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We propose two alternatives to Xu’s axiomatization of Chellas’s STIT. The first one simplifies its presentation, and also provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of Chellas’s STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula without temporal operators (...) is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both for the deliberative and Chellas’s STIT. (shrink) | |
In this paper we consider logical inference as an activity that results in proofs and hence produces knowledge. We suggest to merge the semantical analysis of deliberatively seeing-to-it-that from stit theory and the semantics of the epistemic logic with justification from. The general idea is to understand proving that A as seeing to it that a proof of A is available. We introduce a semantics of various notions of proving as an activity and present a number of valid principles that (...) relate the various notions of proving to each other and to notions of justified knowledge, implicit knowledge, and possibility. We also point out and comment upon certain principles our semantics fails to validate. (shrink) | |
No categories | |
I present a variant of with time, called, interpreted in standard Kripke semantics. On the syntactic level, is nothing but the extension of atemporal individual by: the future tense and past tense operators, and the operator of group agency for the grand coalition. A sound and complete axiomatisation for is given. Moreover, it is shown that supports reasoning about interesting normative concepts such as the concepts of achievement obligation and commitment. | |
A sequent calculus methodology for systems of agency based on branching-time frames with agents and choices is proposed, starting with a complete and cut-free system for multi-agent deliberative STIT; the methodology allows a transparent justification of the rules, good structural properties, analyticity, direct completeness and decidability proofs. | |
In this paper we present BTC, which is a complete logic for branchingtime whose modal operator quantifies over histories and whose temporal operators involve a restricted quantification over histories in a given possible choice. This is a technical novelty, since the operators of the usual logics for branching-time such as CTL express an unrestricted quantification over histories and moments. The value of the apparatus we introduce is connected to those logics of agency that are interpreted on branching-time, as for instance (...) Stit Logics. (shrink) | |
We present a simple theory of actions against the background of branching time, based on which we propose two versions of an extended stit theory, one equipped with particular actions and the other with sets of such actions. After reporting some basic results of a formal development of such a theory, we briefly explore its connection to a version of branching ETL. | |
A prominent issue in mainstream epistemology is the controversy about doxastic obligations and doxastic voluntarism. In the present paper it is argued that this discussion can benefit from forging links with formal epistemology, namely the combined modal logic of belief, agency, and obligation. A stit-theory-based semantics for deontic doxastic logic is suggested, and it is claimed that this is helpful and illuminating in dealing with the mentioned intricate and important problems from mainstream epistemology. Moreover, it is argued that this linking (...) is of mutual benefit. The discussion of doxastic voluntarism directs the attention of doxastic logicians to the notion of belief formation and thus to dynamic aspects of beliefs that have hitherto been neglected. The development of a formal language and semantics for ascriptions of belief formation may contribute to clarifying the contents and the implications of voluntaristic claims. A simple observation concerning other-agent nestings of stit-operators, for instance, may help illuminating the notions of making belief and responsibility for beliefs of others. In this way, stit-theory may serve as a bridge between mainstream and formal epistemology. (shrink) | |
We use a deontic logic of collective agency to study reducibility questions about collective agency and collective obligations. The logic that is at the basis of our study is a multi-modal logic in the tradition of *stit* logics of agency. Our full formal language has constants for collective and individual deontic admissibility, modalities for collective and individual agency, and modalities for collective and individual obligations. We classify its twenty-seven sublanguages in terms of their expressive power. This classification enables us to (...) investigate reducibility relations between collective deontic admissibility, collective agency, and collective obligations, on the one hand, and individual deontic admissibility, individual agency, and individual obligations, on the other. (shrink) | |
This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic. | |
We provide a Kripke semantics for a STIT logic with the "next" operator. As the atemporal group STIT is undecidable and unaxiomatizable, we are interested in strict fragments of atemporal group STIT. First we prove that the satisfiability problem of a formula of the fragment made up of individual coalitions plus the grand coalition is also NEXPTIME-complete. We then generalize this result to a fragment where coalitions are in a given lattice. We also prove that if we restrict the language (...) to nested coalitions the satisfiability problem is NP-complete if the number of agents is fixed and PSPACE-complete if the number of agents is variable. Finally we embed individual STIT with the "next" operator into a fragment of atemporal group STIT. (shrink) | |
Topic of the paper is Q-logic - a logic of agency in its temporal and modal context. Q-logic may be considered as a basal logic of agency since the most important stitoperators discussed in the literature can be defined or axiomatized easily within its semantical and syntactical framework. Its basic agent dependent operator, the Q-operator (also known as Δ- or cstit-operator), which has been discussed independently by E v. Kutschera and B. E Chellas, is investigated here in respect of its (...) relation to other temporal and modal operators. The main result of the paper, then, is a completeness result for a calculus of Q-logic with respect to a semantics defined on the tree-approach to agency as introduced and developed by, among others, E v. Kutschera and N. D. Belnap. (shrink) | |
We investigate a series of logics that allow to reason about agents' actions, abilities, and their knowledge about actions and abilities. These logics include Pauly's Coalition Logic CL, Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL, the logic of ‘seeing-to-it-that' (STIT), and epistemic extensions thereof. While complete axiomatizations of CL and ATL exist, only the fragment of the STIT language without temporal operators and without groups has been axiomatized by Xu (called Ldm). We start by recalling a simplification of the Ldm that has been (...) proposed in previous work, together with an alternative semantics in terms of standard Kripke models. We extend that semantics to groups via a principle of superadditivity, and give a sound and complete axiomatization that we call Ldm G. We then add a temporal ‘next' operator to Ldm G, and again give a sound and complete axiomatization. We show that Ldm G subsumes coalition logic CL. Finally, we extend these logics with standard S5 knowledge operators. This enables us to express that agents see to something under uncertainty about the present state or uncertainty about which action is being taken. We focus on the epistemic extension of X-Ldm G, noted E-X-Ldm G. In accordance with established terminology in the planning community, we call this extension of X-Ldm G the conformant X-Ldm G. The conformant X-Ldm G enables us to express that agents are able to perform a uniform strategy. We conclude that in that respect, our epistemic extension of X-Ldm G is better suited than epistemic extensions of ATL. (shrink) | |
