What conditional probability could not be
Abstract
Kolmogorov''s axiomatization of probability includes the familiarratio formula for conditional probability: 0).$$ " align="middle" border="0">.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith -2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger &Stephan Hartmann -2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga -2024 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.
References found in this work
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach &Colin Howson -1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis -1986 -Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi -1980 - MIT Press.
Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference.Judea Pearl -1988 - Morgan Kaufmann.
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