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How privileged is first-person privileged access?
Abstract
Many philosophers agree that mental states are subject to privileged first-person access. Exactly what privileged, first-person access means is controversial, but it seems that, while our third-person access to mental states is only indirect because it depends on behavioral observation, first-person access seems to be direct because it depends on no such mediationAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
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The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds.Giovanni Merlo -2021 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):633-664.
The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Defining Feature of Consciousness.Dylan Ludwig -2021 -Dialogue 60 (3):435-446.
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