Abstract

Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” is rightly famous. In it, she arguesexplicitly for several theses and implicitly for several more; studying the essay, one gets theimpression that these theses are related to one another by implication—but it’s not obviousprecisely how they are related. In this chapter, I suggest—less controversially, perhaps—that atthe heart of “Modern Moral Philosophy” is Anscombe’s rejection of what she calls“consequentialism.” I also suggest—more controversially, perhaps—that Anscombe isarticulating a tension within consequentialism: the form of consequentialism presupposes theexistence of a divine legislator, while the content of consequentialism presupposes thenonexistence of a divine legislator. In making this argument, I employ the work of DavidSolomon, a senior scholar of the work of Elizabeth Anscombe.