Ethics, evil, andfiction.Colin McGinn -1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.detailsMcGinn's latest brings together moral philosophy and literary analysis in a way that illuminates both. Setting out to enrich the domain of moral reflection by showing the value of literary texts as sources of moral illumination, McGinn starts by setting out an uncompromisingly realist ethical theory, arguing that morality is an area of objective truth and genuine knowledge. He goes on to address such subjects as the nature of goodness, evil character, and the meaning of monstrosity in the context of (...) an aesthetic theory of virtue, which maintains that goodness of character is the same thing as beauty of soul. Looking at such literary works as Billy Budd, Lolita, The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Frankenstein, as well as examples from film and painting, Ethics, Evil, andFiction is an original and compelling book by a leading philosopher who is also a critic and novelist. (shrink)
Character as MoralFiction.Mark Alfano -2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.detailsEveryone wants to be virtuous, but recent psychological investigations suggest that this may not be possible. Mark Alfano challenges this theory and asks, not whether character is empirically adequate, but what characters human beings could have and develop. Although psychology suggests that most people do not have robust character traits such as courage, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we have reason to attribute these virtues to people because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies - children become more studious if (...) they are told that they are hard-working and adults become more generous if they are told that they are generous. He argues that we should think of virtue and character as social constructs: there is no such thing as virtue without social reinforcement. His original and provocative book will interest a wide range of readers in contemporary ethics, epistemology, moral psychology and empirically informed philosophy. (shrink)
Truth inFiction.Richard Woodward -2011 -Philosophy Compass 6 (3):158-167.detailsWhen we engage with a work offiction we gain knowledge about what is fictionally true in that work. Our grasp of what is true in afiction is central to our engagement with representational works of art, and to our assessments of their merits. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to determine what is fictional – it is a good question whether the main character of American Psycho is genuinely psychotic or merely delusional, for instance. (And even (...) in this case, our ignorance itself is crucial to how we engage with the story and assess its qualities.) But in the vast majority of cases, we have no difficulty distinguishing what is fictionally true from what is not. Every attentive reader of Bleak House knows that it is fictional that Esther is Lady Dedlock’s daughter, but not fictional that Ada is the daughter of John Jarndyce. Moreover, we do not think that our judgements about what is fictional are based on guesswork. We have a folk theory of fictional truth, in the sense that we have a relatively stable framework upon which we rely when we engage withfiction, and we face the challenge of characterizing that theory systematically. (shrink)
Against Creationism inFiction.Takashi Yagisawa -2001 -Noûs 35 (s15):153-172.detailsSherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” (...) the relevantfiction. I wish to defend this pretheoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevantfiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim. (shrink)
Is the Paradox ofFiction Soluble in Psychology?Florian Cova &Fabrice Teroni -2016 -Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):930-942.detailsIf feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox offiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to (...) try to dismiss it using data and theories coming from psychology. In opposition to this trend, the present paper argues that the paradox offiction cannot be dissolved in the ways recommended by the recent literature. We start by showing how contemporary attempts at dissolving the paradox assume that it emerges from theoretical commitments regarding the nature of emotions. Next, we argue that the paradox offiction rather emerges from everyday observations, the validity of which is independent from any such commitment. This is why we then go on to claim that a mere appeal to psychology in order to discredit these theoretical commitments cannot dissolve the paradox. We bring our discussion to a close on a more positive note, by exploring how the paradox could in fact be solved by an adequate theory of the emotions. (shrink)
BrainFiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation.William Hirstein -2005 - MIT Press.details[This download contains the table of contents and chapter 1.] This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Exploding stories and the limits offiction.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse -2020 -Philosophical Studies 178 (3):675-692.detailsIt is widely agreed thatfiction is necessarily incomplete, but some recent work postulates the existence of universal fictions—stories according to which everything is true. Building such a story is supposedly straightforward: authors can either assert that everything is true in their story, define a complement function that does the assertoric work for them, or, most compellingly, write a story combining a contradiction with the principle of explosion. The case for universal fictions thus turns on the intuitive priority we (...) assign to the law of non-contradiction. My goal in this paper is to show that our critical and reflective literary practices set constraints on story-telling which preclude universal fictions. I will raise four stumbling blocks for universal fictionalists: the gap between saying and making true, our actual interpretive reactions to story-level contradictions, the criteria we accept for what counts as a story in our literary practices, and the undesirability of the universal fictionalist’s closure principles. (shrink)
Thefiction view of models reloaded.Roman Frigg &James Nguyen -2016 -The Monist 99 (3):225-242.detailsIn this paper we explore the constraints that our preferred account of scientific representation places on the ontology of scientific models. Pace the Direct Representation view associated with Arnon Levy and Adam Toon we argue that scientific models should be thought of as imagined systems, and clarify the relationship between imagination and representation.
