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  1. Introspection during visual search.Gabriel Reyes &Jérôme Sackur -2014 -Consciousness and Cognition 29:212-229.
  • The ins and outs of introspection.Philip Robbins -2006 -Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
    Introspection admits of several varieties, depending on which types of mental events are introspected. I distinguish three kinds of introspection (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and three explanations of the general capacity: the inside access view, the outside access view, and the hybrid view. Drawing on recent evidence from clinical and developmental psychology, I argue that the inside view offers the most promising account of primary and secondary introspection.
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  • The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences.Joana Rigato,Scott M. Rennie &Zachary F. Mainen -2019 -Synthese 198 (9):8005-8041.
    Science aims to transform the subjectivity of individual observations and ideas into more objective and universal knowledge. Yet if there is any area in which first-person experience holds a particularly special and delicate role, it is the sciences of the mind. According to a widespread view, first-person methods were largely discarded from psychology after the fall of introspectionism a century ago and replaced by more objective behavioral measures, a step that some authors have begun to criticize. To examine whether these (...) views are sufficiently informed by actual scientific practice, we conducted a review of methodological approaches in the cognitive science literature. We found that reports of subjective experience are in fact still widely used in a broad variety of different experimental paradigms, both in studies that focus on subjective experience, and in those that make no explicit reference to it. Across these studies, we documented a diverse collection of approaches that leveraged first-person reports, ranging from button presses to unstructured interviews, while continuing to maximise experimental reproducibility. Common to these studies were subjects acting as sensors, intentionally communicating their experience to the experimenter, which we termed “second-person” methods. We conclude that, despite views to the contrary, first-person experience has always been and is still central to investigations of the mind even if it is not recognized as such. We suggest that the conversation ought to be reframed: instead of debating whether to accept subjects’ first-person knowledge we should discuss how best to do so. (shrink)
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  • May Conscious Mind Give a “Scientific Definition” of Consciousness?Bignetti Enrico -2019 -Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):439-451.
    The mind when posing the question “what is consciousness?” (i.e. “The Hard Problem of Consciousness”, THPOC) will encounter an unsurmountable conflict of interest. The hope that by investigating the “neural correlates to consciousness” (NCCs) one might come to a “scientific (conceptual)” definition of consciousness is then paradoxical. In fact, the investigation of NCCs might unveil only “operational” (functional) properties of the mind. Nevertheless, the pieces of information deriving from these investigations seem to be striking. To this respect, there is a (...) growing evidence of a dual-state activity in mind, corresponding to the activities of a conscious (explicit) mind (C) and an unconscious (implicit) mind (U), respectively; moreover, C and U do not share any conceptual connection with psychoanalytic Conscious and Unconscious. In detail, C is the domain where thoughts (as well as images and music) can be managed; instead, U exhibits a biophysical/biochemical activity. In order to communicate with each other, a transduction of one language into the other must reciprocally occur; it is notable that the investigation of NCCs leads to the conclusion that it is right that transduction process accounts for the unsurmountable question about THPOC. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the dual state activity in mind stands on a probabilistic-deterministic mechanism; this functional property of the mind is incompatible with the existence of free-will (FW) but not with C’s FW illusion. In summary in the current literature, there is a unique cognitive model that is compatible with all these evidences, i.e. “The Bignetti Model” (TBM). (shrink)
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  • Psychology of Religion and Neurobiology: Which Relationship?K. Helmut Reich -2004 -Archive for the Psychology of Religion 26 (1):117-134.
    Given that psychologists of religion as a scientific community so far have shown little interest in neurobiology, and neurobiology may become important for our field in the not too distant future, an attempt is made to present and discuss neurobiology and its conceivable interactions with psychology of religion. The long-standing debate about the philosophical grounding of the mind-body problem is recalled, as well as the scope of neurobiology and its research methods. Psychology of religion may assist neurobiology by providing research (...) data that could serve as material for constructing testable neurobiological hypotheses, data resulting, for instance, from studying an individual's perception of God and the numinous, the psychological characteristics of meditation, deep prayer, contemplation, etc. Psychology of religion could benefit from neurobiology, for assessing differing theoretical concepts regarding, for instance, religious experiences, and for constructing dynamic models of religious development. Possible roadblocks on the way to connecting psychology of religion and neurobiology are pointed out and literature for further reading is provided. (shrink)
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block -2015 -Open MIND 2015.
  • Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Robert Epstein,Etzel Cardeña,Tana Dineen,Greg Ealick,Richard Conn Henry,C. Richard Desper,Barry Greenwood,John Alexander,Michael Grosso,Deborah Blum,Jeffrey Long &Michael Sudduth -2010 -Journal of Scientific Exploration 23 (3).
    359 The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing, by Richard Kradin - Robert Epstein 363 Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic, by Russell T. Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel - Etzel Cardeña 365 Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness, by Christopher Lane - Tana Dineen 369 Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness, by Alva Noë - Greg Ealick 371 Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness Are the Keys (...) to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe, by Robert Lanza with Bob Berman - Richard Conn Henry 375 Proving Shakespeare: In Ben Jonson’s Own Words, by David L. Roper - C. Richard Desper 376 Encounters at Indian Head: The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Abduction Revisited, by Karl Pfl ock and Peter Brookesmith; Captured! The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Experience, by Stanton T. Friedman and Kathleen Marden - Barry Greenwood 381 UFOs and Nukes: Extraordinary Encounters at Nuclear Weapons Sites, by Robert L. Hastings - John Alexander 384 Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World, by Jacalyn Duffin - Michael Grosso 388 Unbelievable: Investigations into Ghosts, Poltergeists, Telepathy and Other Unseen Phenomena, from the Duke Parapsychology Laboratory, by Stacy Horn - Deborah Blum 390 The Art of Dying, by Peter Fenwick and Elizabeth Fenwick Jeffrey Long - Jody Long 393 Life Beyond Death: What Should We Expect?, by David Fontana - Michael Sudduth. (shrink)
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