- Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition.Matt Jones &Bradley C. Love -2011 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):169-188.details
The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology – namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology – that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through (...) these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements. (shrink)
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Multiply-constrained semantic search in the Remote Associates Test.Kevin A. Smith,David E. Huber &Edward Vul -2013 -Cognition 128 (1):64-75.details | |
Persistence and accommodation in short‐term priming and other perceptual paradigms: temporal segregation through synaptic depression.David E. Huber &Randall C. O'Reilly -2003 -Cognitive Science 27 (3):403-430.details | |
A dynamic approach to recognition memory.Gregory E. Cox &Richard M. Shiffrin -2017 -Psychological Review 124 (6):795-860.details | |
Modeling memory and perception.Richard M. Shiffrin -2003 -Cognitive Science 27 (3):341-378.detailsI present a framework for modeling memory, retrieval, perception, and their interactions. Recent versions of the models were inspired by Bayesian induction: We chose models that make optimal decisions conditioned on a memory/perceptual system with inherently noisy storage and retrieval. The resultant models are, fortunately, largely consistent with my models dating back to the 1960s, and are therefore natural successors. My recent articles have presented simplified models in order to focus on particular applications. This article takes a larger perspective and (...) places the individual models in a more global framework. I will discuss (1) the storage of episodic traces, the accumulation of these into knowledge (e.g., lexical/semantic traces in the case of words), and the changes in knowledge caused by learning; (2) the retrieval of information from episodic memory and from general knowledge; (3) decisions concerning storage, retrieval, and responding. Examples of applications include episodic recognition and cued and free recall, perceptual identification (naming, yes–no and forced‐choice), lexical decision, and long‐term and short‐term priming. (shrink) No categories | |
Mere exposure in reverse: Mood and motion modulate memory bias.Mark Rotteveel &R. Hans Phaf -2007 -Cognition and Emotion 21 (6):1323-1346.detailsMere exposure, generally, entails influences of familiarity manipulations on affective dependent variables. Previously (Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005), we have argued that familiarity corresponds intrinsically to positive affect, and have extended the correspondence to novelty and negative affect. Here, we present two experiments that show reverse effects of affective manipulations on perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1 affectively valenced exteroceptive cues of approach and avoidance (e.g., apparent movement) modulated recognition bias of neutral targets. This finding suggests that our correspondence hypotheses can be (...) generalised to an important aspect of emotion, namely approach and avoidance tendencies. In Experiment 2 participants? emotional mood was manipulated within the Jacoby?Whitehouse paradigm and a pattern of results was obtained as if consciousness was manipulated. We interpret the latter results within the affective modulation framework (AMF), which postulates facilitation of nonconscious processing by positive affect and an enhancement of conscious processing by negative affect. (shrink) | |
Refractoriness and the healthy brain: A behavioural study on semantic access.Fabio Campanella &Tim Shallice -2011 -Cognition 118 (3):417-431.details | |
Unconscious cognition isn’t that smart: Modulation of masked repetition priming effect in the word naming task.Sachiko Kinoshita,Kenneth I. Forster &Michael C. Mozer -2008 -Cognition 107 (2):623-649.details | |
Deconfounding hypothesis generation and evaluation in Bayesian models.Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz &Thomas L. Griffiths -2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone,Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.details | |
A multinomial model for short-term priming in word identification.Roger Ratcliff &Gail McKoon -2001 -Psychological Review 108 (4):835-846.details | |
Encoding higher-order structure in visual working memory: A probabilistic model.Timothy F. Brady &Joshua B. Tenenbaum -2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone,Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 411--416.details | |
The impact of open and closed mindsets on evaluative priming.Theodore Alexopoulos,Klaus Fiedler &Peter Freytag -2012 -Cognition and Emotion 26 (6):978-994.details | |
Invisible is Better: Decrease of Subliminal Priming With Increasing Visibility.Doris Eckstein,Dennis Norris,Matthew Davis &Richard Henson -2009 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (2).detailsComparisons of indirect measures with direct measures can help elucidate the relationship between nonconscious and conscious perception. We report three experiments on masked word priming in which we observed a negative correlation between prime discriminability and priming , i.e. where priming decreased with increasing prime visibility. While such observations are rare , they may indicate a conflict between conscious and nonconscious processing when primes are shown close to the subjective visibility threshold for the priming-relevant information. For instance, such a conflict (...) could occur between nonconscious processing of a prime’s meaning and conscious perception of prime letters. Theoretical accounts that discuss similar conflicts assume that the conflict is resolved either by automatically prioritising conscious processes or by discounting the estimated confusion caused by a prime-target pair . In both cases, priming is predicted to decrease when prime visibility increases from below threshold to perithreshold levels. Therefore, we suggest that negative priming-d’ relationships are most likely observed when the d’ measure assesses prime visibility at a level of representation that is below the level of representation at which priming arises, in terms of a putative hierarchy of word processing. (shrink) | |