Abstract

This dissertation deals with Hegel's theory of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I argue that the opening chapters of the work contain an account of self-consciousness that ties this awareness to the act of willing. Chapter 1 examines Hegel's discussion of our sensible awareness of the spatiotemporal here and now, as well as our awareness of ourselves as 'I'. Here I argue that Hegel's discussion of space and time points to a sensible element in self-consciousness. I then contrast Hegel's views with those of Kant, Fichte, and other figures in late 18th century philosophy. Chapter 2 examines Hegel's claim that self-consciousness is desire in general. I argue that the concept of desire in the Phenomenology is closely related to Kant's concept of desire and Fichte's concept of a drive. Most importantly, both Hegel and Fichte regard desiring as a form of sensible self-awareness. After examining the role that this awareness plays in Fichte's Jena work, I conclude by considering Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Differenzschrift and the Phenomenology. ;Chapter 3 is concerned with the positive theory of self-consciousness found in Hegel's description of the figure of the bondsman in "Lordship and Bondage." According to this theory, the act of willing an end that is not a mere function of one's natural desires contains an element of self-awareness that underlies all other self-conscious states. The bondsman, a subject capable of free choice, is a self-conscious subject in virtue of this capacity. This theory of self-consciousness, I maintain, instantiates the form of Fichte's "original insight" and is phenomenologically accurate. In the final chapter I examine the relations to other subjects and to oneself that are required by Hegel's theory of self-consciousness. I argue that for Hegel, willing essentially involves the recognition of another rational will as a possible constraint on one's desire satisfaction. Thus, self-consciousness is intersubjective. This connection between willing and recognition underlies the analogy between spirit, life, and a spatiotemporal whole. I conclude by examining the way in which the body of a self-conscious agent must appear to that agent