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This paper seeks to illuminate the nature ofempathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutualempathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon (...) the example of depression, I argue thatempathy is not principally a matter of ‘simulating’ another person’s experience. It is better conceived of as a perception-like exploration of others’ experiences that develops progressively through certain styles of interpersonal interaction. (shrink)

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This comment on Main and Kho’s suggestion for “a relational framework for integrating the study ofempathy in children and adults” takes a conversation analytic perspective. First, I will su...

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Some proponents of moral bioenhancement propose that people should utilize biomedical practices to enhance the faculties and traits that are associated with moral agency, such asempathy and a sense of justice. The hope is that doing so will improve our ability to meet the moral challenges that have emerged in our contemporary, globalized world. In this paper, we caution against this view by arguing that biomedically inducing moreempathy may, in fact, diminish moral agency. We argue that (...) this type of increase inempathy would not be effective for addressingempathy’s vulnerability to the biases that can undermine moral judgment. Furthermore, doing so may undermine the important capacity to regulateempathy. We determine that if the moral enhancement project is to be a serious one, it must address these challenges. (shrink)

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I WISH to defend the claim that imagining what it would be like to be in "someone else's shoes" can serve to explain that person's actions. This commonsense view has considerable plausibility, but requires clarification to be philosophically defensible; discussions of explanation often assume that understanding requires a theory of the thing understood. If understanding requires a theory, then however much imagining what it would be like to be in another person's situation might sooth one's curiosity, it cannot provide real (...) understanding. I shall argue that imagining oneself in someone else's situation does more than that: it allows actions to be explained without recourse to a theory of human behavior. The resulting explanations are real explanations, not just some reassuring facsimile thereof. (shrink)

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This paper discuss the phenomenon ofempathy in social robotics and is divided into three main parts. Initially, I analyse whether it is correct to use this concept to study and describe people’s reactions to robots. I present arguments in favour of the position that people actually do empathise with robots. I also consider what circumstances shape humanempathy with these entities. I propose that two basic classes of such factors be distinguished: biological and socio-cognitive. In my opinion, (...) one of the most important among them is a sense of group membership with robots, as it modulates the empathic responses to representatives of our- and other- groups. The sense of group membership with robots may be co-shaped by socio-cognitive factors such as one’s experience, familiarity with the robot and its history, motivation, accepted ontology, stereotypes or language. Finally, I argue in favour of the formulation of a pragmatic and normative framework for manipulations in the level ofempathy in human–robot interactions. (shrink)

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The concept ofempathy in history education involves students in the attempt to think within the context of historical agents’ particular predicaments. Tracing the concept’s philosophical heritage to R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history and ‘re-enactment doctrine’, this article argues that our efforts in history classrooms to understand historical agents by their own standards are constrained by a tension that arises out of the need to disconnect ourselves from a present that provides the very means for understanding the past. (...) Though rather than serving to undermine the concept, it is proposed that the moderate hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer, through a positive conception of prejudice, tradition and temporal distance, transforms the factors typically seen as inhibitors toempathy’s operation into those that potentially enable it. The article aspires to shed new light on what is at play when history students engage in the intellectually demanding task of empathizing in history. (shrink)

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Erick J. Ramirez, Miles Elliott and Per‑Erik Milam (2021) have recently claimed that using Virtual Reality (VR) as an educational nudge to promoteempathy is unethical. These authors argue that the influence exerted on the participant through virtual simulation is based on the deception of making them believe that they are someone else when this is impossible. This makes the use of VR forempathy enhancement a manipulative strategy in itself. In this article, we show that Ramirez et (...) al.’s ethical rejection ofempathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception ofempathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promoteempathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions. (shrink)

