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With the goal of explaining the maldistribution of evil in the world, Asha Lancaster-Thomas has recently (2023) expounded upon the idea of a fluctuating maximal God (FMG) that she and others developed (Jeffrey et al. (2020)) from the idea of a maximal God originally proposed by Yujin Nagasawa ( 2017 ). Lancaster-Thomas uses this model to answer what I and my co-author, Daniel Linford, have called the problem of geography (Linford and Patterson (2015)). The problem of geography points to the (...) geographically unequal distribution of suffering in the world and argues that this aggravates the original problem of evil (POE) and undermines the primary theodicies offered as solutions to it. I subsequently (2021) added to this problem by pointing out that evil is also maldistributed across race, gender and time. This larger problem may be referred to as the problem of the distribution of evil (PODE). Lancaster-Thomas argues that the FMG, especially under her modified version, is not susceptible to the problem of geography or to temporal inequalities of well-being. In this article I will demonstrate how the FMG, even on Lancaster-Thomas? updated model, fails to undermine either the problem of geography or the more broadly conceived PODE. (shrink) | |
The problem of error is an old argument for atheism that can be found in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Although it is not widely discussed in the contemporary literature in the Philosophy of Religion, I resurrect it and give it a modern spin. By relying on empirical studies in moral psychology that demonstrate that moral judgments from human beings are generally susceptible to certain psychological biases, such as framing and order effects, I claim that if God is responsible for (...) making human beings such that we have these biases, this means that God is not a perfect being. The findings in empirical moral psychology create a problem for the existence of God, traditionally conceived. (shrink) |