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Distributed memory, coupling, and history

In R. Heath, B. Hayes, A. Heathcote & C. Hooker,Dynamical Cognitive Science: Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Cognitive Science Conference. University of Newcastle (1999)

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  1. Remembering as Public Practice: Wittgenstein, memory, and distributed cognitive ecologies.John Sutton -2014 - In V. A. Munz, D. Moyal-Sharrock & A. Coliva,Mind, Language, and Action: proceedings of the 36th Wittgenstein symposium. pp. 409-444.
    A woman is listening to Sinatra before work. As she later describes it, ‘suddenly from nowhere I could hear my mother singing along to it … I was there again home again, hearing my mother … God knows why I should choose to remember that … then, to actually hear her and I had this image in my head … of being at home … with her singing away … like being transported back you know I got one of those (...) … like shivery feelings really suddenly’ (Anderson 2004, 9-10). An older couple, discussing their honeymoon forty years ago, each say that they can’t remember the show they saw, until through iterative, puzzled cross-cuing they finally get there – ‘Desert Song, that’s it’ (Harris et al 2011, 292). An elderly English veteran of a prisoner of war camp in Japan, finishing up morning tea with a young Japanese social scientist interested in reconciliation, suddenly calls out loudly - in Japanese - ‘stand to attention’. He stands to attention in front of her: like many of the men she interviews, he physically re-enacts fragments of that long-past world of the camp, bringing that absent past into this new present context with a visceral shock (Murakami 2001, 2012; Middleton & Brown 2005, 133-136). (shrink)
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  • The churchlands' neuron doctrine: Both cognitive and reductionist.John Sutton -1999 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):850-851.
    According to Gold & Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the (...) argument from unification as reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine. (shrink)
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