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NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies

Theory and Decision 87 (2):155-170 (2019)
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Abstract

Inspired by Scarf, Zhao, Sandholm and Yang and Zhang, we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.

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