Phenomenal and Access Consciousness Ned Block and Cynthia MacDonald: Consciousness and Cognitive Access
Abstract
This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block -2011 -Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show.Ian B. Phillips -2011 -Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.
Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?Berit Brogaard -2011 -Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
References found in this work
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce: Pragmatism and pragmaticism and Scientific metaphysics.Charles Sanders Peirce -1960 - Cambridge: Belknap Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel -1979 - InMortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
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