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The A Simili Argument draws the conclusion that a target case has a normative property Q since it shares a relevant property P with a source case. It can be seen as a complex inference constituted by three inferential steps: An abduction of the relevant property P , an induction of the class having that property, and a deduction of the target's having property Q . A major problem of this argument is the characterization of the property relevance. The standard (...) answer refers to the notion of ratio: It is the ratio that fixes what is relevant for what. But the determination of the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. This issue is considered here from an inferentialist point of view, claiming that the ratio and relevance are determined by the normative statuses reciprocally attributed by the speakers in the context of legal argumentation. (shrink) | |
Hart dedicó poca atención a la regla de adjudicación –lo mismo hizo la literatura especializada. El propósito de este escrito consiste en intentar ir más allá de las escasas indicaciones brindadas por Hart sobre el tema de la regla de adjudicación y detallar la función que desempeña en el seno de su concepción del derecho. El método elegido es esencialmente reconstructivo: no se trata de tomar inspiración en Hart para elaborar una noción propia de regla de adjudicación, sino de poner (...) de relieve las potencialidades –aunque también los límites– de este tipo de regla secundaria. Para ello, en primer lugar se profundizan las conexiones entre la regla de adjudicación, por un lado, y la coacción y la interpretación jurídica, por el otro: el objetivo consiste en dibujar la posición teórica de los jueces, que se desprende, en particular, de la investigación de sus tareas en relación con los casos dudosos y los casos claros. A continuación, tal postura teórica se somete a crítica; prestando atención, en particular, al problema de la definitividad e infalibilidad de las sentencias, se demuestra cómo Hart consideró la aplicación del derecho de forma demasiado declarativa. (shrink) No categories | |
The present paper aims at addressing a crucial legal conflict in the information society: i.e., the conflict between security and civil rights, which calls for a “fine and ethical balance”. Our purpose is to understand, from the legal theory viewpoint, how a fine ethical balance can be conceived and what the conditions for this balance to be possible are. This requires us to enter in a four-stage examination, by asking: (1) What types of conflict may be dealt with by means (...) of balancing? (2) What is meant by balancing? Is it a metaphor that hides and dissimulates discretionary powers and subjective decisions or a rational instrument that helps us cope with conflicts between fundamental values and interests? (3) What models of balancing are available to us? Are these models irreducible to each other? What can provide us with a common understanding of different models of balancing? (4) How can the crucial issues of rational controllability, predictability, and homogeneity of legal decisions be dealt with? Our paper will try to answer those questions by trying to reconstruct the act of balancing in terms of a rational legal reasoning, which relies upon information. In fact, every judicial decision contains some information that is delivered to the legal system: that information may serve as the basis for future evaluations, decisions, and actions, and thus influence the way we recognize and hence we protect our values, interests, and rights. In this perspective, our examination will attempt to understand those questions in informational terms. This informational treatment can provide us with a more universalistic understanding of those issues and offer us a novel way to conceptually deal with them. To this aim, we will avail yourself of Luciano Floridi’s philosophy of information: notably, we believe his constructionist conception of epistemology is crucial, based on the Maker’s Knowledge approach and his solution of the upgrading problem (i.e., from information to knowledge) in terms of a network theory of account. The informational approach will help us having a better understanding of the balance between competing interests. (shrink) |
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