We present a theory of actions based on a theory of events in branching time, in which "particular" or "token" actions are taken to be sets of transitions from their initial states to the outcomes. We also present a simple theory of composition of events by which composite events can be formed out of other events. Various kinds of actions, including instantaneous group actions and sequential group actions, are introduced by way of composition, and an extended stit theory of agency (...) is proposed, in which the stit operators are combined or equipped with reified group actions. (shrink) | |
The paper develops a set of quantified temporal alethic boulesic doxastic systems. Every system in this set consists of five parts: a ‘quantified’ part, a temporal part, a modal (alethic) part, a boulesic part and a doxastic part. There are no systems in the literature that combine all of these branches of logic. Hence, all systems in this paper are new. Every system is defined both semantically and proof-theoretically. The semantic apparatus consists of a kind of$$T \times W$$T×Wmodels, and the (...) proof-theoretical apparatus of semantic tableaux. The ‘quantified part’ of the systems includes relational predicates and the identity symbol. The quantifiers are, in effect, a kind of possibilist quantifiers that vary over every object in the domain. The tableaux rules are classical. The alethic part contains two types of modal operators for absolute and historical necessity and possibility. According to ‘boulesic logic’ (the logic of the will), ‘willing’ (‘consenting’, ‘rejecting’, ‘indifference’ and ‘non-indifference’) is a kind of modal operator. Doxastic logic is the logic of beliefs; it treats ‘believing’ (and ‘conceiving’) as a kind of modal operator. I will explore some possible relationships between these different parts, and investigate some principles that include more than one type of logical expression. I will show that every tableau system in the paper is sound and complete with respect to its semantics. Finally, I consider an example of a valid argument and an example of an invalid sentence. I show how one can use semantic tableaux to establish validity and invalidity and read off countermodels. These examples illustrate the philosophical usefulness of the systems that are introduced in this paper. (shrink) | |
In this paper we propose a method for modeling social influence within the STIT approach to action. Our proposal consists in extending the STIT language with special operators that allow us to represent the consequences of an agent’s choices over the rational choices of another agent. | |
This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...) the semantics, such as inductive skepticism, the logic of discovery, Duhem’s problem, the articulation of theories by auxiliary hypotheses, the role of serendipity in scientific knowledge, Fitch’s paradox, deductive closure of knowability, whether one can know inductively that one knows inductively, whether one can know inductively that one does not know inductively, and whether expert instruction can spread common inductive knowledge—as opposed to mere, true belief—through a community of gullible pupils. (shrink) No categories | |
In this paper I propose and motivate a logic of the interdefined concepts of making true and control, understood as intensional propositional operators to be indexed to an agent. While bearing a resemblance to earlier logics in the tradition, the motivations, semantics, and object language theory differ on crucial points. Applying this logic to widespread formal theories of agency, I use it as a framework to argue against the ubiquitous assumption that the strongest actions or options available to a given (...) agent must always be pairwise incompatible. The conclusion is that this assumption conflicts with failures of higher order control of agents over their degree or precision of control, failures exhibited by such imperfect agents as ourselves. I discuss models in this setting for understanding such imperfectly self-controlling agents. In an appendix, I prove several relevant results about the logic described, including soundness and completeness both for it and for certain natural extensions. (shrink) | |
STIT logic is a prominent framework for the analysis of multi-agent choice-making. In the available deontic extensions of STIT, the principle of Ought-implies-Can (OiC) fulfills a central role. However, in the philosophical literature a variety of alternative OiC interpretations have been proposed and discussed. This paper provides a modular framework for deontic STIT that accounts for a multitude of OiC readings. In particular, we discuss, compare, and formalize ten such readings. We provide sound and complete sequent-style calculi for all of (...) the various STIT logics accommodating these OiC principles. We formally analyze the resulting logics and discuss how the different OiC principles are logically related. In particular, we propose an endorsement principle describing which OiC readings logically commit one to other OiC readings. (shrink) | |
Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative (...) ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr’s three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the moral tractability thesis. (shrink) | |
In this paper we prove the uncompactness of every stit logic that contains a generalized refref conditional and is a sublogic of the stit logic with refref equivalence, a syntactical condition of uncompactness that covers infinitely many stit logics. This result is established through the uncompactness of every stit logic whose semantic structures contain no chain of busy choice sequences with cardinality , where is any natural number . The basic idea in the proof is to apply the notion of (...) companions to stit sentences in finding busy choice sequences in structures, and to make use of a relation between chains of busy choice sequences and generalized refref conditionals in connecting the two conditions of uncompactness mentioned above. (shrink) | |
In a recent paper, Negri and Pavlović (Studia Logica 1–35, 2020) have formulated a decidable sequent calculus for the logic of agency, specifically for a deliberative see-to-it-that modality, or dstit. In that paper the adequacy of the system is demonstrated by showing the derivability of the axiomatization of dstit from Belnap et al. (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). And while the influence of the latter book on the study of logics (...) of agency cannot be overstated, we note that this is not the only axiomatization of that modality available. In fact, an earlier (and arguably purer) one was offered in Xu (J Philosophical Logic 27(5):505–552, 1998). In this article we fill this lacuna by proving that this alternative axiomatization is likewise readily derivable in the system of Negri and Pavlović (Studia Logica 1–35, 2020). (shrink) |
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