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In this paper, I provide a history of Kant's extensive experimentation with the doctrine of the schematism. I claim that diverse interpretations of schemata—as syntheses or intuitions; as attributable to the imagination or to the understanding; even as wholly incomprehensible—mark specific stages in Kant's own thought, and that the changes in the doctrine reflect changes in the very idea of transcendental philosophy. Ultimately, I argue that the instability here lies at the heart of Kant's critical project: the schematism plays an (...) essential role in securing its most basic presupposition, but it is difficult to account for within that project. This is a problem that Kant recognizes and grapples with directly, without completely resolving it to his own satisfaction. (shrink) No categories | |
This paper outlines a reading of the Objective Logic that emphasizes Hegel’s post-Kantian metametaphysical aims. I defend two claims: (1) Hegel’s Objective Logic reorganizes what Longuenesse has famously termed the ‘leading thread’ that structures Kant’s Table of Categories. (2) The aim of this reorganization is to demonstrate that the apparent reality of objects given in qualitative sensation must ultimately be explained by appeal to the notion of modal actuality – or, rephrased, that sense perception must be explained by appeal to (...) the activity of thought. To start, I briefly sketch the understanding of Hegel’s thought that serves as a backdrop for my reading of the Objective Logic. Next, I introduce Longuenesse’s discussion of Kant’s leading thread and lay out what Kant has to say about quality and qualitative synthesis following cues from Longuenesse’s treatment of quantity. Finally, I discuss in detail two modifications that Hegel makes to Kant’s leading thread: the primacy of qualitative determinations at the outset of the Objective Logic and the related discussion of actuality at the end of the Objective Logic. (shrink) No categories |