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Disabled – therefore, Unhealthy?

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1259-1274 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known ‘social model of disability’, that we should prefer a usage of ‘disabled’ which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I argue that it is often wrong to use the term ‘healthy’ in a way that makes health inconsistent with any degree whatsoever of health-relevant bodily dysfunction. Whether someone is ‘healthy’ properly-so-called depends on standards of health presupposed in conversational context. Sometimes, I argue, these standards are or ought to be lax enough to allow some people with some health deficits still to count as ‘healthy’ per se. Taking inspiration from David Lewis and Mary Kate Mcgowan, I go on to argue that denying that someone is ‘healthy’ in a context typically succeeds in shifting going presuppositions to require standards strict enough to make that denial acceptable. And this, I conclude by arguing, often constitutes an abuse of conversational power.

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Sean Aas
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Disability: a justice-based account.Jessica Begon -2020 -Philosophical Studies 178 (3):935-962.
Sexual Reorientation in Ideal and Non‐Ideal Theory.Candice Delmas &Sean Aas -2018 -Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (4):463-485.
Disability as Inability.Alex Gregory -2020 -Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (1):23-48.
Relational Equality and Disability Injustice.Jeffrey M. Brown -2019 -Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (3):327-357.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis -1996 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse -1977 -Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis -2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske,Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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