Conditionals Are Not Truth-Functional: An Argument from Peirce
Abstract
Peirce's example puts another nail in the coffin of the truth-functionality thesis. Conditionals are not truth-functional.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Harmony and autonomy in classical logic.Stephen Read -2000 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):123-154.
Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock &David W. Agler -2015 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.
When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko.Lloyd Humberstone &Allen Hazen -2020 -Studia Logica 108 (2):199-220.
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