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후설의 생활세계 개념은 다양한 맥락에서 해석될 수 있으나 교육학적인 관점에서의 해석 또한 중요한 의미를 지닌다. 생활세계는 일상적 세계로서 우리에게 경험을 통해 직접적으로 주어지는 세계이지만 한편으로 문명화된 현대인에게는 객관주의적인 과학적 세계관에 의해 은폐되고 왜곡된 채 주어진다는 것이 후설의 설명이다. 따라서 있는 그대로의 생활세계에 접근하고 이를 바라본다는 것 자체가 일종의 태도의 변화이자 인간됨의 변화를 함축한다. 그러므로 생활세계의 주제화는 인간성의 변화 내지 일깨움을 지향하는 교육학적인 함의를 지닌다. 생활세계가 주관 연관적이고 주관성과 불가분리의 상관관계를 맺고 있다는 점에서 생활세계 교육론은 주관성의 영역별 특징에 상응해, 크게 신체적 (...) 주관, 상호주관적 주관, 보편적 주관의 세 층으로 나누어 고찰할 수 있으며, 이를 뒷받침하는 주된 개념이 후설에서는 각각 신체성, 감정이입, 그리고 자유이다. 이러한 관점에서 생활세계 교육론은 신체성, 감정이입에 근거한 감성교육의 측면과 자유를 기반으로 한 도덕교육의 두 측면으로 나뉜다. 그러나 전자는 궁극적으로 후자로 수렴된다는 것이 본 글의 시각이다. 후설의 생활세계 교육론은 곧 개별적 의식이 상호주관적, 보편적 주관성으로 변화, 승화되는 데 초점이 있으며, 보편적 윤리적 주관성의 실현을 지향하는 자유의 교육론이 후설 생활세계 교육론의 최종적 목표로 볼 수 있다. (shrink)

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In this response to Seisuke Hayakawa’s paper, “Empathy, Timeliness, and Virtuous Hearing,” I have three distinct aims: to highlight how Hayawaka’s account of virtuous hearing deepens our understanding of ethical engagement; to raise questions about how timeliness will work in certain situations; and to draw attention to a line of empirical research that may support Hayawaka’s account.

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Contemporary healthcare environments are becoming increasingly informationally demanding. This requires patients, and those supporting them, to engage with a broad range of expert knowledge. At the same time, patients must find ways to make sense of this information in the context of their own values and needs. In this article, we confront the problem of communication in our current age of complexity. We do this by focusing on a field that has already had to grapple with these issues directly: genetic (...) counseling. We articulate anempathy-based framework that provides a way to integrate the teaching and counseling models of genetic counseling. As well as being useful for those providing genetic counseling in the era of genomic medicine, this framework has the potential to address challenges of communication in healthcare settings beyond genetic counseling. Furthermore, it has important ramifications for ethical debates about autonomy and decision-making. (shrink)

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This paper argues that early phenomenologists used the concept ofempathy not only to refer to the direct perception of the other’s experiences – as underscored by contemporary proponents of the Direct Perception Theory – but also to describe – in a sense close to Lipps’s theory and contemporary Simulation Theory – how, by virtue of imagining, we “feel into” animate and inanimate objects. Focusing on this second usage of the term, two kinds of imagination-based accounts ofempathy (...) in early phenomenology are identified. According to “radical imaginationists”,empathy can be explained in terms of the series of imaginative processes entailed in the idea of “feeling into”, such as projecting oneself into the target, “imitating” its feelings, and resonating with it. Voigtländer’s account of empathizing with one’s own self in Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) and Geiger’s account ofempathy with atmospheres in “Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung” (1911) can in this sense be regarded as radical imaginationist theories. According to “moderate imaginationists”,empathy might (but need not) entail imagining. Stein’s account ofempathy with others in On the Problem ofEmpathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung) (1917/1989) as a three-step process which can involve imagination-like states is a good example of a moderate imaginationist account. (shrink)

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One important aspect of Nussbaum´s thesis on the moral value of literature concerns the power of literature to enhance our ability to empathise with other minds. This aspect will be the focus of the current article. My aim is to reflect upon this question regarding the moral value of ourempathy for fictional characters. The article is structured in two main parts. I will first examine the concept of “empathy” and distinguish betweenempathy for human beings and (...)empathy for fictional characters. I will call the latter “literaryempathy”. In the second part of the paper I will examine the arguments for and against the double thesis that reading literature enhances our ability to feelempathy, and that feelingempathy prompts altruistic behaviour. (shrink)

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Empathizing with others is thought to be a useful, if not necessary, skill for a wise person to possess. Beyond this general conceptual assonance, however, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize this relationship. This paper aims to address this issue by investigating what roleempathy is said to play inphronesisand whether there is a legitimate place for it in Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) accounts of practical wisdom. First, after a brief overview of Aristotle’s account ofphronesis, I will try (...) to define three different ways in whichempathy is thought to contribute to it according to the existing literature, based on a conceptual distinction between affectiveempathy, cognitiveempathy, and sympathy. Second, I will ask whetherempathy is the best conceptual candidate for Aristotle’s account ofphronesisand, more generally, whether the wise person should always rely onempathy in order to deliberate and act well. My tentative answer will be thatempathy does not seem to be perfectly compatible with the concept ofphronesis, nor is it its best ally. (shrink)

