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What is it to be a rational agent?

In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan,The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge (2020)
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Abstract

What is it to be a rational agent? The orthodox answer to this question can be summarized by a slogan: Rationality is a matter of recognizing and responding to reasons. But is the orthodoxy correct? In this chapter, I explore an alternative way of thinking about what it is to be a rational agent according to which a central activity of rational agency is the creation of reasons. I explain how the idea of metaphysical grounding can help make sense of the idea that as rational agents, we can, quite literally, create reasons. I end by suggesting a reason to take this alternative view of rational agency seriously. The orthodoxy faces a challenge: How do rational agents make choices within ‘well-formed choice situations’? By allowing that we have the normative power to create reasons, we have a satisfying and attractive solution to this question.

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Ruth Chang
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

The Normative Insignificance of the Will.Jason Kay -forthcoming -Philosophical Studies.

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