The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective
Abstract
We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are explored.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini &Carl Craver -2011 -Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
Minimal Model Explanations.Robert W. Batterman &Collin C. Rice -2014 -Philosophy of Science 81 (3):349-376.
Are More Details Better? On the Norms of Completeness for Mechanistic Explanations.Carl F. Craver &David M. Kaplan -2020 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1):287-319.
The cognitive neuroscience revolution.Worth Boone &Gualtiero Piccinini -2016 -Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
Empiricism without Magic: Transformational Abstraction in Deep Convolutional Neural Networks.Cameron Buckner -2018 -Synthese (12):1-34.
References found in this work
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer,Lindley Darden &Carl F. Craver -2000 -Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel &Adele Abrahamsen -2005 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action.David Morris,E. Thelen &L. B. Smith -1997 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2).
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini &Carl Craver -2011 -Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
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