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The patient-physician relationship, as formulated in the traditional biomedical model of medicine, is inherently flawed. In entering this relationship, most patients seek simply to be delivered from illness back to normal psychosocial functioning. The physician, however, almost invariably responds with a purely biologic approach to diagnosis and treatment that often does not effectively address the patient's needs. This precludes the opportunity for a consensus between them, and may in fact lead to the physician manipulating the patient's decisions about the course (...) of therapy. The relationship should be reshaped within a new scientific model of patient care that combines the biomedical analysis of disease with an empathic understanding of the patient's illness experience. Truly informed consent is viewed as a natural outcome of the application of this more comprehensive framework. (shrink)

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I respond to two basic questions raised by my commentators: (a) What is the proper definition ofempathy?; (b) What is the morality ofempathy?

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The utilization of artificial agents in medicine becomes a foremost topic in research of recent medical advances. Moreover, to possibility to simulate adequate care and create the sense ofempathy towards the patients, becomes a major question for research that would rather fall in the area of philosophy of medicine than in any other discipline as the very notion ofempathy is a complex topic that is difficult to define in its natural concept boundaries, and furthermore in proposing (...) the notion of artificial care andempathy. The question of whether we can define and simulate those would also help us answer a larger problem – can we trust artificial agents as aids or replacements of humans in the medical environment and healthcare in general. (shrink)

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Modern television is awash in programs that focus on the rough hero, a protagonist that is explicitly depicted as immoral. In this paper I examine why audiences find these characters so compelling, focusing on archetypal rough heroes in two programs: The Sopranos and Breaking Bad. I argue that the ability of rough-hero programs to engender a certain degree ofempathy for morally deviant characters despite viewers' resistance to empathizing with these characters' moral views is an aesthetic achievement. In addition, (...) I argue thatempathy for the rough hero has cognitive value in that it enables us to reflect on the nuances of the psychology underlying moral deviance. In defending these claims, I offer my view as an alternative to A.W. Eaton's robust immoralist view that the aesthetic value of rough-hero programs lies in their ability to make audiences empathize with immoral perspectives; my claim is thatempathy for rough heroes does not extend to their moral outlooks. My view also provides an alternative to Matthew Kieran's cognitive immoralist view that a work's depiction of immorality has cognitive value insofar as it imparts a normative lesson; my claim is that rough-hero programs are cognitively valuable not because they teach us about the perils of acting immorally, but because they help us understand the moral psychology that underlies immoral behavior. I defend an interpretation of rough-hero programs that incorporates insights from Eaton's and Kieran's immoralist views but does not support immoralism. (shrink)

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: Today’s debate onempathy is characterized by an interplay between neuroscience, philosophy of mind and phenomenology that has led to several distinct definitions ofempathy. Much of the difficulty in definingempathy is due to the emphasis on its prosocial value, a feature that has made it a “keyword” of our time. Does the roleempathy has been assigned in social interactions imply its involvement in matters of identity, similarity and affective resonance? What happens when (...) the flow of sensations and emotions between humans produces more complex interactions and gives rise to feelings of estrangement, facing the unknown, or a fear of others? We need a paradigm shift in which we considerempathy in practice, rather than theory. We need to consider how various empathies arise in different contexts and manifest in diverse ways. In this way, we can shed light on the limits and failures of mutual comprehension, and arrive at a more radical and realistic vision of the great challenge involved in relating to others. Keywords:Empathy; Phenomenological Approach; Intersubjectivity; Neuroscience; Otherness Dall’empatia alle empatie. Verso un mutamento di paradigma Riassunto: Il dibattito attuale sull’empatia è caratterizzato da uno scambio particolarmente vivo tra neuroscienze, filosofia della mente e fenomenologia. Da un esame dei numerosi contributi che hanno tentato di rispondere alla domanda “che cos’è l’empatia?” proponendo varie definizioni risulta chiaro che la difficoltà di fondo dell’intero dibattito consiste nel fare i conti con il valore prosociale dell’empatia, l’aspetto che ne ha fatto una parola chiave del nostro tempo. Per esplicare il ruolo che le viene assegnato nelle interazioni sociali l’empatia deve implicare somiglianza e corrispondenza affettiva? Che cosa accade quando il flusso di sensazioni e di emozioni tra esseri umani genera movimenti più complessi, in cui emergono l’estraneità, l’ignoto, la paura dell’altro? È necessario cambiare paradigma e considerare l’empatia non in teoria, ma in pratica. E guardare alle empatie, i cui contesti e differenti manifestazioni mettono in luce limiti e fallimenti, che forniscono una visione più radicale e realistica della grande scommessa delle relazioni con gli altri. Parole chiave: Empatia; Approccio fenomenologico; Intersoggettività; Neuroscienza; Alterità. (shrink)

