Our study examines whether gender-diverse engagement partners constrain unethical earnings management behavior in a French mandatory joint audit setting. The investigation of the joint audit setting, by raising concerns about audit team organization and management, provides new insights into how gender-diverse audit partners contribute to the effectiveness of audit decision-making, resulting in reduced earnings management. The need for effective collaboration and communication between joint auditors may foster a transformational leadership style on the part of audit engagement partners. In this regard, (...) we argue that better interaction between male and female lead audit partners confers a comparative advantage on gender-diverse audit partners compared to all-male audit partners. In line with our expectation, our empirical results show that gender-diverse audit partners are negatively associated with discretionary accruals of client firms. Gender-diverse audit partners are also found to constrain earnings management irrespective of whether clients hire one or two brand-name audit firms. Finally, we find that the pervasiveness of earnings management declines when client firms switch from all-male audit partners to gender-diverse audit partners. Our findings underline the importance of considering audit partner gender by policy makers in contexts where joint audits are required or in countries that are considering introducing joint audits. (shrink)

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This paper investigates the moderating role of industry regulation on the effectiveness of audit committees in restricting earnings management. Using comprehensive panel data of S&P 1500 firms between 2003 and 2007, we find that the proportion of CEO directors on an audit committee is positively associated with earnings management in unregulated industries, while this association is significantly weaker in regulated industries. Further, the proportion of financial experts on an audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management. Our results also indicate (...) that the average board tenure of audit committee members is negatively related to earnings management in regulated industries, but positively affects earnings management in unregulated industries. Finally, audit committee members’ average directorship increases earnings management in regulated industries, but reduces earnings management in unregulated industries. Overall, our results suggest that the effectiveness of audit committees in reducing earnings management and improving financial reporting quality is influenced by industry regulation. (shrink)

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This study investigates the influence of old directors on corporate social responsibility (CSR) using roughly 25,000 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2015 in the United States. We employ the widely used selection, optimization, and compensation (SOC) model from psychology to explain the CSR decisions of old directors. Our results indicate that firms with a higher percentage of old directors tend to have lower engagement in CSR activities. To address endogeneity, we adopt the difference-in-differences method and use the event of sudden (...) deaths and unexpected retirements of old directors and find that our results remain robust. Our analysis also reveals that the negative impact of old directors on CSR is more significant in firms where directors receive fewer reputational spillover benefits from CSR initiatives and/or firms exhibiting poor corporate governance. In addition, this adverse impact of old directors comes from two effects: a reduction in efforts to enhance CSR strengths and an increase in inaction to address CSR concerns. Overall, these findings suggest that the CSR decision-making process of old directors involves assessing the costs and benefits of CSR engagements, consistent with our hypothesis derived from the SOC model. (shrink)

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Corporate scandals brought the issue of corporate governance to the forefront of the agendas of lawmakers and regulators in the early 2000s. As a result, Congress, the New York Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ enacted standards to improve the quality of corporate governance, thereby enhancing the quantity and quality of disclosures by listed companies. We investigate the relationship between corporate governance strength and the quality of disclosures in pre- and post-regulation time periods. If cross-sectional differences in corporate governance policies affect (...) the quality of financial disclosures, the quality of information available to analysts varies with such policies. Specifically, higher quality disclosures, produced as a result of strong corporate governance, should lead to more accurate and less dispersed analysts’ forecasts. Our analysis suggests that voluntary implementation of stronger corporate governance enhanced the quality of disclosures in the pre-regulation period; however, exceeding current corporate governance standards does not appear to result in higher quality disclosures post-regulation. These results suggest that SOX and the stronger regulations enacted by U.S. exchanges were effective in reducing variation in the quality of financial information available to investors. (shrink)

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