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Reasons, Explanation, and Saramago's Bell

Hypatia 20 (4):144-163 (2005)
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Abstract

In this essay, I suggest that significant insights of recent feminist philosophy lead, among other things, to the thought that it is not always better to choose than to be compelled to do what one might have done otherwise. However, few feminists, if any, would defend such a suggestion. I ask why it is difficult to consider certain ideas that, while challenging in theory, are, nonetheless, rather unproblematic in practice. I suggest that some questions are not pursued seriously enough by philosophers, because certain popular liberal conceptions of individuality and freedom are taken too much for granted.

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Susan E. Babbitt
Queen's University

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