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_In Perception,Empathy, and Judgment_ Arne Johan Vetlesen focuses on the indispensable role of emotion, especially the faculty ofempathy, in morality. He contends that moral conduct is severely threatened onceempathy is prevented from taking part in an interplay with cognitive faculties in acts of moral perception and judgment. Drawing on developmental psychology, especially British "object relations" theory, to illuminate the nature and functioning ofempathy, Vetlesen shows how moral performance is constituted by a sequence (...) involving perception, judgment, and action, with an interplay between the agent's emotional and cognitive faculties occurring at each stage. In the powerful tradition from Kant to present-day theorists such as Kohlberg, Rawls, and Habermas, reason is privileged over feeling and judgment over perception, in such a way that basic philosophical questions remain unasked. Vetlesen focuses our attention on these questions and challenges the long-standing assertion that emotions are damaging to moral response. In the final chapter he relates his argument to recent feminist critiques that have also castigated moral theorists in the Kantian tradition for their refusal to recognize a role for emotion in morality. While the book's argument is philosophical, its method and scope are interdisciplinary. In addition to critiques of such philosophers as Arendt, MacIntyre, and Habermas, it contains discussions of specific historical, ideological, and sociological factors that may cause "numbing"—selective or broad-ranging, pathological insensitivity—in humans. The Nazis' mass killing of Jews is studied to illuminate these and other relevant empirical aspects of large-scale immoral action. (shrink)

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Empathy means understanding another person’s emotional or intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to emotional contagion,empathy is characterized by the self–other distinction of subjective experience.Empathy develops in the second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to empathize with a distressed playmate (...) were investigated. Almost all recognizers showed compassion and tried to help, whereas nonrecognizers were perplexed or remained indifferent. Several motivational consequences ofempathy are discussed and its special quality is outlined in comparison with theory of mind and perspective taking. (shrink)

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There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon ofempathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action (...) Model, together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety ofempathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels ofempathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding ofempathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels ofempathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitiveempathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion;empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

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This volume contains twelve original papers about the importance ofempathy and sympathy to morality, with perspectives from philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, and neuroscience.

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Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of others is non‐instrumentally valuable to its recipients. People have a complex but profound need to (...) be humanely understood. Because we respond to others’ very real need when we pursue this sort of understanding of their emotions,empathy is best understood as itself a way of caring, rather than just a means to promote other caring behavior. (shrink)

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Althoughempathy is arguably an important factor to consider in moral education, the concept itself has consistently stood on tenuous ground. In this essay, I claim that our adherence to ontological dualism and discrete subjectivity have problematized our comprehension ofempathy. I propose that our understanding is limited by our understanding of selfhood. If the self were defined as intersubjective, along the lines of Merleau-Ponty, thenempathy’s ambiguities would dissipate. After reconceptualizingempathy in light of intersubjectivity, (...) I call for pedagogical relations that are aligned with developmental research, which provides further support for adhering to an alternative conception of the phenomenon. (shrink)

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Empathy has for a long time, at least since the eighteenth century, been seen as centrally important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people's minds, and predict and explain what they will think, feel, and do; and in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically. In addition,empathy is seen as having a central role in aesthetics, in the understanding of our engagement with works of art and with (...) fictional characters. A fuller understanding ofempathy is now offered by the interaction of research in science and the humanities. This volume draws together nineteen original chapters by leading researchers across several disciplines, together with an extensive Introduction by the editors. The individual chapters reveal how important it is, in a wide range of fields of enquiry, to bring to bear an understanding of the role ofempathy in its various guises. It offers the ideal starting-point for the exploration of this intriguing aspect of human life. (shrink)

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A crucial debate currently raging in the fields of cognitive and social science centers around general and specific approaches to understanding the actions of others. When we understand the actions of another person, do we do so on the basis of a general theory of psychology, or on the basis of an effort to place ourselves in the particular position of that specific person? Hans Herbert Kögler and Karsten R. Stueber'sEmpathy and Agency addresses this other issues vital to (...) current social science in an advanced and diverse analysis of the foundations of social-scientific methodology based on recent cognitive psychology. The book serves as both an introduction to the debate for non-academic audiences and as a catalyst for further discussion for serious theorists.Empathy and Agency provides a solid foundation of the fundamental issues in social and cognitive science, but also presents the most influential paradigms in the field at this time. (shrink)

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