This paper challenges the conventional view that pre-Qin Confucianism represents kingly virtue politics that lacks institutional duty. By interpreting Xunzi’s notion of yi 義, particularly gong-yi 公義, as a form of public obligation, I show that Xunzi exposes yi to state institutions to oblige people to serve public ends. While institutional duty is often associated with post-Enlightenment political philosophy, this paper argues that Xunzi’s philosophy offers a comparable framework of public–private exchange. Xunzi’s gong-yi may be a public-servicing sense of duty (...) that combines moral and civic dimensions, compelling individuals to cooperate for the collective good. Unlike social contract theories that trade private rights with public duties, Xunzi’s system relies on moral compulsion and normative reciprocity. This system posits a sensible exchange between individual duties from inner compulsion for the public good. By contrasting gong 公 (the public) with si 私 (the private), Xunzi envisions the public as an entity that is serviced through public duties and a place for human flourishing. Positioning the role of gong-yi in Xunzi’s broader institutional project crystalizes this nascent concept of a “public” and its relationships with civic duties. (shrink)

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Familism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism form three concentric circles in a person's life. Each of these respective human communities constitutes an independent good for the good life. The value of family life does not depend on the value of country, and the world. Nor does the value of patriotic life or cosmopolitan life depend on that of family life. Shifting allegiances between these circles entails reallocating loyalty and dedication, and thus both enriches one's life and incurs a cost to it. In (...) the view that I construct here, a philosophy of the good life articulates its own vision of the ideal allocation of loyalty and dedication among these three or more spheres. While cosmopolitanism has its own value and good, it also comes with a cost; proponents of cosmopolitanism-including Confucian cosmopolitansoften overlook such a cost. I argue for a "dynamic harmony" approach to cosmopolitanism that takes into account the cost it incurs on people's local commitments. (shrink)

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This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...) view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough. (shrink)

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This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...) view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough. (shrink)

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