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  1. Business ethics and doing what one ought to do.Gregory Mellema -1994 -Journal of Business Ethics 13 (2):149 - 153.
    There are situations in human life where the failure to perform a certain act can be morally blameworthy and at the same time not constitute the failure of moral duty or obligation. While traditional approaches to ethics have not acknowledged the possibility of these acts, recent contributions to the literature have made a strong and convincing case for their existence. Here I explain the nature of these acts, present some examples of these acts as they might arise in one''s business (...) or professional life, and point out the importance of recognizing and performing these acts for those who wish to practice good ethics in their business or professional lives. (shrink)
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  • Supererogation, blame, and the limits of obligation.Gregory Mellema -1994 -Philosophia 24 (1-2):171-182.
  • Employee Profit Sharing: A Moral Obligation or a Moral Option?Franz Giuseppe F. Cortez -2017 -Kritike 11 (2):257-277.
  • Quasi-obligation and the failure to be virtuous.Gregory Mellema -1993 -Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):176-185.
  • Überschatten.Ranier Carlo V. Abengaña -2017 -Kritike 11 (2):i-i.
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  • Charitable organisations and the rescue principle.John M. Whelan Jr -2004 -Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7 (3):52-66.
    Despite what Peter Singer and Peter Unger believe, no one violates the ‘rescue principle’ when she makes a frivolous purchase instead of giving to a charity like UNICEF. Nor does any one violate a collective action version of the rescue principle when she makes a frivolous purchase instead of giving to a charity. Garrett Cullity is also mistaken in believing that ‘the transitivity of wrongness’ can be used to reach the conclusion that a failure to give to charity is wrong (...) because a failure to save is. This makes it likely that the requirement to give to charity is based not on the requirement to rescue but instead on the moral requirement to marginally improve the ability of charitable organisations to do their important work. (shrink)
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