Knowing how to believe with justification
Abstract
Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skillsAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva -2022 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.
References.John Bengson &Marc A. Moffett -2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett,Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 361-386.
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