The principle of fair play is widely thought to require simply that costs and benefits be distributed fairly. This gloss on the principle, while not entirely inaccurate, has invited a host of popular objections based on misunderstandings about fair play. Central to many of these objections is a failure to treat the principle of fair play as a transactional principle—one that allocates special obligations and rights among persons as a result of their interactions. I offer an interpretation of the principle (...) of fair play that emphasizes its similarities to another transactional principle: consent. This interpretation reveals that playing fair requires one to reciprocate specifically by following the rules of the cooperative scheme from which one benefits, just as consent requires one to act according to the terms of an agreement. I then draw on the comparison with consent to reply to some popular and persistent objections to the principle. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

Fair-play theories of political obligation hold that persons have a duty to obey the law based on the fact that they benefit from the law and have a duty of reciprocity to comply in return. These accounts are vulnerable to the open-ended reciprocity challenge, according to which persons have discretion over how they discharge debts of reciprocity, such that they may discharge the debts they incur from being members of society in ways other than compliance with the law. I defend (...) fair-play theories against this challenge by arguing that the principle of reciprocity shares a ground with the principle of public equality, and that the latter ultimately requires that legal institutions be arranged in such a way that persons may not exercise discretion over how they discharge the debts of reciprocity that they incur from others’ compliance with the law. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

English today seems to be emerging as a global lingua franca. And a global lingua franca would be a global public good. Characteristically, being non-excludable, public goods are susceptible to free-riding: absent targeted distributive policies, some individuals can accrue a good’s benefits without having contributed to the costs of its production. In this paper, I make two arguments. First, I argue, against Philippe Van Parijs, that Anglophones are not unfairly free-riding on the efforts of non-Anglophones of producing English as a (...) global lingua franca. I defend the view that instances of what counts as unfair free-riding should be limited to free-riding on public goods that are co-operatively produced. Second, I suggest an alternative claim that is available for Van Parijs to make. Van Parijs believes a global lingua franca is required by global justice. This is a highly controversial claim. But if he is right, then Anglophones' free-riding on the global lingua franca while not an instance of unfair free-riding, may be objectionable nonetheless. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation