Abstract

The view that contradictions cannot be true has been part of accepted philosophicaltheory since at least the time of Aristotle. In this regard, it is almost unique in the history ofphilosophy. Only in the last forty years has the view been systematically challenged with theadvent of dialetheism. Since Graham Priest introduced dialetheism as a solution to certainself-referential paradoxes, the possibility of true contradictions has been a live issue in thephilosophy of logic. Yet, despite the arguments advanced by dialetheists, many logicians andphilosophers still hold the opinion that contradictions cannot be true.Rather than advocating the truth of certain contradictions, this thesis offers adifferent challenge to the classical logician. By showing that it can be philosophically coherentto propose that true contradictions are metaphysically possible, the thesis suggests that theclassical logician must do more than she currently has to justify her confidence in theimpossibility of true contradictions. Simply fighting off the dialetheist’s putative examples oftrue contradictions at the actual world isn’t enough to justify the classical logician’s conclusionthat true contradictions are impossible.To aid the thesis dialectically, we introduce a new position, absolutism, whichhypothesises that it’s metaphysically possible for at least one contradiction to be true, contrastingwith the dialetheic hypothesis that some contradictions are true in the actual world. Wedemonstrate that absolutism can be given a philosophically coherent interpretation, anappropriate logic, and that certain criticisms are completely toothless against absolutism. Thechallenge put to the classical logician is then: On what logical or philosophical grounds can werule out the metaphysical possibility of true contradictions?