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TheInhuman Overhang: On Differential Heterogenesis and Multi-Scalar Modeling

la Deleuziana 11:202-235 (2020)
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Abstract

As a philosophical paradigm, differential heterogenesis offers us a novel descriptive vantage with which to inscribe Deleuze’s virtuality within the terrain of “differential becoming,” conjugating “pure saliences” so as to parse economies, microhistories, insurgencies, and epistemological evolutionary processes that can be conceived of independently from their representational form. Unlike Gestalt theory’s oppositional constructions, the advantage of this aperture is that it posits a dynamic context to both media and its analysis, rendering them functionally tractable and set in relation to other objects, rather than as sedentary identities. Surveying the genealogy of differential heterogenesis with particular interest in the legacy of Lautman’s dialectic, I make the case for a reading of the Deleuzean virtual that departs from an event-oriented approach, galvanizing Sarti and Citti’s dynamic a priori vis-à-vis Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. Specifically, I posit differential heterogenesis as frame with which to examine our contemporaneous epistemic shift as it relates to multi-scalar computational modeling while paying particular attention to neuro-inferential modes of inductive learning and homologous cognitive architecture. Carving a bricolage between Mark Wilson’s work on the “greediness of scales” and Deleuze’s “scales of reality”, this project threads between static ecologies and active externalism vis-à-vis endocentric frames of reference and syntactical scaffolding.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel -1974 -Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel -2003 - In John Heil,Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel -2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas,Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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