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  1. The ambiguity of “true” in English, German, and Chinese.Kevin Reuter -2024 -Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-20.
    Through a series of empirical studies involving native speakers of English, German, and Chinese, this paper reveals that the predicate “true” is inherently ambiguous in the empirical domain. Truth statements such as “It is true that Tom is at the party” seem to be ambivalent between two readings. On the first reading, the statement means “Reality is such that Tom is at the party.” On the second reading, the statement means “According to what X believes, Tom is at the party.” (...) While there appear to exist some cross-cultural differences in the interpretation of the statements, the overall findings robustly indicate that “true” has multiple meanings in the realm of empirical matters. (shrink)
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  • Mentalizing Objects.David Rose -forthcoming -Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 4.
    We have a mentalistic view of objects. This is due to the interdependence of folk psychology and folk physics, where these are interconnected by what I call Teleological Commingling. When considering events that don’t involve agents, we naturally default to tracking intentions, goal-directed processes, despite the fact that agents aren’t involved. We have a deep-seated intentionality bias which is the result of the pervasive detection of agency cues, such as order or non-randomness. And this gives rise to the Agentive Worldview: (...) we view nature as a whole as being infused with agency and purpose. Teleological Commingling and the Agentive Worldview it gives rise to are at the core of our conception of objects. I maintain that the ordinary view of material objects is rooted in an implicit, false theory. It should be given no weight in metaphysical debates about the nature of material objects. And this problematizes the central methodological assumption that metaphysical theories of material objects should be beholden to common sense. (shrink)
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  • Understanding “Why:” How Implicit Questions Shape Explanation Preferences.Sehrang Joo,Sami R. Yousif &Frank C. Keil -2022 -Cognitive Science 46 (2):e13091.
    Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.
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  • How to Test the Ship of Theseus.Marta Campdelacreu,Ramón García-Moya,Genoveva Martí &Enrico Terrone -2020 -Dialectica 74 (3).
    The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers from different countries have (...) undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story. (shrink)
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  • (1 other version)Two Ships of Theseus.Vilius Dranseika -manuscript
    Based on a large cross-cultural study, David Rose and his colleagues (2020) argue that the Ship of Theseus story is a genuine puzzle in the sense that people who consider it feel inclined to assert two prima facie inconsistent propositions (Ambivalence). In response, Marta Campdelacreu and her colleagues (2020) argue that the data reported by Rose et al. (2020) fail to support Ambivalence. Namely, the data show sharp interpersonal disagreement among different readers of the Ship of Theseus story, but they (...) fail to demonstrate an intrapersonal conflict or indecision. Should intrapersonal Ambivalence be demonstrated, this, according to Campdelacreu et al. (2020), would be a good indicator of the presence of a puzzle. Here, I provide empirical evidence for intrapersonal Ambivalence about the Ship of Theseus story. (shrink)
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  • The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer &Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) -2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
    The relatively new movement of Experimental Philosophy applies different systematic experimental methods to further illuminate classical philosophical issues. This book brings together experts from the field to give the reader a compact yet extensive overview, offering a ready at hand introduction to the state of the art.
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