Artificial intelligence infiction: between narratives and metaphors.Isabella Hermann -2023 -AI and Society 38 (1):319-329.detailsScience-fiction (SF) has become a reference point in the discourse on the ethics and risks surrounding artificial intelligence (AI). Thus, AI in SF—science-fictional AI—is considered part of a larger corpus of ‘AI narratives’ that are analysed as shaping the fears and hopes of the technology. SF, however, is not a foresight or technology assessment, but tells dramas for a human audience. To make the drama work, AI is often portrayed as human-like or autonomous, regardless of the actual technological limitations. (...) Taking science-fictional AI too literally, and even applying it to science communication, paints a distorted image of the technology's current potential and distracts from the real-world implications and risks of AI. These risks are not about humanoid robots or conscious machines, but about the scoring, nudging, discrimination, exploitation, and surveillance of humans by AI technologies through governments and corporations. AI in SF, on the other hand, is a trope as part of a genre-specific mega-text that is better understood as a dramatic means and metaphor to reflect on the human condition and socio-political issues beyond technology. (shrink)
Fiction as Thought Experiment.Catherine Z. Elgin -2014 -Perspectives on Science 22 (2):221-241.detailsJonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...) her cognitive improvement restricted to acquiring new justified true beliefs about the works themselves. What the reader gleans is supposed to enhance her knowledge or understanding of the .. (shrink)
The Epistemic Value of SpeculativeFiction.Johan De Smedt &Helen De Cruz -2015 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.detailsSpeculativefiction, such as sciencefiction and fantasy, has a unique epistemic value. We examine similarities and differences between speculativefiction and philosophical thought experiments in terms of how they are cognitively processed. They are similar in their reliance on mental prospection, but dissimilar in thatfiction is better able to draw in readers (transportation) and elicit emotional responses. By its use of longer, emotionally poignant narratives and seemingly irrelevant details, speculativefiction allows for a (...) better appraisal of the consequences of philosophical ideas than thought experiments. (shrink)
Much Ado About Nonexistence:Fiction and Reference.Avrum Stroll (ed.) -2007 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.detailsFiction, Reference, and Nonexistence contains a new, contemporary theory offiction and discusses the connection between language and reality. Martinich and Stroll, two of America's leading philosophers, explorefiction and undertake an analytic philosophical study offiction and its reference, and its relation to truth.
It's notfiction if you believe it: How imaginary worlds are derived from imaginary realities.Jeffrey Jensen Arnett -2022 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e277.detailsImaginary worlds are not a consequence of humans' exploratory tendencies as argued in the target article but a recent spinoff of a strong human tendency to create imaginary realities, that is, versions of how the world works that are fabricated (although we believe they are real) in order to allow us to believe we understand it and can control it.
The NewFiction View of Models.Fiora Salis -2021 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):717-742.detailsHow do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as representations, the indirectfiction view and the directfiction view, with respect to these conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call ‘the newfiction view of models’. On this view, models are akin to (...) fictional stories; they represent real-world phenomena if they stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the generation of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)
ScienceFiction Double Feature: Trans Liberation on Twin Earth.B. R. George &R. A. Briggs -manuscriptdetailsWhat is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)
The moral psychology offiction.Gregory Currie -1995 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (2):250 – 259.detailsWhat can we learn fromfiction? I argue that we can learn about the consequences of a certain course of action by projecting ourselves, in imagination, into the situation of thefiction's characters.
Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts.Alberto Voltolini -2006 -Synthese 153 (1):23-47.detailsIn this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...) be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis 58, 107; Mind and Language 13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies 107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’ – theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese 138, 145). (shrink)
Stories of philosophy: an introduction through originalfiction and discussion.Thomas D. Davis -2019 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.detailsStories of Philosophy is an introduction to philosophy textbook that combines bothfiction and philosophical discussion. It combines compelling stories devoted to particular philosophical problems followed by clear and detailed guided discussions of the topics and ideas explored within the fictional stories. The text includes chapters on Logic, Appearance and Reality, The Nature of Mind, Freedom and Responsibility, The Existence of God, and Morality. Each chapter has several highly praised pedagogical features, including chapter-opening learning objectives, boldfaced key terms, questions (...) for discussion, definitions of terms, and suggested further readings. It will be accompanied by online support material for the instructor and the student. (shrink)
Fact,Fiction and Virtual Worlds.Alexandre Declos -2020 - In R. Pouivet & V. Granata,Epistemology of Aesthetics. Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. pp. 195-219.detailsThis paper considers the medium of videogames from a goodmanian standpoint. After some preliminary clarifications and definitions, I examine the ontological status of videogames. Against several existing accounts, I hold that what grounds their identity qua work types is code. The rest of the paper is dedicated to the epistemology of videogaming. Drawing on Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin's works, I suggest that the best model to defend videogame cognitivism appeals to the notion of understanding.
Philosophy asfiction: self, deception, and knowledge in Proust.Joshua Landy -2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.detailsPhilosophy asFiction seeks to account for the peculiar power of philosophical literature by taking as its case study the paradigmatic generic hybrid of the twentieth century, Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time. At once philosophical--in that it presents claims, and even deploys arguments concerning such traditionally philosophical issues as knowledge, self-deception, selfhood, love, friendship, and art--and literary, in that its situations are imaginary and its stylization inescapably prominent, Proust's novel presents us with a conundrum. How should it (...) be read? Can the two discursive structures co-exist, or must philosophy inevitably undermine literature (by sapping the narrative of its vitality) and literature undermine philosophy (by placing its claims in the mouth of an often unreliable narrator)? In the case of Proust at least, the result is greater than the sum of its parts. Not only can a coherent, distinctive philosophical system be extracted from the Recherche, once the narrator's periodic waywardness is taken into account; not only does a powerfully original style pervade its every nook, overtly reinforcing some theories and covertly exemplifying others; but aspects of the philosophy also serve literary ends, contributing more to character than to conceptual framework. What is more, aspects of the aesthetics serve philosophical ends, enabling a reader to engage in an active manner with an alternative art of living. Unlike the "essay" Proust might have written, his novel grants us the opportunity to use it as a practice ground for cooperation among our faculties, for the careful sifting of memories, for the complex procedures involved in self-fashioning, and for the related art of self-deception. It is only because the narrator's insights do not always add up--a weakness, so long as one treats the novel as a straightforward treatise--that it can produce its training effect, a feature that turns out to be its ultimate strength. (shrink)
The Bureau and the Realism of SpyFiction.Pauline Blistène -2022 -Open Philosophy 5 (1):231-249.detailsThis article addresses the issue of realism in relationship to contemporary serialfiction. Drawing on The Bureau, it argues that spy TV series are “realistic” not because they correspond to reality but because of their impact on reality. It begins by giving an overview of the many ways in which “realism,” in the ordinary sense of a resemblance with reality, served as the working framework for The Bureau’s team. It then identifies three distinct types of realisms in the series. (...) The first is a “fictional realism,” namely the ability of The Bureau to conform to the aesthetic and narrative conventions of realistic fictions. The second type of realism, which I qualify as “ordinary,” refers to the possibilities offered by the show’s aesthetics and the enmeshment of The Bureau with viewers’ ordinary experience. The third type of “performative realism” refers to the series’ impact on shared representations and reality. By providing a common language about the secret activities of the state, The Bureau has gone from being a framed version of reality to being one of the defining frameworks through which state secrecy is experienced both individually and collectively, by insiders and the public at large. (shrink)
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