Abstract

According to a prominent, broadly Kantian objection to Nietzsche’s account of the self, only a self or ‘I’ of the sort he seems steadfastly to deny could possibly come to be misled about the self in the way he claims we are. In this article, I’ll argue that this criticism is mistaken. There are, I suggest, three different ways of fleshing out the objection, each of which fails to present an effective challenge to Nietzsche’s view. The Kantian criticisms either advance claims that Nietzsche can readily accept or presume metaphysical commitments he explicitly rejects. In the course of elaborating and rejecting the different versions of the Kantian criticism, I advance an account of Nietzsche’s principal target in his critical remarks on the self. His main focus, I contend, should be understood as a minimally substantive subject embedded in a schema that separates doers from deeds.