Movatterモバイル変換

[0]ホーム
URL:

PhilPapersPhilPeoplePhilArchivePhilEventsPhilJobs
Switch to: References

Citations of:

Structural realism and abductive-transcendental arguments

In P. Kerszberg, J. Petitot & M. Bitbol,Constituting Objectivity. Transcendental Perspectives on Modern Physics. Hal Ccsd (2009)

Add citations

You mustlogin to add citations.
  1. Is structural underdetermination possible?Holger Lyre -2011 -Synthese 180 (2):235 - 247.
    Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.
    Direct download(8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Humean perspectives on structural realism.Holger Lyre -2010 - In Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Marcel Weber, Dennis Dieks & Friedrich Stadler,The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 381--397.
    The paper is a kind of opinionated review paper on current issues in the debate about Structural Realism, roughly the view that we should be committed in the structural rather than object-like content of our best current scientific theories. The major thesis in the first part of the paper is that Structural Realism has to take structurally derived intrinsic properties into account, while in the second part key elements of aligning Structural Realism with a Humean framework are outlined.
    Direct download(4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • (1 other version)The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability.Holger Lyre -2009 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb,Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 79.
    Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR (...) cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction. (shrink)
    Direct download(7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
    • Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct

    CDPPhiosophy Documentation Center
    PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
    This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

    Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
    All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation

    Server: philpapers-web-54b44b69b7-g6h22 uwo
    [8]ページ先頭
    ©2009-2025 Movatter.jp