e.g., Muller 1870; Darwin [1871] 2003; Pitt-Rivers 1875; James 1880; Huxley 1955; Gerard et al. 1956; Campbell 1975; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Durham 1992; Henrich and McElreath 2003; Mesoudi et al. 2004, 2006; Boyd and Richerson (...) 2005; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Many others, however, while accepting the need for some form of evolutionary approach to culture, have consistently emphasized the differences between biological and culturalevolution (e.g., Gabora 2004; Sperber and Claidiere 2006; Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007), with these differences often presented as being problematic for existing evolutionary analyses of culture. Here I argue that this is largely a false debate, given that its protagonists agree on the majority of key points. Apparent disagreement may stem partly from simple differences in emphasis, and partly from the diversity of both biological and cultural evolutionary processes. (shrink)
Massive Redeployment and theEvolution of Cognition.Michael L. Anderson -unknowndetailsPart of understanding the functional organization of the brain is understanding how it evolved. This talk presents evidence suggesting that while the brain may have originally emerged as an organ with functionally dedicated regions, the creative re-use of these regions has played a significant role in its evolutionary development. This would parallel theevolution of other capabilities wherein existing structures, evolved for other purposes, are re-used and built upon in the course of continuing evolutionary development (“exaptation”: Gould & Vrba (...) 1982). There is psychological support for exaptation in cognition (e.g. Cosmides 1989), theoretical reason to expect it (Anderson 2003; in press-a; in press-b) and neuroanatomic evidence that the brain evolved by preserving, extending, and combining existing network components, rather than by generating complex structures de novo (Sporns & Kötter 2004). However, there has been little evidence that integrates these perspectives, bringing such an account of theevolution of cognitive function into the realm of cognitive neuroscience (although see, e.g., Barsalou 1999). (shrink)
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The significance of non-vertical transmission of phenotype for theevolution of altruism.Scott Woodcock -2006 -Biology and Philosophy 21 (2):213-234.detailsMy aim in this paper is to demonstrate that a very simple learning rule based on imitation can help to sustain altruism as a culturally transmitted pattern or behaviour among agents playing a standard prisoner’s dilemma game. The point of this demonstration is not to prove that imitation is single-handedly responsible for existing levels of altruism (a thesis that is false), nor is the point to show that imitation is an important factor in explanations for theevolution of altruism (...) (a thesis already prominent in the existing literature). The point is to show that imitation contributes to theevolution of altruism in a particular way that is not always fairly represented by evolutionary game theory models. Specifically, the paper uses a simple model to illustrate that cultural transmission includes mechanisms that do not transmit phenotype vertically (i.e. from parent to related offspring) and that these mechanisms can promote altruism in the absence of any direct biological propensity favouring such behaviour. This is a noteworthy result because it shows that evolutionary models can be built to explicitly reflect the contribution of non-vertical transmission in our explanations for theevolution of altruism among humans and other social species. (shrink)
The (spatial)evolution of the equal split.Jason Alexander &Brian Skyrms -unknowndetailsThe replicator dynamics have been used to study theevolution of a population of rational agents playing the Nash bargaining game, where an individual's "fitness" is determined by an individual's success in playing the game. In these models, a population whose initial conditions was randomly chosen from the space of population proportions converges to a state of fair division approximately 62% of the time. (Higher rates of convergence to final states of fair division can be obtained by introducing artificial (...) correlations into the models.) Spatial models of the Nash bargaining game exhibit considerably more robust convergence properties. These properties are considered at length, and a sufficient condition for convergence to fair division is proved. (shrink)
Theevolution of skeletal muscle performance: gene duplication and divergence of human sarcomeric α‐actinins.Monkol Lek,Kate Gr Quinlan &Kathryn N. North -2010 -Bioessays 32 (1):17-25.detailsIn humans, there are two skeletal muscle α‐actinins, encoded by ACTN2 and ACTN3, and the ACTN3 genotype is associated with human athletic performance. Remarkably, approximately 1 billion people worldwide are deficient in α‐actinin‐3 due to the common ACTN3 R577X polymorphism. The α‐actinins are an ancient family of actin‐binding proteins with structural, signalling and metabolic functions. The skeletal muscle α‐actinins diverged ∼250–300 million years ago, and ACTN3 has since developed restricted expression in fast muscle fibres. Despite ACTN2 and ACTN3 retaining considerable (...) sequence similarity, it is likely that following duplication there was a divergence in function explaining why α‐actinin‐2 cannot completely compensate for the absence of α‐actinin‐3. This paper focuses on the role of skeletal muscle α‐actinins, and how possible changes in functions between these duplicates fit in the context of gene duplication paradigms. (shrink)
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TheEvolution of Science: Reformation and Counter-Reformation.Stefan Amsterdamski -1975 -Diogenes 23 (89):21-43.detailsThe remarks which follow deal with the ideas which I developed in more detail in my book: between Experience and Metaphysics. They are inspired principally by the vigorous polemic aroused by the publication several years ago of a work which caused a great uproar in epistemological circles; I am speaking of The Structure of Scientific Revolution by T.S. Kuhn. One could thus consider this essay, as well as my book, as an element to be added to that polemic's dossier. It (...) goes without saying that I am indebted to a great number of those who before me have given their points of view on the question, whether I agree with their opinions or not. (shrink)
Evolution, cognition and argumentation.Cristian Santibanez Yanez &Michael A. Gilbert -unknowndetailsSperber and Mercier maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the flow of information between interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss this definition of argumen-tation by analyzing what they mean by “communicator’s persuasiveness” and “audience epistemic vigilance”.
Evolution of early development of the nervous system: a comparison between arthropods.Angelika Stollewerk &Pat Simpson -2005 -Bioessays 27 (9):874-883.detailsLarge numbers of cells with unique neuronal specificity are generated during development of the central nervous system of animals. Here we discuss the events that generate cell diversity during early development of the ventral nerve cord of different arthropod groups. Neural precursors are generated in a spatial array in the epithelium of each hemisegment over a period of time. Spatial cues within the epithelium are thought to evolve as embryogenesis proceeds. This spatiotemporal information might generate diversity among the neural precursors (...) in all arthropod groups, although the mechanisms regulating the positioning of individual precursors have diverged. However, distinct strategies for the generation of neuronal diversity have evolved in the different arthropod lineages that appear to correlate with specific modes of ontogenesis. We hypothesize that an evolutionary trend towards reduced cell numbers and possibly rapid embryogenesis in insects has culminated in the appearance of stereotyped neuroblast lineages. BioEssays 27:874–883, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)
Evolution and revolution in theories of legal reasoning: nineteenth century through the present.Scott Brewer (ed.) -1998 - New York: Garland.detailsThis new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.Explores enduring questionsFocusing ...
Evolution and Religion.John Hedley Brooke -2014 - In W. J. Mander,The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.detailsThis essay examines the impact of evolutionary theory on religious thinking in Victorian Britain. Four cultural shifts are identified that were associated with Darwin’s scientific achievement and its implications. One was the deepening of divisions concerning how scientific knowledge and religious beliefs were best related. Another was a difficult adjustment to the continuity between animals and humans that Darwin’s theory of “descent with modification” enshrined. A third was the eventual elimination from technical scientific literature of references to a Creator, and (...) a fourth was the attenuation of apologetic literature that purported to harmonise biblical exegesis with the latest science. Specific theological issues are then examined in greater depth. These include the doctrines of imago dei and of the ‘fall’, the problem of suffering, and revisions to traditional conceptions of the deity. Contrary to popular accounts of the Darwinian debates, the diversity of the religious response is emphasised. (shrink)
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Evolution, knowledge and revelation.Stewart Andrew McDowall -1924 - New York,: The Macmillan company.detailsThis is a new release of the original 1924 edition.
TheEvolution of Death: Why We Are Living Longer.Stanley Shostak -2006 - State University of New York Press.detailsArgues that death is not unchanging, but rather has evolved over time.
Theevolution of morality and its rollback.Brian Garvey -2018 -History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40 (2):26.detailsAccording to most Evolutionary Psychologists, human moral attitudes are rooted in cognitive modules that evolved in the Stone Age to solve problems of social interaction. A crucial component of their view is that such cognitive modules remain unchanged since the Stone Age, and I question that here. I appeal to evolutionary rollback, the phenomenon where an organ becomes non-functional and eventually atrophies or disappears—e.g. cave-dwelling fish losing their eyes. I argue that even if cognitive modules evolved in the Stone Age (...) to solve problems of social interaction, conditions since then have favoured rollback of those modules. This is because there are institutions that solve those problems—e.g. legal systems. Moreover, evidence suggests that where external resources are available to perform cognitive tasks, humans often use them instead of internal ones. In arguing that Stone Age cognitive modules are unchanged, Evolutionary Psychologists say that evolutionary change is necessarily slow, and that there is high genetic similarity between human populations worldwide. I counter-argue that what is necessarily slow is the building-up of complex mechanisms. Undoing this can be much quicker. Moreover, rollback of cognitive mechanisms need not require any genetic change. Finally, I argue that cross-cultural similarity in some trait need not be rooted in genetic similarity. This is not intended as decisive evidence that rollback has occurred. To finish, I suggest ways we might decide whether moral attitudes are likely to be rooted in unchanged Stone Age modules, given that I have argued that cross-cultural similarity is not enough. (shrink)